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ABSTRACT 
The methods used to plan adaptation to climate change have been heavily influenced 
by scientific narratives of gradual change and economic narratives of marginal 
adjustments to that change. An investigation of the theoretical aspects of how the 
climate changes suggests that scientific narratives of climate change are socially 
constructed, biasing scientific narratives to descriptions of gradual as opposed rapid, 
non-linear change. Evidence of widespread step changes in recent climate records and 
in model projections of future climate is being overlooked because of this. Step-wise 
climate change has the potential to produce rapid increases in extreme events that can 
cross institutional, geographical and sectoral domains.  
 
Likewise, orthodox economics is not well suited to the deep uncertainty faced under 
climate change, requiring a multi-faceted approach to adaptation. The presence of 
tangible and intangible values range across five adaptation clusters: goods; services; 
capital assets and infrastructure; social assets and infrastructure; and natural assets 
and infrastructure. Standard economic methods have difficulty in giving adequate 
weight to the different types of values across these clusters. They also do not account 
well for the inter-connectedness of impacts and subsequent responses between agents 
in the economy. As a result, many highly-valued aspects of human and environmental 
capital are being overlooked. 
 
Recent extreme events are already pressuring areas of public policy, and national 
strategies for emergency response and disaster risk reduction are being developed as 
a consequence. However, the potential for an escalation of total damage costs due to 
rapid change requires a coordinated approach at the institutional level, involving all 
levels of government, the private sector and civil society.  
 
One of the largest risks of maladaptation is the potential for un-owned risks, as risks 
propagate across domains and responsibility for their management is poorly allocated 
between public and private interests, and between the roles of the individual and civil 
society. Economic strategies developed by the disaster community for disaster 
response and risk reduction provide a base to work from, but many gaps remain. 
 
We have developed a framework for valuing adaptation that has the following aspects: 
the valuation of impacts thus estimating values at risk, the evaluation of different 
adaptation options and strategies based on cost, and the valuation of benefits 
expressed as a combination of the benefits of avoided damages and a range of 
institutional values such as equity, justice, sustainability and profit.  
 
The choice of economic methods and tools used to assess adaptation depends largely 
on the ability to constrain uncertainty around problems (predictive uncertainty) and 
solutions (outcome uncertainty). Orthodox methods can be used where both are 
constrained, portfolio methodologies where problems are constrained and robust 
methodologies where solutions are constrained. Where both are unconstrained, 
process-based methods utilising innovation methods and adaptive management are 
most suitable. All methods should involve stakeholders where possible. 
 
Innovative processes methods that enable transformation will be required in some 
circumstances, to allow institutions, sectors and communities to prepare for anticipated 
major change.  
2 Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Recent climate extremes experienced in Australia have been more severe and 
produced more severe impacts than suggested by conventional climate scenarios and 
impact models. Analysis of recent Australian climate change shows that Australia has 
warmed in two episodes: 1968–73 and 1994–97 with little change in between. Rainfall 
decreased rapidly by 85mm or 12% in SW WA in 1968 and increased rapidly by 22% in 
northern Australia in 1973. All these changes occurred as statistically-significant step 
changes. Similar rapid climate changes are widespread, occurring in all regions of the 
world and in a number of climate variables. They also occur in climate model 
simulations of temperature and rainfall for Australia. 
 
If these changes are so widespread, why have they not been incorporated into the 
analysis and communication of climate science for impact and adaptation studies?  
 
The climate science literature openly discusses the possibility that climate change is 
non-linear, but this has not made its way into practise. The answer is in science 
narratives, which are the main means by which sense is made from scientific findings 
and communicated between scientists and the community. These narratives influence 
the framing and development of approaches to adaptation practice and policy.  
 
The strongest narrative currently accompanying adaptation is that of gradualism. 
Current statistical approaches manage climate uncertainty by smoothing over climate 
variability, biasing the theoretical understanding of how climate changes. Climate 
change is overwhelmingly described as a gradual change in variables such as mean 
temperature and rainfall. If adaptation is thought of as an adjustment to those changes, 
then the practice of adaptation too, becomes gradual.  
 
This narrative is related to similar narratives of gradual change in classical economics. 
Existing economic models aim to optimise outcomes by making the world simpler than 
it is, and by smoothing over variations.  
 
Richer approaches in both climate and in economics are needed to develop adequate 
valuation methods and adaptation policies to rapid climate change. Disaster 
economics, which researches the negative aspects of maladaptation and the positive 
aspects of transformation, is the source of some of these approaches. 
 
Using two case studies of direct climate model output, we show that for heat stress and 
fire, the results produce rapid changes in impacts during the late 20th and 21st centuries 
that are much more economically damaging than smoothed data from the same 
models. 
 
The broad physical and social economy is divided into five adaptation clusters: goods, 
services, capital assets and infrastructure, social assets and infrastructure and natural 
assets and infrastructure. The first three are well represented in the monetary economy 
(as tangle values) and the latter two, not so well (as intangible values). These clusters 
produce very different patterns of risk under climate change. 
 
“Value is not a logical process because value is not the just about cost, it is also about 
what we as individuals and communities hold as precious to us.” 
 
The greatest risk with rapid climate change is with changing extreme events such as 
heat stress, fires, floods and storm events. Rapid climate change can changes these 
extremes rapidly, and has already done so for heat and fire risk in SE Australia. 
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Such changes can escalate and combine in a variety of ways, propagating risks across 
institutional, spatial and sectoral domains. For example, a series of extreme events 
may propagate economic risks from state to federal level, and from the private to the 
public sector if properties are under-insured. Production systems may be interrupted 
and transport disrupted. Social capital, if eroded may transfer from self-reliance to 
government relief and natural capital may degrade.  
 
Some of these risks may be owned by institutional entities but others may be un-owned 
where no institutional body will take responsibility for ensuring that value is maintained. 
Currently, there no clear understanding as to where institutional thresholds are or what 
the likely consequences are if these thresholds are crossed. Institutional frameworks 
and structures are, for the most part, inflexible and siloed. Consideration as to how to 
undertake transformation of these structures and processes is needed if rapid change if 
the risks posed by rapid change are to be effectively managed. 
 
The current focus on expenditure on disaster response may actually counterproductive 
to reducing risk at both a financial and institutional level. Present disaster response is 
outweighing investment in resilience programs. Planned adaptation is needed to 
recover this imbalance. 
 
The project describes an economic framework for assessing values at risk, the cost of 
adaptation and the social and economic from implementing adaptation. This framework 
is polycentric, in that it can accommodate a wide range of methods and tools rather 
than concentrating on cost benefit analysis and its various modifications. 
 
The values and costs associated with the impacts also need to be assessed fully over 
differing time frames (short, medium, long-term). This will require blending of 
frameworks and methodologies from areas of economics addressing disasters, and 
environmental and social values. The current framing of discount rates provides no 
clear direction as to what rates are appropriate for different circumstances, especially 
over long time frames. 
 
To meet these challenges we need a new generation of adaptation policies, on a larger 
scale than currently envisaged and with different intellectual foundations. These 
policies must address the likelihood of abrupt climate change and pervasive economic 
and social impacts, even though the nature, timing and location of those impacts 
remain uncertain. They must be cooperative and polycentric, and involve the various 
forms of the public and private sectors at both the national, state and local levels. They 
will require attention to diverse risks and the values they threaten, to the extension of 
many risks across domains, to the key role of innovation in creating adequate 
responses and require ongoing adaptive management strategies in cases in which 
there is deep uncertainty about both the problem and its solution.  
 
Key aspects needed are: 
 The guided transformation of current institutional structures and systems. In 
particular the development of collaborative frameworks that enable decision 
making within and across a number of institutions and frameworks to assist 
with decision making under uncertainty. 
 The development of fit for task economic frameworks, capable of integrating 
and assessing a diversity of costs and values across different time scales. In 
particular ‘intangible’ costs need to be included more fully in these 
assessments. The disparity between different discount rates used in different 
institutional settings needs to be addressed. 
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 The integration into adaptation practice and policy of frameworks and methods 
that are iterative and reflexive, such as innovation and assurance processes. 
These are already in use and have established mechanisms that allow for: 
decision-making with uncertain outcomes, the introduction of new ideas and 
technologies, social interactions, knowledge development and collaboration 
across a broad range of stakeholders. 
 Further research to better understand the full ramifications of rapid change and 
how it will impact current systems and institutions and assess where possible 
thresholds might be and where they cross institutional domains. In particular 
the development of models that include different types of extreme events in a 
number of contexts and sequences. 
 Development of capacity through appropriate resourcing, the development of 
knowledge and communication that is ‘fit for purpose’ for end users and 
governance to support this. 
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1. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this study is to develop an economic methodology at the institutional 
scale to support decision-making on adaptation actions and investments ranging from 
adjustment to transformation, given the likelihood of rapid changes in regional climate 
leading to rapid changes in extremes and accompanying risk of disaster. The 
methodology explicitly identifies and responds to the limitations in current approaches 
extending from climate science through to the implementation of adaptation.  It draws 
widely from different disciplines and accounts for rapidly changing climatic and socio-
economic factors. 
 
The original aims of the study (slightly reworded for clarity) were to: 
 Understand the appropriate mix between public and private adaptation and risk 
sharing; 
 Understand the impacts of changing climate extremes on the economics of 
valuing adaptations;  
 Identify critical points where the economics of adaptation has not yet integrated 
recent findings from climate science and offer suggested improvements; and 
 Identify valuation tools for end-users that cope with the realities of uncertain 
damage functions, ambiguous climate futures and the potential for non-marginal 
change. 
While not all of the above aims have been met, substantial progress has been made on 
all four: 
 The concept of risk ownership applied to adaptation to climate change has great 
potential to delineate responsibility between different institutional players; 
 The economic impacts of rapid changes are clear, but valuing adaptation remains 
highly context specific, although we have identified some high level principles; 
 We are recommending significant changes to how climate information is used, 
with less reliance on predicting mean regional climate change; and 
 While some emphasis has been placed on tools, we place a greater emphasis on 
decision-making processes, particularly at the institutional scale. 
These points are elaborated on in the final chapter. 
1.1 Background to the project 
The project focus is on using economic principles to support collective adaptation 
decisions at the institutional scale, how those decisions can support a range of values, 
and how they are governed.  It concentrates on developing an institutional framework 
that aims to cover actions and investments ranging from adjustment to transformation. 
It draws on a wide range of literature including the IPCC Special Report on Managing 
the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation 
(IPCC, 2012b). 
 
The framework also accounts for recent scientific evidence that human-induced climate 
change is not a gradual process independent of natural climate variability. This means 
that rapid changes in the frequency and magnitude of a range of severe weather 
events are a normal part of climate change, and should therefore be factored into the 
adaptation process. The dominant gradualist model of adaptation planning assumes 
that climate change will proceed incrementally – focusing on the magnitude of climate 
change occurring within a specific planning horizon and extrapolating smooth changes 
within that horizon (Downing et al., 1997; Smithers and Smit, 1997; Dessai and van der 
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Sluijs, 2007; Millar et al., 2007). We show that this model is a socially constructed 
statistical model that does not reflect observational evidence or scientific theory. 
 
Evidence of rapid change is contained within recently observed climate records. For 
example, south-eastern Australia has experienced almost 1°C of anthropogenic 
warming, most of which occurred in two episodes: 1968–73 and 1994–97 (Jones, 
2012). Certain extreme events, such as extreme heat and fire danger, have also 
changed faster than mean temperature changes in some regions. Climate model 
output, if analysed appropriately, shows similar non-linearity (Jones, 2012). Extreme 
events are very difficult to predict with any skill (IPCC, 2012b), but like earthquakes, 
can be anticipated in many cases. Therefore, lack of predictability should not preclude 
planning for rapid climate change if it is being measured in both observations and 
climate model data. 
 
With a few exceptions (Adger, 2000; Naess et al., 2005), adaptation at the institutional 
scale has also been largely overlooked in the literature and is difficult to assess. To 
date, the economics of adaptation has largely concentrated on the individual adaptation 
actions needed to manage anticipated climate change (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala, 
2006; Hallegatte et al., 2011). To a lesser extent they have also dealt with increasing 
adaptive capacity (Adger et al., 2007). Decision-making on adaptation involves not just 
decisions on how to adapt, but the broad institutional context within which such 
decisions are made and how they are implemented and managed over their 
operational lifespan.  
 
The main focus of this project is on the institutional and governance structures involved 
in both public and private adaptation in Australia. Institutions here are considered as 
clusters of rights, rules and decision-making procedures that give rise to social 
practices (Young et al., 2008). Governance structures considered here are those rules 
and practices designed to foster adaptation to climate change, but other governance 
structures that influence adaptation are also relevant. Some governance structures, 
such as government policy and legal frameworks are formal while others, such as 
market behaviour and community-based practices, are both formal and informal. 
 
Iterative risk management is used to address system processes, especially in how risk 
is propagated across scales and between systems. Here, an identifiable geographic or 
institutional scale is referred to as a domain, to distinguish interactions within a specific 
domain from the propagation of risk across domains. A heterodox economic 
framework1 is applied, where specific economic methods and tools are matched to their 
area of strength. This has been identified as a necessary approach to adaptation 
because of its complexity and context-specific nature (Keating and Handmer, 2011b; 
Oberlack and Neumärker, 2011). 
 
Of special interest is where risk propagates from one domain to another – as in so-
called cross-cutting effects – warranting a policy response. For example, adaptation at 
the local scale is largely a microeconomic issue where the bottom-up assessment of 
impacts aims to identify and select a set of cost-effective actions. However, at the 
national scale, where repairing the cumulative costs of these actions may require large 
injections of finance or where large uninsured losses are mounting, adaptation 
becomes a macroeconomic issue.  
 
How adaptation actions propagate across domains should be of particular interest to 
policy-makers because policies designed for single domains (e.g., the housing sector 
                                               
1
 Heterodox economic frameworks use multiple methods for setting values rather than an orthodox 
framework that uses only single method, such as welfare or utility. 
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or agriculture), may break down. Two such cases are when private risk accumulating 
from many individuals needs to be managed as a public risk after a disaster, or when 
risks shift from one economic sector to another (e.g., from production systems or 
households to finance). Opportunities for creative policy-making across domains also 
exist if specific pathways that transfer co-benefits of adaptation actions across those 
domains can be identified. This topic has not been very well addressed in the 
adaptation literature. 
 
At the institutional level, individual government bodies (departments, local 
government), industry sectors, corporations and other organisations may be able to 
manage adaptation within specific domains but would need increased capacity to do 
so. If increased adaptive capacity is warranted, cross-institutional support and the 
requisite governance arrangements to facilitate this may be required. The propagation 
of risk between domains or the creation of new risks caused by maladaptation or by a 
set of actions accruing at one scale and transferring to another will also require cross-
institutional and governance support. 
 
We have adapted two frameworks for this project. The first is a generic problem- 
solution framework for implementing adaptation (Young, 2012) that separates the 
problem phase from the solution phase of the adaptation process. It provides two 
primary framings for this: risk and innovation, and three key tasks: problem 
identification, assessment and implementation of actions.  This was developed to assist 
practitioners identify where they were in the adaptation process and the different 
options available in relation to framing, tools and processes as well as appropriate 
modes of communication that related to specific tasks. 
 
The context for identifying problems sits squarely within the analytic phase of risk, 
whereas the context for implementing solutions is associated with innovation models 
and processes. Economics in assessing values at risk and the cost of different 
strategies bridges the two phases. 
 
The second framework assesses adaptation at the institutional scale. For this task, we 
have adapted the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework of Ostrom 
(2005, 2011), institutional and governance analysis (Young et al., 2008), economic 
frameworks summarised by Hallegatte et al. (2011) and climate risk approaches 
(Jones, 2001; Jones, 2004a; Jones et al., 2007; Jones and Preston, 2011).  
 
The IAD framework has been applied as an organising methodology in two settings:  
1. to understand the current state of play; and  
1. to explore potential future strategies that range from transition to transformation. 
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2. RESEARCH ACTIVITIES AND METHODS 
2.1 Project design and methods 
The project combines new evidence of rapid change in climate, especially climate 
extremes, with economics from the disasters assessment field. These rapid changes 
have the potential to result in impacts that cross geographical, political, social and 
economic domains, causing significant harm if left unmanaged. New economic 
approaches to valuing adaptation to rapid change are developed from disaster 
economic and economic approaches for adaptation that have been developed for 
decision-making under deep uncertainty. 
 
Rapid climate changes have been assessed using statistical tools used to diagnose the 
likelihood of step-like changes in noisy time series. These have been modified to 
ensure that they are not producing false positives from time series of observed and 
modelled climate. Many different time series from observed climate data from around 
the world and simulated future temperature and rainfall data from Australia show that 
step changes are common in historical records and climate model data. Why have 
such changes been overlooked in scientific analysis of climate change and the 
resulting assessments of climate impacts? 
 
To answer this, the current statistical approaches to measuring climate change were 
assessed for their historical and social legacies. While very useful, the almost total 
reliance on such tools to analyse and communicate climate change in order to manage 
the resulting uncertainty have obscured the theoretical understanding of how the 
climate changes. This understanding is split between climate change being smooth and 
independent of climate variability, and climate change being non-linear and interacting 
with climate variability. The project results show that the latter is the most plausible 
explanation, given the widespread evidence of step-like changes in climate data. 
 
The strong legacy of these changes is traced through narrative assessment. Narratives 
are the main means by which sense is made from scientific findings and communicated 
between scientists and the community. These narratives influence the framing and 
development of approaches to adaptation. The methods and values informing these 
narratives have their origin in the scientific enlightenment. They have resulted in a 
narrative of gradual change, which informs how the climate changes. Applied to 
adaptation they form a narrative of gradual change that we have called the gradualist 
narrative. Ironically, the origins of these narratives in the enlightenment also underpin 
similar narratives of gradual change in classical economics. 
 
The likelihood of rapid changes in climate – and particularly in climate extremes – 
required that the economics of adaptation be re-assessed. In addition to investigating 
how disaster economics views aspects such as maladaptation and transformation, we 
looked at orthodox approaches to valuing adaptation and how they need to be 
modified. The limitations of current approaches to economic assessment of adaptation, 
valuing intangibles, assessing the risk of maladaptation, and the costs and benefits of 
transformative adaptation are described and addressed.  
 
The possibility of risks crossing domains at an increasing rate was investigated by 
looking at how recent climate events precipitated responses from areas of government 
not normally involved in emergency management. We adopted an approach that 
looked at these risks on the institutional scale, adapting Ostrom’s IAD framework 
Ostrom (2005, 2007a, 2011) to look at collective decisions on adaptation. Four key 
elements from Hallegatte (2011) – information, regulation and standards, institutions 
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and public investment – have been integrated into this framework. Institutions provide 
governance for knowledge, regulation and standards, and public/private investment. 
 
Finally, one of the main ways to overcome the barrier of predictive uncertainty, 
particularly in complex social-ecological systems, is to adopt innovation processes for 
decision-making. These help manage the knowledge and communication aspects of 
adaptation and but also assist in the implementation of adaptation –one of the missing 
links in current methods. Innovation methods inform two of the processes commonly 
used to manage climate-related uncertainty: iterative risk management and adaptive 
management. 
 
A workshop (originally planned for March 2012) that aimed to develop the main 
concepts was replaced by a workshop held in November 2012 that applied the 
proposed institutional framework developed by the project team. 
 
A decision-making framework has, for application of economic methods, been 
developed that separates the decision-making process into a problem-solution 
construct. Economic methods move from valuing the problem to costing alternative 
solutions and assessing their benefits. The IAD framework is used as an organising 
framework and the problem-solution economic framework as a decision-making 
framework. 
 
The approach used by the project is, in many ways, complementary to existing 
approaches, but contains some significant differences: 
 the incorporation of rapid climate change and its impacts on economic 
assessments; 
 applying salient climate information to decision-making by asking whether it 
poses a credible risk that needs to be managed, rather than filtering such 
information according to whether it is ‘predictable’; 
 specifically addressing rapid changes in climate extremes and their economic 
impacts instead of assuming gradual change in both the mean and extremes; 
 addressing the collective needs of adaptation across institutions at the regional to 
national scale rather than focusing on a specific event type, sector or region; and 
 concentrating on the adaptation deficit of both present and future climate without 
trying to separate climate into components of change and variability. 
2.2 Report structure 
This section deals with project design and methods, presenting two frameworks: a 
problem-solution-implementation framework that combines risk and innovation in 
Section 2.3, and the IAD framework in Section 2.4. Methods of climate change analysis 
– describing methods for analysing gradual and rapid change – are described in 
Section 2.5. 
 
Section 3 then describes the results of the study laid out according to a problem-
solution-implementation approach. Section 3.1 is about understanding the rapid climate 
change. Recent events caused by climate extremes and the resulting impacts are 
shown (Section 3.1.1), along with recent rapid climate change in Australia. The 
anatomy of rapid change, along with descriptions of coping ability and thresholds is 
described in Section 3.1.3. 
 
Section 3.2 covers the current gradualist approaches to assessing climate change, 
impacts and adaptation. Scientific and adaptation narratives are introduced and 
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described, followed by impact and adaptation assessment, orthodox economic 
approaches and current adaptation policy. 
 
Section 3.3 covers the understanding of the economic response to rapid change. Two 
case studies on heat extremes and fire show how rapid changes can drive up the costs 
of impacts (Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). These case studies contrast the costs modelled 
under gradual change and then use climate model data containing rapid changes to 
show how significant economic shocks can occur as part of ordinary climate change. 
How these risks cross domains in the way that disasters affect us now is described in 
Section 3.3.3. Different values associated with impacts are described in five adaptation 
clusters: goods; services; capital assets and infrastructure; social assets and 
infrastructure; and natural assets and infrastructure. Each cluster covers one or more 
sectors of the economy (Section 3.3.4), and also contains values not measured as part 
of the conventional economy. Clusters were chosen by how the economic costs of 
impacts and adaptation are represented, how the monetary and non-monetary aspects 
of value are viewed, and their institutional setting. These clusters are supported by 
adaptive capacity that has both public and private components.  
 
A national synthesis describes how these risks may manifest at the national scale and 
details current research needs prompted by question raised during the project (Section 
3.3.5). Finally, in this section, we describe a range of economic methods and tools that 
are used for valuing adaptation (Section 3.3.6). The major filters for managing risks 
through adaptation at the institutional level are: who values the risk and who owns the risk 
(the latter can be separated into who is responsible for the risk); who pays for the risk if it 
occurs; and who pays for managing the risk. Ownership may be invested in a single 
entity but often extends across institutions and domains. Valuation methods need to be 
appropriate within specific institutional contexts. 
 
Section 3.4 describes the evaluation of solutions. Section 3.4.1 outlines the framework 
for economic approaches to the valuation of risks associated with changing impacts, 
the costing of adaptation options and valuing the benefits those options provide. The 
workshop results where the problem-solution framework was applied to scenarios of 
rapid change and assessed for how the resulting risks crossed domains, surveyed the 
values at risk and proposed a number of solutions for selected problems, are reported 
on (Section 3.4.2). The tools and methods used in the evaluation process are briefly 
described with their strengths and weaknesses in Section 3.4.3. 
 
A key part of adaptive capacity is understanding and managing the process of 
knowledge development and communication. The construction of formal and informal 
narratives is an important aspect of communication. The role of innovation in 
implementing planned adaptation – where solutions are part of common practice – is 
crucial (Section 3.4.4). Transformation is a special case, requiring significant resources 
and the use of innovation processes (Section 3.4.5). Maladaptation can occur if 
inappropriate assumptions are applied, or if adaptations are considered at one scale 
but manifest negatively at another scale. Institutional-scale assessment is important to 
void such outcomes (Section 3.4.6). 
 
Capacity and governance are closely linked and are both important elements of 
institutions. Rapid climate change requires significant additional capacity over and 
above that being assumed to adapt to gradual climate change (Section 3.4.7). To 
develop these capacities, existing policies will require revisiting and new policy 
initiatives may need to be considered (Section 3.4.8). 
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Implementation covering policy assessment, scenarios and application of economic 
tools is covered in Section 3.5. Gaps and future research options are briefly outlined in 
Section 5. 
2.3 Economic framework for adaptation  
The economic framework for valuing adaptation is a generic problem-solution 
framework for implementing adaptation using risk and innovation framing (see 
Appendix B) that separates the problem phase of climate change and its impacts from 
the solution phase of the adaptation process. This framework is also cognitive and 
resonates strongly with the decision-making and risk literature. Behavioural economics 
shows that people frame problems and solutions in very different ways ((Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 2000; 
Kahneman, 2003, 2011), so that problem thinking is very different to solution thinking. 
Not managing the transition between the two sufficiently leads to risk amplification 
(Kasperson, 1992; Burns et al., 1993; Pidgeon et al., 2003; Rosa, 2003; Renn, 2011), 
or the risk trap (Beck, 2000) – where the risk of uncertain solutions competes with the 
risks of uncertain problems, often leading to decision paralysis (Jones, 2011). 
 
The transition between problem and solution is managed using economics. Risks are 
valued at the problem stage, different options are then proposed and costed, and the 
benefits of implementation valued. This part of the risk process, often referred to as the 
risk management component, is given over to innovation models and processes. 
Innovation is the key tool for decision-making under ‘deep uncertainty’ – where both 
problems and solutions cannot be predicted with any great confidence, and ongoing 
learning and knowledge development are part of implementation. In this context, it is 
largely synonymous with iterative risk management or adaptive management. 
 
Figure 1 shows that both the problem and potential solution inform the economic 
analysis, where understanding how adaptation will be applied becomes just as 
important as understanding the climate risks that necessitate that adaptation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Economics and adaptation decision-making framework with a problem-
solution focus (Adapted from Young, 2012, Appendix B). 
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2.4 Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
Ostrom’s (2005, 2011) IAD framework is described in Figure 2. It has external 
influences that influence the problem or situation and internally has interactions and 
outcomes that are affected by evaluation criteria. The model is economic and can 
accommodate different economic theories as needed. The external influences are 
climate change. The action situation and interactions describe the valuation of 
adaptation to rapid change. 
 
Ostrom (2011) uses framework, theory and models as a hierarchical foundation for 
institutional analysis. The framework and theory are used to construct the IAD process 
and the models are used to assess the interactions and outcomes within the 
framework. Her use of the framework-theory hierarchy is to describe the application of 
economic theory to an institutional framework.  
 
 
Figure 2. A framework for institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2005, 2011). 
Here, we apply a hierarchical foundation of framework, methodology and methods and 
tools. The framework level applies paradigms that include theory, methods and values. 
This, more or less, expresses the platform from which one views the world (e.g., 
Hacking, 1993) and everything that follows from this – methodologies, methods and 
tools – depend on this platform. 
 
The framework organises the elements and general relationships for institutional 
analysis that can then be pursued with diagnostic and prescriptive enquiry. For this 
project, the overall framework concerns adaptation to climate change –adaptation to 
rapid changes in climate extremes in particular. The framework needs to encompass all 
the information available to actors, the flow of activities and who receives what costs 
and who pays. In Table 1, the framework, methodologies and methods and tools 
hierarchies covering the IAD, science, economics and institutions are outlined. 
 
Questions that need to be addressed are:  
 How are specific impacts valued and by whom?  
 How can we cost them in order to fully assess the value of adaptation to rapid 
climate change? 
 How can different methods of valuation support decision-making and future 
investments for adaptation? 
 
The framework is strongly influenced by the external variables listed in Figure 2; the 
biophysical system, community attributes and rules in use. These external variables 
are surveyed to determine the scope of what the framework needs to contain. The 
biophysical conditions describe the state of the climate and rate of climate change that 
Biophysical
conditions
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Action situation Interactions
Evaluation 
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Outcomes
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result in rapidly changing impacts and risks. The attributes of the community include 
the actors involved and their institutional context. The rules in use are shared 
understandings amongst the actors that refer to what actions or states are permitted, 
required or prohibited, and these may be explicit or implicit (Ostrom, 2011).  
 
The IAD framework is used to organise our understanding of the risks of rapid change 
at the institutional level and the problem-solution framework is used as a decision-
making framework. The next level down is theory, addressed by selecting the most 
appropriate parts of the framework needed to understand and explain process, and to 
predict potential outcomes.  
 
Table 1. Framework, methodologies and methods and tools hierarchies used in 
this project. 
 General IAD  Science Economics Institution 
Framework  
 
The platform of 
understanding 
surrounding the 
generation and 
use of knowledge 
and application of 
values 
 
The general 
approach taking 
in the external 
inputs, nature of 
the problem, 
action situation 
and outcomes 
Paradigm: a 
collection of 
theory, methods 
and values used 
to describe a 
disciplinary 
approach  
The philosophical 
underpinnings of 
ways to assess 
values and 
allocate resources 
in the future 
The ‘mission 
statement’ and 
major aspirations 
of an institution 
Methodologies  The ways in which 
that knowledge is 
used to exercise 
those values 
The ways in which 
problems are 
described and 
solutions found to 
evaluate different 
courses of action 
 
The ways in 
which those 
approaches are 
applied to 
understand 
phenomena,  
problems and 
solutions 
The ways in which 
the benefits of a 
given course of 
action is valued 
The narratives 
and rules by 
which an 
institution carries 
out its mission 
Methods and 
Tools  
 
The means by 
which that 
knowledge 
applied 
The individual 
tools used to 
apply those 
methodologies 
The individual 
tools used to 
analyse and 
apply those 
approaches 
 
The individual 
tools used to 
apply those 
actions 
The tools used by 
that institution as 
writ into practice 
 
 
Two important areas of theory are:  
1. the science of climate change and how it contributes to the understanding of 
impacts and adaptation under rapid change; and  
2. The economics of impacts and adaptation. 
Models are used to apply theory but contain assumptions about how a specific theory 
should be represented. For climate science, the dominant model is the signal-to-noise 
model (STNM) that measures and communicates climate change within a forecasting 
paradigm. Scenario-led approaches are also very important and convey plausibility but 
not probability.  
 
For economics, existing models are dominated by cost-benefit analysis (CBA) but here 
we survey a wide range of approaches to manage the wide range of decision-making 
contexts. Other important theoretical considerations include theories associated with 
risk management, psychology, behavioural economics and communication. 
 
The framework is shown in more detail in Figure 3. Action situations involve actors, 
domains and decision-types working according to a set of interactions and outcomes 
against which costs and benefits (very broadly defined) can be attached. Here, the 
interactions focus on climate impacts, risks and adaptation decision-making. Outcomes 
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are assessed according to a set of evaluation criteria that cover aspects of value, 
institutional performance and specific policy outcomes. These topics are summarised in 
the following sections, with action situations dealt with first because of their central 
nature to the framework. 
 
 
Figure 3. Institutional framework for assessing the economics of adaptation 
(Based on Ostrom, 2011 and others). 
2.4.1 Action/adaptation situations 
Problems or situations are identified through a conceptual unit – called an action 
situation – that can be utilised to describe, analyse, predict, and explain behaviour 
within institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 2005). The action situations in this project 
cover rapid climate change and how the resulting risks cross-institutional domains. An 
action situation involves a set of actors, their institutional positions and an allowable set 
of actions they are able to undertake. Interactions and outcomes are linked through a 
set of evaluative criteria.  
 
A specific actor in a situation includes assumptions about four types of variable 
(Ostrom, 2011):  
1. the resources that an actor brings to a situation; 
2. the valuation actors assign to states of the world and to actions; 
3. the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge and information; and  
4. the processes actors use for selection of particular courses of action. 
Most analyses stop at the surface levels of this framework, but further depth can be 
gained by addressing the factors that have influenced the structure of the current 
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situation (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982) and by investigating how an action situation 
changes over time due to altered perceptions and new information and strategies 
(Ostrom, 2007b; Ostrom et al., 2007). 
 
In this project we have found the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use 
knowledge and information particularly important. The generation and transfer of 
knowledge and information between research, technology, technology transfer and 
practice is the glue that holds the framework together. The means by which this is done 
– through rules and regulations, narratives, reports, interpersonal and inter-group 
discourse – are many and diverse, but narratives, formal and informal, are central.  
 
We focus on how knowledge is generated at three stages:  
1. Research – research into, and communication of, scientific knowledge to 
understand problems;  
2. Technology – the development of adaptation as a social technology to develop 
solutions; and  
3. Implementation – the application of adaptation actions, followed by monitoring 
and review. 
Narratives dominate the communication between these stages. Formal and informal 
knowledge are both important, because adaptation requires the blending of different 
types of knowledge. Various forms of knowledge interact through a network of formal 
statements, findings, rules, recommendations and narratives. The three most important 
epistemological groupings investigated in this framework are science, risk and 
adaptation. Here, adaptation is also considered as a social technology. 
 
More recent work by Ostrom and colleagues has expanded the reach of the IAD 
framework towards social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2007b; Ostrom et al., 2007). 
This expands the system from having a limited set of external variables grouped under 
the biophysical system, community attributes and rules in use, to one that affects and is 
affected by social, economic and political settings, and related ecosystems. The actors 
interacting in action situations generate interactions and outcomes that are affected by 
and affect a resource system, resource units and governance systems (Ostrom, 2011). 
 
This is certainly the case for adaptation to climate change where risks are being 
propagated across geographic, sectoral and institutional domains. Likewise, the social, 
economic and political settings that adaptation takes place in at the institutional level 
cannot be separated from adaptation actions themselves. For example, adaptation in 
the area of water supply and demand has to take place within a broader framework of 
water policy, social and cultural attitudes to water and water politics. In this project, we 
have endeavoured to undertake our analysis at the scale that requires the role of 
adaptation within the broader social-ecological system to be addressed. 
 
Two critical aspects of the overall social-ecological system affected by climate change 
are uncertainty and complexity. These aspects mean that solutions are found, not by 
making and responding to forecasts, but by exploring sets of options within an 
institutional setting and acting according to a particular set of criteria designed to 
achieve institutional goals.  
 
Solutions, therefore, are not fixed, but can change according to new information or 
when the system itself changes sufficiently to warrant a change of strategy. The project 
framework is a way of managing values within a complex system on an ongoing basis, 
rather than a single assessment designed to produce a fixed set of outcomes. 
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2.4.2 External variables 
External variables to an action situation include the: 
 biophysical system; 
 rules and institutions; and 
 Community attributes and culture. 
The biophysical system describes climate change and its impacts. Instead of taking the 
conventional route of emphasising adaptation to the most reliable predictions we ask:  
 “What climate risks most need to be managed at the institutional scale?”; and  
 “What do we know about them?” 
To answer these questions adequately, we need to know the values at stake if we 
failed to adapt to a range of plausible climate risks – characterised as rapid changes in 
extreme events – and prioritise them on that basis. 
 
The main scientific aim moves away from the current emphasis on predictability 
(although that remains an important aim of scientific and economic endeavours), 
towards salience and relevance. Adaptation needs are prioritised by assessing which 
values are most under threat from rapid changes of uncertain magnitude and 
frequency, and assessing the contributing factors to their vulnerability. Other 
endeavours where this type of approach is taken is with security issues, such as 
serious crime, biosecurity and terrorism, and with disasters such earthquakes and 
tsunamis that are difficult to forecast. 
 
The above questions require some prior knowledge of how the climate may change 
over a region and what impacts are likely to ensue. A key finding of this project is that 
rapid changes in climate risks are currently unpredictable but are far more likely to 
occur than has been estimated using the conventional methods of climate change 
analysis (see Section 3.2.2). 
 
Rules in use can be considered as external to an action situation. In this instance, we 
can recognise two sets of rules that influence adaptation at the institutional scale. The 
first set deals with methodologies, methods and toolkits that provide guidance on how 
to conduct adaptation assessments. The second set comprises the formal and informal 
rules used by actors and institutions that will influence how they adapt. Initially, the first 
set was constructed quite separately from the second, but more recent assessments 
are integrating methods and tools with institutional and actor-based rules to produce 
adaptation assessments that are more context-relevant. 
 
The analysis of institutional rules can be carried out at two levels. Rules can be 
interpreted at face value or at deeper levels where factors such as community 
attributes and culture influence how such rules are generated and/or interpreted. 
Communities of practice will have rules as to how knowledge is generated, 
communicated and applied. Some of these will have a sound epistemic basis because 
they have been rigorously tested, but others may be rules of thumb or be taken from a 
‘like’ process and adapted to suit the task at hand. 
 
Rules also influence how knowledge is applied. Revisiting the hierarchy of framework, 
theory and practice, the deepest rules are at the philosophical level where assumptions 
and values are used to determine how rules frame an action situation. For both climate 
science and economics, this was carried out by investigating the underlying paradigms 
influencing theory and methods before identifying how those paradigms inform 
adaptation narratives. 
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Scientific narratives are translated into risks where they inform both calculated and 
perceived risks. Various institutions have different ways in which they calculate and 
understand risk, and one of the roles in developing the IAD framework in this project is 
to value risks and risk management within those institutional contexts. 
 
2.4.3 Interactions 
The interactions we are most interested in are climate impacts resulting from rapid 
change that cross geographical domains, or that occur in one location and their effects 
propagate across institutional domains.  
 
The associated risks represent the valued aspect of those impacts. These may be 
absorbed by existing capacity within institutions or, if large enough, may propagate to 
other domains requiring a greater response. An example is where a series of large 
floods may overwhelm local capacity and livelihoods, requiring intervention in the form 
of flood relief and perhaps subsequent rezoning and regional redevelopment. 
 
A risk can propagate across geographic scales (e.g., many local risks combining to 
affect a region or state), across sectors (e.g., from production to finance) and across 
institutions (e.g., from local government to state and federal governments), or between 
these types of domain. The crossing of a domain is almost invariability associated with 
the propagation of that risk across institutions, and with it, some responsibility for 
management.  
 
Domains include levels of government, public–private domains, regions and sectors. 
Adaptation decisions can manage risk within a particular location and institutional 
setting (domain) and across scales (cross-domain). We propose that existing and 
future risks that propagate across scales are less understood than those that occur at 
particular locations – therefore they are not ‘visible’ and will be less well-managed.  
 
This lack of visibility is due to several reasons: 
 Unclear, partial or disputed ownership of risks as they cross domains; 
 Unclear and partial costs associated with the current risks; 
 The narrative of gradualism suggests that risks will accumulate slowly, significant 
events are therefore remote in time, so can be managed at leisure; 
 Un-owned risks are undervalued, therefore are considered psychologically 
remote. If they are valued, then someone else will surely take responsibility for 
them; 
 Significant risks tend to be discounted by individuals; and 
 A lack of clarity as to the values at stake, who they affect, and what the potential 
costs associated will be if they are left unmanaged has not been made clear. 
Silo-based policy and planning will also tend to overlook the transmission of risks 
across scales. More efficient markets by themselves are not sufficient to manage such 
risks. Adaptation actions may also propagate risks across domains, and when those 
risks outweigh the net benefits they can be considered as maladaptation. Risk 
amplification is of particular interest for policy-making because such risks can 
potentially be large and costly. Here, we treat adaptation as a social technology applied 
within an innovation framework.   
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2.4.4 Outcomes 
Outcomes vary between those that are predicted by various models, are mandated or 
aspirational (e.g., achieving a particular state of sustainability). The testing of outcomes 
is conditional on both the underlying frameworks and on the models and assumptions 
used. For example, methods such as CBA are not suited to assessing transformative 
change because they can only assess marginal change in the economy. 
 
Outcomes are measured according to evaluative criteria, institutional performance and 
policy outcomes. These are not single adaptation decisions, but rather the collective 
decisions made by various actors within a given action situation.  
 
Evaluation criteria test the broad costs and benefits within a given situation. Some of 
the methods that can be used include: economic efficiency; equity through fiscal 
equivalence; redistributional equity; accountability; conformance to values of local 
actors; and sustainability (Ostrom, 2011). 
 
Institutional performance ensures that adaptation decisions are consistent with stated 
institutional aims, and can be implemented as intended and adjusted if new information 
becomes available.  
 
Policy outcomes test whether a given set of adaptation decisions is better than existing 
decisions (within the bounds of a specific policy), or manage risks that threaten policy 
outcomes. Success criteria for such tests are normative and are defined by the policy 
process. 
2.5 Statistical analysis of climate change 
The standard view of how the climate changes has been developed through the signal-
to-noise model (STNM) (STNM, Hasselmann, 1979; Santer et al., 1990; Wigley et al., 
1999; Hasselmann, 2002). Santer et al. (2011) describe it as: the warming signal 
arising from slow, human caused changes in atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases is embedded in the background ‘noise’ of natural climate variability. 
Statistical methods are used to extract a climate signal from the noise of random 
variability. Within the climate system, climate variability is considered to be largely 
random (Rodionov, 2006; Roe, 2009), occurring on annual to millennial time scales. 
Daily to decadal time scales are of most importance for adaptation.  
 
The anthropogenic warming signal is assumed by many to change smoothly (as in 
Figure 4), with natural variability expressed as noise around that signal (e.g., Swanson 
et al., 2009). Figure 4a and b both represent information about temperature change 
from a single climate simulation, Figure 4a shows the raw annual data form that 
simulation, and Figure 4b shows the signal interpreted according to a line of non-linear 
best fit. Most climate change information is processed in this manner and used in a 
number of ways. The STNM is the mainstay of scenario construction, impact 
assessment, communication of climate uncertainty and forecasting techniques used to 
assess likelihoods on a range of scales. 
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a b   
Figure 4. Single climate model simulation for south-east Australian minimum 
temperature (CSIRO Mk3.5 A1B TminAGW) showing a) annual variability, and b) 
mean change for a high emissions pathway. 
 
An important finding has been that regional mean climate such as rainfall and 
temperature changes proportionally with global mean temperature (Santer et al., 1990; 
Wigley et al., 1999). This allows a technique called pattern scaling, which is the 
mainstay of regional climate change projections (Carter et al., 1994; IPCC-TGICA, 
1999, 2007). Changes in extremes are often scaled in the same way. Mean changes 
extracted using the STNM are often used to scale observed climate records to create 
long time series of variability for a given date in the future. The results of mean change 
from different models can be combined to provide probabilistic estimates of change. 
Such results can also be used to communicate uncertainty, as ranges of change and 
some of the IPCC’s most notable diagrams have been constructed this way. 
 
The STNM also enables uncertainty across different models to be combined, allowing 
the construction of probabilistic projections. Projections with attached likelihood of 
exceedance (10%, 50%, 90%) were a major feature in the CSIRO and BoM (2007) 
projections of climate change for Australia. 
 
Although the modern application of this statistical model has become very 
sophisticated, its origins lie within the scientific enlightenment of the 17th and 18th 
centuries. The STNM has also proven very useful for a whole range of applications, 
such as forecasting and scenario construction, so its bona fides amongst the 
climatological community are very strong. 
 
Methods to assess non-linearity are less well-developed, so have a much lower 
acceptance amongst the scientific community. Two tools that have been widely used 
for climatological time series are the bivariate test (Maronna and Yohai, 1978) and the 
STARS test (Rodionov, 2005; Rodionov, 2006). The bivariate test compares two 
serially independent time series to detect inhomogeneities. It has been used widely for 
locating artificial step changes due to changes in observing instruments, location or site 
condition (Potter, 1981; Bücher and Dessens, 1991; Jones et al., 2001; Kirono and 
Jones, 2007). It has increasingly been used to assess regime changes in observations 
(Lettenmaier et al., 1994; Gan, 1995; Jones, 2010b), and has been adapted to 
measure step change in single time series by sampling random number series multiple 
times to reduce statistical uncertainty (Vivès and Jones, 2005). Jones (2012) adapted it 
further to sample multiple step change in a time series, combining that with the STNM 
to assess step and trend behaviour in climate time series.  
 
The sequential t-test analysis of regime shifts (STARS) model has been used widely to 
assess regime shifts in systems influenced by decadal climate variability (Rodionov, 
2005; Overland et al., 2008). It was tuned to analyse shifts in climate data by using 
artificial data (Jones, 2012) and has the advantage of being able to remove 
autocorrelations (where the current value is influenced by previous values), thus 
reducing the likelihood of attributing a regime shift to a random event (Rodionov, 2006). 
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The bivariate test has also been tested for its robustness by randomising time series 
before and after a shift to determine whether the shift is truly a step change. 
 
Charting software was adapted to analyse and portray time series to show step and 
trend behaviour in climate time series and illustrate how climate may change. Most of 
the time series analysed this way are annual time series of rainfall and maximum and 
minimum temperature, but other time series include tide gauge sea level records, sea 
surface temperature, ocean heat content and streamflow.   
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3. RESULTS AND OUTPUTS 
Section 3.1 describes the recent history of rapid climate change in Australia, its 
scientific background and how it manifests as a series of risks. Section 3.2 describes 
the current state of play built on narratives of gradual change, covering narratives, 
current scientific assessment methods, current economic methods and adaptation 
policy. Section 3.3 addresses the issue of rapid economic change with case studies on 
heat stress and fire risk. The valuation of adaptation begins with a description of 
adaptation clusters as an organising structure, a summary of our current understanding 
at the national scale and a description of the key economic factors for assessing rapid 
change. 
3.1 Understanding rapid climate change 
3.1.1 Recent events and climate risks 
The 2009 heatwave in southern Australia 
 
After 13 years of drought and higher than usual temperatures, Melbourne experienced 
record temperatures in late January–early February 2009. In late January, three days 
above 40°C (Figure 5) led to power brownouts, public transport network failure, crop 
and animal losses and widespread heat stress in people (Queensland University of 
Technology, 2010).  
 
On Black Saturday (February 7, 2009), temperatures rose to record levels, the system 
failures experienced in ten days earlier returned and catastrophic fires caused 
unprecedented amounts of damage. Three hundred and seventy-four people are 
estimated to have died of heat stress, 173 people died in the fires, over 400 were 
injured and over 2,000 buildings were lost. The fires were estimated to have cost over 
$4 billion of which $1.3 billion was covered in insurance payouts.  
 
 
Figure 5. Maximum temperatures measured at Laverton Jan–Feb 2009 showing 
the heatwave (43.2°C, 44.8°C, and 44.8°C) and fire (Black Saturday; 47.5°C) 
peaks. 
 
In Melbourne, the Southern Star observation wheel, open only for a month, developed 
cracks during the heat and remains idle over three years later at a direct cost of over 
$100 million with associated losses to businesses in the Docklands area caused by the 
wheel’s closure. Step changes in the frequency of temperatures >35°C Figure 11c and 
in Forest Fire Danger Index in the region are statistically significant. 
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These changes have resulted in significant responses that can be considered as 
adaptation responses, because they changed the way heightened climate risks are 
managed. For example, Adelaide between Jan 27–Feb 8 2007 experienced 13 days 
over 33°C, six over 40°C and four over 43°C. One minimum temperature was 33.9°C. 
Hospital admissions increase 14-fold, ambulance callouts 16-fold and more than 30 
people died. Mentally-ill people were identified as vulnerable so the Department of 
Health revisited their protocols for their 800 clients. Their new benchmark for action is 
three days above 35°C (Washington, 2013). 
 
“Above a threshold of 26.7C, we observed a positive association between 
ambient temperature and hospital admissions for mental and behavioural 
disorders,” the paper says. “Compared with non-heatwave periods, hospital 
admissions increased by 7.3 per cent during heat waves … 
“Mortalities attributed to mental and behavioural disorders increased during heat 
waves in the 65 to 74-year age group and in persons with schizophrenia, 
schizotypal and delusional disorders. Dementia deaths increased in those up to 
65 years of age.” (South Australia’s chief psychiatrist, Dr Peter Tyllis quoted in 
Washington (2013)) 
 
SA Health have not lost one of their clients to heat stress since the summer of 2009/10. 
 
Keating and Handmer (2011a) estimate the current cost of heatwave mortality in 
Melbourne, using statistical value of life estimates, to be approximately $1 billion per 
annum, derived from approximately 300 heatwave deaths. Recent events have also 
called into question the use of only maximum temperatures to measure heat stress risk 
– minimum temperatures are critical to building a realistic hazards relationship (Nairn et 
al., 2009).  
 
Rapid climate change in Australia  
 
Australia has recently experienced two main periods of rapid change in climate; one in 
1968–1973 and the other in 1994–97. To 1967, temperature and rainfall relationships 
indicate a statistically stationary climate (Jones, 2012). 
 
Figure 6 shows selected regional records that have undergone statistically significant 
step changes. Figure 6a shows the only region of Australia, SW Western Australia, that 
has unequivocally experienced a downward step change in rainfall in 1968. Figure 6b 
shows average sea surface temperature for Australia, and Figure 6c and d are for 
maximum and minimum temperature for SE Australia. All records are also shown with 
a linear trend and 11-year running mean. 
 
All regions of Australia experienced step changes in climate during the period 1968–72. 
The results for SE Australia are described in Jones (2012), but the results for other 
regions are presented here for the first time. SW WA experienced a decrease in rainfall 
of 85 mm, or 12% of the pre-shift period. Minimum temperature increased by 0.6°C but 
the underlying anthropogenic warming component is estimated to be 0.8°C. Maximum 
temperature did not increase in the region until 1994 by 0.8°C with an underlying 
anthropogenic component of 0.6°C. The reasons for the discrepancies for both 
maximum and minimum temperatures are contained in rainfall-temperature responses. 
The downward step change of rainfall in SW WA is thought to be at least partially 
anthropogenic in origin (IOCI (Indian Ocean Climate Initiative), 2002; Power et al., 
2005; Fredriksen et al., 2010). 
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a   b  
SW Western Australia rainfall Australian sea surface temperature 
c  d  
South-east Australian maximum temperature South-east Australian minimum temperature  
Figure 6. a) South-west WA rainfall 1900–2012, showing statistically significant 
step and trend profile (long dashes), 11-year running average (light grey) and 
linear trend (dotted); b) sea surface temperatures for Australia 1910–2011; c) 
maximum temperature for south-east Australia 1910–2011; and d) minimum 
temperature for south-east Australia 1910–2011.  
In northern Australia, rainfall increased by 22% in 1973. Maximum temperature shows 
an increase of 0.6°C in 1979, but with the effect of rainfall removed, shows an increase 
of 0.6 °C in 1969 and a further 0.5°C in 1996. Minimum temperature increased by 
0.7°C in 1979, with the anthropogenic component increasing by 0.6°C at the same 
time.  
 
Natural regime changes have occurred in Australian climate in the past, and appear to 
be a long-standing feature (Power et al., 1999; Verdon et al., 2004; Vivès and Jones, 
2005; Power et al., 2006; Verdon and Franks, 2006; Lough, 2007; Mills et al., In 
revision-a; Mills et al., In revision-b)). The most recent documented regime change due 
to natural variability affected eastern Australia in 1946–48 and involved a change from 
drought-dominated to a flood-dominated rainfall regime.  
 
Economic impacts of recent extremes 
 
This emerging narrative of rapid climate change raises key question for policy-makers 
and practitioners as to what effects rapid changes in extremes will have on critical 
thresholds.  
 
Data is not routinely collected on the full economic impact of disasters in Australia, but 
the Insurance Council of Australia makes information available on insurance claims. 
Between 2000 and 2011, insurance claims for natural disasters in Australia totalled 
approximately $16 billion, or an annual average of approximately $760 million. 
Weather-related insurance claims for Victoria 1990–2011 are shown in Figure 7. They 
also ran to >0.3% of gross state product three years running. In Queensland the costs 
of the 2010–2011 floods were around 2% of gross state product (Hartley et al., 2011) 
and resulted in a national flood levy on high income earners. According to ABARES, 
the impact of the 2010–11 floods on Australia’s agricultural production and exports was 
roughly $2.3 billion (ABARES, 2011). 
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Figure 7. Weather-related insurance claims for Victoria 1990–2011. Damages in 
millions of dollars on the left and as a percentage of gross state product on the 
right. 
Australian government funding for disaster mitigation and resilience 2005–06 and 
2010–11 was $182 million, whereas spending on disaster responses was 6,705 million 
Table 2). This disparity in funding is continuing to grow. 
 
Table 2. Australian Government funding for disaster prevention and recovery, 
2005-06 to 2010-11 (Productivity Commission, 2012) 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
 $m $m $m $m $m $m 
Disaster mitigation or 
resilience 31 24 30 37 34 26 
Natural Disaster Relief 
and Recovery 
Arrangements 69 104 18 292 106 6,116 
 
 
Cost estimates from the insurance industry are often used, however these are a limited 
proxy for actual cost and are problematic in many ways (Keating and Handmer, 2011a, 
b). Keating and Handmer (2013) utilise a few full economic impact assessments of 
bushfire to conservatively estimate the current costs of bushfires to the Victorian 
agricultural and timber industries. They find that: 
 Bushfire costs the Victorian agricultural industry approximately $42 million per 
annum. Including business disruption the total cost to the Victorian economy is 
approximately $92 million per annum. 
 Bushfire costs the Victorian timber industry approximately $74 million per annum. 
Including business disruption the total annual cost to the Victorian economy is 
approximately $185 million per annum. 
Keating and Handmer (2013) estimate that climate disasters cost the Victorian public 
sector approximately $424 million per annum, accounting for direct expenditure in 
terms of output and asset investments only. 
3.1.2 The science of rapid climate change  
Observations, past climate reconstructions, and climate model output strongly suggest 
that anthropogenic is non-linear and step-like, with rapid shifts in climate means and 
extremes. This information is very important for adaptation because it can change the 
way it is costed, evaluated and implemented.  
 
A version of this material with greater detail is in Appendix A. 
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Figure 4b shows the standard way of showing climate information as a smooth curve.  
Figure 8a shows the same raw data that was used to produce that smooth curve. Using 
the statistical methods for analysing rapid change described in Section 2.5, Figure 8b 
shows the same time series with a series of step and trends (bold dashes) and a non-
linear line of best fit (dotted line). Instead of a smooth curve, this time series shows a 
staircase of more gradual trends punctuated by step-like changes.  
 
a b   
Figure 8. Single climate model simulation for south-east Australian minimum 
temperature (CSIRO Mk3.5 A1B TminAGW) showing a) the mean, b) annual 
variability and c) mean, annual variability and step changes for a high emissions 
pathway. 
 
The other important finding is that this data has been produced by a climate model 
simulating climate change over SE Australia. Of over 20 simulations looking at changes 
in maximum and minimum temperature every simulation showed multiple step changes 
occurring over the latter 20th and 21st century of up to 1.5°C for maximum temperature 
and up to 1°C for minimum temperature. About half of over 20 twenty rainfall 
simulations show similar step-like changes. 
 
In the following paragraphs, we show that such changes are widespread in both 
observed and simulated time series of a range of important climate variables. This is an 
important finding with significant implications for adaptation planning. The smooth 
curve and series of step and trends shown in Figure 8b will produce different patterns 
of impacts resulting in very different economic outcomes as we will show in Sections 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 
 
Evidence for non-linear climate change 
 
The process of anthropogenic climate change is described by two competing 
hypotheses (Corti et al., 1999; Hasselmann, 2002): 
1. Anthropogenic climate change occurs independently of climate variability; and 
2. Anthropogenic climate change interacts with climate variability. 
Corti et al. (1999) stated:  
“A crucial question in the global-warming debate concerns the extent to which 
recent climate change is caused by anthropogenic forcing or is a manifestation of 
natural climate variability. It is commonly thought that the climate response to 
anthropogenic forcing should be distinct from the patterns of natural climate 
variability. But, on the basis of studies of nonlinear chaotic models with preferred 
states or ‘regimes’, it has been argued that the spatial patterns of the response to 
anthropogenic forcing may in fact project principally onto modes of natural 
climate variability.” 
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The first hypothesis supports a gradual climate response to forcing, but the second 
would produce distinct non-linear behaviour in climate variables. The key to deciding 
between these two hypotheses is in assessing climate behaviour over decadal time 
scales. Figure 9 shows a wide range of time series from observations around the world 
analysed using the step and trend methodology described in Section 2.5.  
 
The tests show a clearly accelerating number of shifts over the latter part of the record.  
 
Fewer shifts occur near the equator and more occur at higher latitudes. The most 
prominent of changes in temperature at the regional and global scale coincide with the 
1997–98 ‘El Niño of the century’ (Changnon and Bell, 2000; Karl et al., 2000). This 
registers as a 0.2–0.3°C step change within most of the GISS and Hadley data sets at 
the regional, hemispheric and global scales. 
 
The timing of many of these changes coincide with extreme events or changes in 
decadal variability (Tomé and Miranda, 2004; Menne, 2006; Ivanov and Evtimov, 2010; 
Ruggieri, 2013). Notable dates for average temperature changes in Figure 9 are 1936, 
1968 and 1997 in the southern hemisphere and 1920, 1988 and 1997 in the northern 
hemisphere. The dates 1946 and 1976 also occur in some latitudinal average records.  
 
In the northern hemisphere, a cooling episode in the mid-20th century interrupted 
warming (Ivanov and Evtimov, 2010). Unpublished analyses of temperature change of 
several USA states using the method of removing natural variability from temperature 
records as carried out for SE Australia (Jones, 2012), suggests this cooling was due to 
natural variability. Using this method, climate was stationary for most of the 20th century 
and anthropogenic warming temperatures in continental USA did not begin until 1988. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 (opposite). Selected local, regional and global climate variables 
covering air and sea surface temperature, ocean heat content and tide gauge 
records. Statistically significant step changes to the 1% and 5% level analysed 
with the bivariate test (left) and STARS test (right) are shown with year and size 
of change between periods. Method of analysis described in Jones (2012). 
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3.1.3 The anatomy of rapid climate change 
Rapid change can be identified at a number of points through the cause and effect 
pathway; affecting climate change itself, and increasing the likelihood of impact 
thresholds or system ‘tipping points’ being exceeded. 
 
The previous sections show rapid changes in regional climates occurring as a series of 
step-change responses to external forcing. These may be occurring in combination 
with internally-generated climate variability. Here, we explore the history of these 
changes for Australia and the potential for future rapid change, particular those that 
affect climate extremes. 
 
Rapid changes in impacts are often called thresholds or ‘tipping points’ and come in 
two basic forms. The first is a physical threshold that heralds a change in a system 
process or state, and the second is a graduated change in one or more measures that 
leads to some kind of planning or management response (Kenny et al., 2000; Pittock 
and Jones, 2000; Schneider and Lane, 2006). Rapid climate change will affect the 
magnitude and frequency of thresholds being crossed, so the dynamic between climate 
change and impact thresholds becomes important when considering impact costs and 
adaptation needs. 
 
The contribution of how changing climate hazards may contribute risks to can be 
summarised as: 
 Gradual change as part of a trend. Not as common as previously thought due to 
an over-reliance on the signal-to-noise concept. 
 Step-changes expressed as rapid shifts in mean and variability. These may be 
associated with a regime change in decadal variability affecting mean and/or 
patterns of annual and seasonal variability (e.g., the Interdecadal Pacific 
Oscillation influence on ENSO). Model output shows they usually occur in the 
direction of the long-term externally-forced trend. Further investigation is required 
to survey the range of variables affected, regions of greatest change, frequency 
and magnitude of changes. 
 Internally generated natural variability independent of climate change can 
produce clusters extreme events, or alternatively, contribute to relatively quiet 
periods. 
A further rapid change not examined here is a large-scale ‘climate shift’ such as the 
Younger Dryas, the cooling event 8,300 years ago or the rapid increase in sea level at 
14,500 years ago. This type of scenario was investigated by Schwartz and Randall 
(2003) who assessed its implications for security in the USA. These are thought to be 
rare, only becoming a risk at higher magnitudes of climate change. 
 
The main types of climate variable likely to be associated with rapid shifts are shown in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3. Climate variables potentially associated with greenhouse-induced rapid 
changes with evidence and notes. 
Event Evidence for step change Notes 
 Observations  Models  
Extreme 
heat/heatwaves 
Southern Australia (since 
1997), global evidence 
circumstantial (mean 
annual Tmax change), 
continental US 
SE Australia, 
Melbourne region 
(monthly max 
temp), every run 
Northern Australia, there is 
some evidence the high P 
has suppressed Tmax 
increases (Alice Springs) 
Fire Danger (FFDI 
Days high–
catastrophic) 
Victoria (1998, 2002) based 
on the average of 9 site 
records 
SE Australia, Melb 
region, transfer 
function using 
Tmax and P, some 
runs 
Data from Lucas (2009), with 
inhomogeneities in wind 
speed adjusted and poorer 
parts of records omitted 
Mean temperature Every region SE Australia, 
global mean, every 
run 
 
Mean rainfall SW WA, some individual 
streamflow records SE 
Australia. Nile, Yangtze 
historical records 
SE Australia, Melb 
Region, about 50% 
of models 
Some evidence that models 
are less hydrological 
sensitive than observations 
Extreme daily 
rainfall 
SW WA (1968, downward), 
circumstantial evidence 
associated with mean 
changes 
Not checked, using 
mean as a proxy, 
likely if mean 
rainfall steps 
Checked for trend, so likely 
to be non-linear if associated 
with shifts in mean 
Flash flooding Little evidence of non-
linearity, stats hard to pin 
down 
Not checked Models show increases in 
convective strength and 
extreme events on a per 
event basis 
Wind speed Some evidence of decadal 
variability 
Not checked Mean may decrease in many 
regions and extremes 
increase 
Tropical cyclones Some evidence of decadal 
variability in numbers and 
intensity 
Not checked Wind speed and central 
pressure has been checked 
for trend, little evidence on 
numbers 
Extreme cold Linked to step changes in 
min temp, decreasing 
SE Australia, 
Melbourne region 
(monthly min 
temp), every run 
Numbers decreasing 
Extreme seasonal 
rainfall 
Some evidence of wetter 
summer rainfall in N Aust 
with increasing 
temperatures 
Mean shows non-
linear behaviour 
Perhaps falls of tropical 
origin are increasing and mid 
latitude origin are decreasing 
Sea surface 
temperature 
Widespread in ocean 
basins 
Not checked Changes in air temperature 
over land are most likely 
affected by non-linear 
changes in SST 
Ocean heat 
content 
Widespread at ocean basin 
and global scale 
Not checked Models contain the physics 
likely to reproduce such 
changes 
Sea level Ubiquitous in tide gauge 
records (20–30 mm) 
Not checked Models contain the physics 
likely to reproduce such 
changes 
Tmax – maximum temperature, Tmin – minimum temperature, SST – sea surface temperature. 
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The potential for step changes to cause a greater number of climate induced ‘shocks’ 
has implications for how future risks and hazards should be managed and costed. 
Rapidly changing extreme events can lead to unanticipated levels of stress occurring in 
a relatively brief period.  
 
Coping ranges and thresholds 
 
The coping range of climate (Hewitt and Burton, 1971) is described by the IPCC as the 
capacity of systems to accommodate variations in climatic conditions (Smith et al., 
2001). It includes the range of climate variability that covers qualities that span thriving 
in to barely tolerating climatic conditions (Figure 10). The core of the coping range 
contains beneficial outcomes. Towards one or both edges, outcomes become negative 
but tolerable. Beyond the coping range, the damages or losses are no longer tolerable 
and denote a vulnerable state; the limits of tolerance describe a critical threshold. 
Levels of vulnerability mark the size of the adaptation deficit. A coping range is usually 
specific to an activity, group and/or sector.  
 
This is a conceptual model for understanding changing risk (c.f., Morgan et al., 2001) 
that provides a suitable template for understanding the relationship between changing 
climate hazards and society (Carter et al., 2007). The concept of the coping range 
incorporates concepts of current and future adaptation, planning and policy horizons, 
and likelihood (Downing et al., 1997; Jones, 2001; Yohe and Tol, 2002; Willows and 
Connell, 2003; UNDP, 2005). It can sometimes be used operationally, but often 
remains conceptual because of difficulties with measuring phenomena like critical 
thresholds in complex situations. 
 
At the institutional scale, the coping range can be thought of a measure of socio-
economic capacity after Yohe and Tol (2002). Large-scale critical thresholds may 
involve irreversible damage to an iconic or important natural system such as the Great 
Barrier Reef or Kakadu National Park, or be significant enough to contribute to 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (Schneider and Lane, 
2006). 
 
 
Figure 10. Coping range showing (a) the relationship between climate change 
and threshold exceedance, and (b) how adaptation can establish a new critical 
threshold, reducing vulnerability to climate change (Jones and Mearns, 2005). 
This project looks at the thresholds that mark where risks cross domains. Such 
thresholds may affect several institutions at once. The values at risk held within the 
broader socio-economic system will affect institutional outcomes if they are ‘owned’ by 
that institution – either by being a formal responsibility or part of institutional practice 
and goals. For example, if profits are effected across and industry sector, industries will 
respond and may act to prevent such losses in future. Some risks may be ‘un-owned’ 
in that they are widely held to be of value, but are not included in institutional 
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responsibilities, or they are written into institutional rules but are latent and not acted 
on. Many such risks are environmental or social and belong to the ‘commons’. 
 
Most of the thresholds assessed in the literature are activity-based but some are 
system-based. Yohe and Tol (2002) suggest an approach based on vulnerability as a 
function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. The determinants of adaptive 
capacity they tested for expanding the coping range included technology, resources, 
institutions, human capital, social capital, risk spreading processes, managed 
information and attribution processes. The measures they used were designed to 
assess options against each other to test their relative effectiveness. 
 
Other coping ranges are judged according to a physical limit. For example, Jones and 
Page (2001) constructed two critical thresholds for the Macquarie River catchment in 
Australia for irrigation allocation and environmental flows. The probability of exceeding 
these thresholds was a function of both natural climate variability and climate change, 
and in 2008, both thresholds had been exceeded in the Millennium drought. This may 
have been due to non-linear interactions of climate change and variability. For 
ecosystems, such as the Great Barrier Reef, measures of ecological function are being 
proposed and developed (McCook et al., 2007; De'ath et al., 2008; Olsson et al., 2008; 
Bennett et al., 2009). 
 
This project is taking a more institutional focus than Yohe and Tol (2002) but 
similarities remain. The elements of adaptive capacity they list are all important as are 
the practical factors of feasibility and effectiveness. However, here institutional 
structures are seen as major determinants as to how these factors can be organised 
into a framework that can accommodate both bottom-up (location specific, actor and 
community-based) with top-down (macro-economic, policy and governance) factors. 
 
Rapidly changing extremes 
 
Rapidly changing extremes are the major driver of vulnerability to climate change, and 
the costliest if not adapted to. Assessing the distributional aspects of extremes over 
time provides a picture of potential impacts and adaptation needs. An important 
assumption that can be drawn from the structure of the coping range shown in Figure 
10 is that the relationship between extremes and threshold exceedance is an important 
determinant of vulnerability. 
 
Most of the range of a single climate variable is likely to be within the coping range in 
all but very narrowly-adapted systems. That means if a rapid change occurs, most of 
the distribution will still fall within the coping range. For activities widely distributed 
across climate gradients (such as agricultural production systems, adaptation 
analogues), an example of the same or a similar activity being carried out in a similar 
range of climate will be within reach for those affected, subject to adjustment costs for 
those carrying out the adaptation (Quiggin and Horowitz, 2003). An example of this is 
the expansion of cropping at the expense of grazing in formerly wetter areas of Victoria 
during the 2000s, increasing profitability per hectare.  
 
In sectors where markets are active, such adaptation is likely to be market-led. Under 
the assumption of gradual change, it is easy to assume that markets will have time to 
adjust to such changes. Under rapid change, these assumptions may be 
unsustainable. 
 
Also, the direct transfer of adaptation analogues (like activity for like climate) may not 
work if patterns of extremes unfamiliar to everyone emerge. This could be the case for 
very extreme heat, rainfall intensity, severe storms or more intense swings between 
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drought and flood. Step changes will also threaten systems with a limited adaptive 
capacity (such as fragmented ecosystems in highly-altered landscapes) because of 
their limited ability to respond. 
 
The limiting factor for most systems is where events exceed thresholds at an increased 
rate and magnitude. For a system close to a critical threshold, this can have significant 
impacts. For systems a long way from such thresholds, a small number of shifts may 
occur, then one more step change produces serious results. Sensitivity to change is a 
function of how close a system is to critical thresholds (Katz and Brown, 1992; Keller et 
al., 2004; Wilmking et al., 2005). This is important information for adaptation planning 
because rapid shifts in climate can move a system towards, or even across, a 
threshold much sooner than anticipated under gradual change. 
 
These relationships are shown in Figure 11a and b, where recent changes in daily and 
monthly maximum temperature for Laverton are illustrated. This station is used 
because it is a high-quality temperature station close to an urban centre that is still 
classified as rural, so is free of the urban heat effect. This record is divided into three 
periods; 1944–1972, 1973–1996 and 1997–2011 – marking the known stationary and 
first and second non-stationary periods between step changes. 
 
 
Figure 11. Frequency distribution of a) daily and b) monthly temperature at 
Laverton for the period 1944–1972, 1973–1996 and 1997–2011. Number of days c) 
from 35–40°C and >40°C 1944–2011 with the average of days above 35°C shown 
as black lines before after 1997; and d) scaled as a function of temperature from 
a baseline of 1974–1996, shown with the 1997–2011 average from c. Note that the 
averages from the periods 1944–1996 and (c) 1974–1996 (d) are slightly different. 
 
Most of the change in range is associated with positive impacts due to decreases in 
cold temperatures reducing cold stress and warmer average daily temperatures leading 
to a more comfortable outdoor environment. Such changes can readily be adapted to. 
However, for the two thresholds of 35°C and 40°C associated with heat stress, 
increases are notable. The first step-change event in 1968–73 mainly affected 
minimum temperature and partially masked a potential increase in maximum 
temperature due to higher rainfall at the time. 
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However, the second step change in 1996–1997 involved an increase in mean 
maximum temperature of about 0.5°C from the preceding period and saw an increase 
in days above 35°C from 8–12 per year. 
  
Figure 11d shows increases in days above 35°C and 40°C as a function of increases in 
mean scaled up from a baseline of 1974–1996, and contrasts it with observed days 
above 35°C and 40°C from 1997–2011 (note that the two baseline periods are slightly 
different). This scaling method is commonly used and was the same site data used in 
the Garnaut Review estimate of heat deaths (Bambrick et al., 2008) and in recent 
communications on climate change and human health from the Climate Commission 
(Hughes and McMichael, 2011).  
 
The observed frequency of extreme temperatures has increased beyond the number 
that would be estimated by scaling them according to changes in the mean, 
emphasising the potential for extremes to change faster than the mean. 
 
Economic implications 
 
Rapid climate change calls into question existing patterns of settlement, may make 
some current methods of production, consumption and transport no longer viable, and 
pose threats to the health and welfare of many citizens. Such changes would also 
require a fundamental reshaping of infrastructure.  
 
Such a pervasive threat poses a major challenge to economic methods and models 
attuned to the analysis of more limited problems. While economic models are 
simplifying devices, the basic model of neoclassical economics is very simple indeed. 
Its ontology is sparse, containing two forms of economic organisation: the market and 
the government, two types of goods; private goods and public goods, and two agents; 
rational utility-maximising individuals and profit-maximising firms. Its starting 
assumptions are many, and chosen to derive the mathematical results in which the 
market delivers the optimum. These assumptions include complete markets and 
perfect foresight, diminishing returns to scale, agents that only interact through the 
market and a given structure of technology and of goods.  
 
In such a model, the best economic outcome can be achieved through the market, with 
lump sum transfers by governments required to make this also the social optimum.  
No economist presumes that this is an accurate description of the real world, but many 
do take it to be a reasonable starting point. If one starts from this model and makes the 
assumption of gradual climate change, the task of adaptation policy is relatively 
straight-forward. Autonomous action by private individuals and firms through markets is 
likely to deliver most of what is required for adaptation to gradual climate change.  
 
As a result, the main priorities for adaptation policies are to: 
 reduce the barriers to the effective operation of markets, which would also deliver 
benefits in current climate conditions;  
 improve the availability of information to market participants; 
 increase the effectiveness of government in its areas of responsibility; and 
 deal with the impact of climate change on the disadvantaged through the tax and 
transfer system.  
 
Given that knowledge of the impact of gradual climate change will increase over time, 
there is little case for undertaking long-term, costly initiatives to shape adaptation in 
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relation to an uncertain future. This is a brief summary of the conclusions of the 
Productivity Commission’s recent draft report (2012) on adaptation.  
 
An important exception to this general pattern is found in some of society’s approaches 
to sudden (or at least to events that appear sudden) events with negative impacts – 
such as climate extremes (for more detail on this point see IPCC (2012a, b)).  This was 
recognised in the Productivity Commission’s report, which highlighted the important 
government role in emergency management as a fundamental way of dealing with 
change and the manifestation of that change through extremes.  
3.2 Gradualism: current approaches to assessment 
Current methods of assessing climate impacts and adaptation are out of step with the 
evidence for rapid change present in the previous three sections. Instead, they are 
formed by very strong narratives of gradual change, pervasive through both the 
science of climate change and the economics of adaptation. In the following sections, 
we look at the structure of these narratives and their origins, their influence on science 
and economics, and summarise current adaptation policy in Australia. 
 
3.2.1 Current narratives and their influences 
Gradualist narratives informing adaptation are developed from scientific narratives, 
which are socially-constructed accounts of how the climate changes. This section 
introduces adaptation narratives and describes a model that outlines how scientific 
knowledge contributes to the building of those narratives. 
 
Narratives are accounts of events with temporal or causal coherence that can be 
constructed for a purpose (László and Ehmann, 2012). Narratives can be linked to 
individuals and organisations, and include institutional and cultural narratives. They are 
an innate property of the expression of mind in communication with one’s-self or 
another; and are a “tool or process for making sense of events” (Gephart Jr, 1991) and 
have a strong role in creating social legitimacy.  At the core of narratives is the use of 
language:  
“Many people believe that language is a tool used to describe and report on 
reality. Language is not only content; it is also context and a way to 
recontextualize content. We do not just report and describe with language; we 
also create with it.” (Boje et al., 2004) 
 
Narratives can be spoken, written, and expressed visually or physically and can be 
presented formally or informally. They include storytelling, fables, myths and legends, 
songs, paintings and different forms of theatre. In organisations, narratives can be 
conveyed through informal conversations between actors or more formally 
communicated through presentations or documents. Narratives are iterative in nature 
and can alter with the teller and with time as they reconstruct events as they occur in 
order to find their meanings (László and Ehmann, 2012).  Meanings may change with 
time, memory and context. 
 
Scientific narratives 
 
Scientific narratives are important tools for explaining the cause and effect sequence of 
processes and phenomena interpreted from scientific theory. They are also key tools in 
framing how science is viewed within a broader social and cultural context, contributing 
to narratives of cultural origins and identity and framing themes around issues such as 
progress and risk (Shackley et al., 1998; Edwards, 1999). Scientific narratives can also 
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be used to manage conversations about science: by appropriating the labels available 
to describe a certain phenomenon, one also appropriates what sense can possibly be 
made of it (Näslund and Pemer, 2012). 
 
Recent literature has explored how scientific narratives of climate change are 
influencing broader social narratives, especially via framing effects (Jasanoff, 1996; 
Hulme, 2009; Jasanoff, 2010; Viehöver, 2011), but work on the first step of narrative 
building – how climate science is developed into narratives for both formal and informal 
settings – has been limited.  
 
For narratives informing adaptation to climate change, scientific narratives describe the 
way in which climate change is expected to change and by how much (e.g., Edwards, 
1999). These narratives also inform climate scenario construction and, in turn, will 
inform the construction of adaptation methods. They will also combine with narratives 
of climate experience in the general community to inform the adaptation process. The 
initial scientific narratives of climate change constructed by the scientific community are 
critically important in shaping how subsequent narratives informing adaptation are 
constructed. To date, this conversation has been dominated by the IPCC through its 
carefully-constructed language on uncertainty delivered to policy-makers (Viehöver, 
2011). 
 
The model we are using to explain this sequence of narratives is shown in Figure 12. 
Expert scientific knowledge is shown as being constructed through general scientific 
narratives. Scientific knowledge becomes robust through review, criticism, modification 
and consensus-building. Discipline-based narratives such as climatology, build on 
these narratives but also develop their own modifications informed by a specialist 
community of practice. These modified narratives inform broader public narratives of 
how climate changes. They also contribute to the development of methodologies for 
assessing and managing risk. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Conceptual model of the development of expert knowledge and 
narratives informing adaptation. 
 
A recent literature has critiqued the framing of science communication to policy-makers 
and the public by bodies (such as the IPCC) as carrying specific frames that influence 
public narratives and the perception of risk (Hulme, 2009, 2011). In particular, 
narratives of risk and catastrophe have proven to be politically divisive. They are 
charged with producing decision paralysis if not accompanied by enabling narratives 
that provide potential solutions (Hulme, 2008; Risbey, 2008). While most authors have 
concentrated on how scientific information is being framed to inform decision-making 
and public opinion (Patt and Schrag, 2003; Kandlikar et al., 2005; Swart et al., 2009; 
Hulme, 2011), few have assessed whether the basic narratives of climate change 
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accurately reflect the weight of scientific evidence (c.f., Beven, 2002). This does not 
include contrarian narratives that challenge the basic science.  
 
A distinction needs to be made between the straightforward communication of science 
and the communication of scientific information for risk, which contains a specific value 
component (Jones, 2011). This distinction has not been recognised in the IPCC 
uncertainty guidance material (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). Adaptation narratives need to 
be informed by the decision-making context within which climate risks are assessed, 
and can only be addressed by having experts working with decision-makers in order to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of a specific problem-solution process. This 
process is one of innovation. 
 
Types of adaptation narratives 
 
Adaptation narratives can take on many forms. Because different stakeholders and 
contexts may be involved in adaptation narratives, collaborative narratives that blend 
different narrative types are often developed. For example, scientists and community 
groups may collaborate to create a new narrative that incorporates narrative elements 
from a range of sources. This is both a product and a manifestation of the complex 
process of (shared and confronted) meaning (Altopiedi and Lavié, 2006), negotiated 
through a series of dialogues. 
 
Types of narrative used in adaptation include: 
 scientific;  
 institutional;  
 collaborative; 
 community;  
 personal; and  
 cultural.  
Two aspects that adaptation narratives aim to address are:  
1. the transferral of ideas to action; and  
2. the responses at an individual/institutional level to an aspect of adaptation.  
The first aspect is in the translating of problem identification into a common 
understanding so that actions can be implemented. This narrative bridges the route 
between scientific paradigm and adaptation methodology, and is often achieved by 
working with the multiple actors in order to creatively explore the solution.  
 
The second aspect concerns the stories that relate people’s own responses to climatic 
impacts and other aspects of change. This is a complex area as these narratives relate 
strongly to identity, culture and perceptions of risk and are context specific. They 
provide the social construction within which decisions may be applied, and also inform 
the nature of responses to future climate events. For example, a community that 
believes itself to be resilient and self-reliant is more likely to respond proactively, 
contrasted to a community that believes itself to be vulnerable. 
 
Institutional narratives are a key driver for understanding the rules and culture that 
influence both individual and institutional responses to adaptation. The role of 
institutions in developing and communicating scientific narratives, and how adaptation 
narratives are and can be used, is an important issue that requires further 
development. 
  
Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change 37 
 
3.2.2 Standard assessment methods and gradualist narratives 
The gradualist narrative is the foundation of standard assessment methods for climate 
change. This section describes how that narrative is being applied and the influence it 
has on assessment methods.  
 
The main areas of influence on scientific narratives that subsequently shape adaptation 
assessments are:  
 assessment guidelines and how they have evolved; 
 the use of the STNM to assess, attribute and communicate climate change; 
 the focus on forecasting techniques using the signal-to-noise model to develop 
likelihoods of mean change in climate; and  
 the communities of practice that have developed around climate modelling, IPCC 
assessments, and impacts and adaptation assessments. 
 
Development of impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments  
 
Until recently, adaptation methods have been constructed largely along scientifically 
rational lines rather than being informed by the decision sciences, such as 
organisational theory and psychology. 
 
Formal guidance for adaptation planning was originally published by the IPCC in 1994 
(Carter et al., 1994). The original seven-step method, now more commonly-known as 
the standard method (Carter et al., 2007), has since been expanded and modified by 
many others (Parry and Carter, 1998; Willows and Connell, 2003; UNDP, 2005; AGO, 
2006). It generally follows a predict-then-act sequence of assessment (Dessai et al., 
2009; Hulme, 2011).  
 
The current standard framework used in Australia is a risk assessment approach 
developed by the former Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO, 2006; Preston et al., 
2007) based on the ANZ risk management standard (Standards Australia and 
Standards New Zealand, 2004). The framework relies heavily on climate projections 
generated by CSIRO (Whetton et al., 2005; CSIRO and BoM, 2007; Whetton, 2011). 
Whetton et al. (in press) describe the recent history of climate scenario development in 
Australia. 
 
The mainstay of impact assessment to now has been time slice experiments. Climate 
scenarios are constructed to represent a change in mean climate at a future date 
(2030, 2050 and 2070 are all common). These may be combined with scenarios of 
changing population, economic or other environmental conditions. These mean 
changes are used to scale existing climate records of up to a century or more in length, 
providing comprehensive assessments of climate change plus variability (Jones, 
2004b; Chiew et al., 2009). Scaling future changes by observed variability is assumed 
to represent likely future variability as a first approximation (Chiew et al., 2008). 
Changes in impacts extrapolated between now and the time slice date are used to 
estimate the gap between current coping capacity and what may be required in future. 
This extrapolation is generally assumed to proceed gradually.  
 
Narratives of abrupt climate change do exist in the scientific literature and are 
widespread (Alley et al., 2003; Hulme, 2003; Schwartz and Randall, 2003; Schneider, 
2004; Arnell et al., 2005) but with a few exceptions, have not become mainstream in 
impact and adaptation assessment, Abrupt climate change is also considered to a low 
probability event, becoming more likely over time with high rates of emissions. Such 
events are therefore framed as requiring a highly precautionary stance, mainly 
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informing the need for greater investment in mitigation (Alley et al., 2003; Weitzman, 
2007a). 
 
Programs are now in place to develop decadal-scale forecasting, an area where 
predictability is considered to be low (Hurrell et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2009; Collins et 
al., 2011). Predictability of decadal change is linked to the reproducibility of results over 
multiple simulations. The main methods being proposed to predict decadal climate are 
to use the STNM to derive the most likely decadal mean change analysed as a gradual 
signal. 
 
Although the STNM contributes to a wide range of analytical and techniques and 
communication tools, its use continues to perpetuate the narrative of gradual climate 
change.  
 
Impacts and adaptation 
 
The widespread assumption that adaptation is a gradual process is captured by the 
following statements: 
 Within limits, the impacts of gradual climate change should be manageable. 
www.pc.gov.au 
 Therefore, climate change adaptation can be understood as: (a) adapting to 
gradual changes in average temperature, sea level and precipitation. 
www.prevention.web 
 Gradual climate change allows for a gradual shift in the mix of crops and to 
alternative farming systems. www.ers.usda.gov 
 
The difference between current and future rates of adaptation caused by changing 
climate is known as the adaptation deficit or adaptation gap (Burton, 2004; Burton and 
May, 2004). Burton (2004) identifies two types of adaptation deficit; the deficit to 
current climate variability and the deficit to climate change. The size of the latter deficit 
is often proportional to the magnitude of climate change, although non-linear climate-
impact relationships, and system thresholds or ‘tipping points’ may accelerate the 
adaptation deficit relative to climate change.  
 
Measuring the adaptation deficit as a factor of climate change, ignoring the current 
adaptation deficit, is consistent with the definition of climate change mandated by the 
UNFCCC, but may not be the most useful for undertaking adaptation. A true index of 
adaptation needs would cover all weather and climate-related hazards (Bass, 2004) 
incorporating climate change and variability in a whole-of-climate approach (Jones, 
2010a). Such a measure would require the mainstreaming of adaptation into 
sustainable development building within both the social and ecological aspects of 
adaptation (e.g., Yohe et al., 2007). A further option is to measure adaptation as the 
degree of innovation required for coping with variability and change (Bass, 2004). This 
is the most useful path to take, but the most difficult to measure. 
 
Most impacts and adaptation studies are conducted over a small to moderate sized 
region, natural or human system, sector or activity; largely because of the significant 
spatial and temporal heterogeneity in impacts and for adaptation options. Most 
adaptation policy therefore covers adaptation actions at these scales. 
 
The main ways to combine information from multiple impacts are:  
 to combine the results from diverse studies (Preston et al., 2006; Hennessy et al., 
2007);  
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 to conduct a set of studies with common inputs (Garnaut, 2008); or  
 to construct and run an integrated assessment model.  
Issues such as inconsistent scenarios and underpinning assumptions cause difficulties 
with the first case, the need for coordinated funding limit the second, and compromises 
in detail limit the conclusions that can be drawn in the last case. For these reasons, 
obtaining aggregated findings to assess potential adaptation needs at the institutional, 
state or national scale is difficult. Even though individual adaptation assessments are 
becoming more sophisticated and are using scenarios of social and economic change 
that are more tailored to the needs of users, the aggregation problem remains. This 
project takes a different approach to the modelling approach, instead using the IAD 
framework to address institutional arrangements and values with respect to adaptation 
(as described in Section 2.3). 
 
3.2.3 Orthodox economics of impacts and adaptation  
The main tool used to assess the economics of impacts and adaptation is cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) modified to take account of uncertain future climate risks over long time 
frames.  
 
Orthodox economic thinking on climate change adaptation is centred on the optimality 
criterion, where investment and action on adaptation should maximise benefit to 
society. Osberghaus et al. (2010, p. 837) state “the sum of all marginal benefits from 
public adaptation should equal the marginal costs of public investment.”  
 
Heuson et al. (2012) delineate how optimality in the investment decision is ideally 
achieved at all levels:  
 Micro level – the maximisation of net benefit for a single adaptation measure;  
 Single problem, several measures – the measure or group of measures that 
provide the greatest net benefit for a single problem (e.g., bushfire); 
 Several problems, many measures – the group of measures that provide the 
greatest net benefit across multiple problems (e.g., a sector or region); and 
 Macro level adaptation – investment is optimised across the whole economy, 
carried out in conjunction with mitigation. 
 
In some instances, specific adaptation measures may be deemed to be sub-optimal 
because the marginal benefits of avoided impacts are less than the marginal costs of 
the corresponding adaptation investment. In these instances, resulting damages would 
be endured rather than addressed (Osberghaus et al., 2010). 
 
A further aspect of optimal adaptation is timing. In sectors that are able to respond 
quickly and have relatively low capital-intensity, timing of adaptation is less important. 
However, when adaptation is time-consuming, possibly requiring many years of 
transition, selecting the optimal timing for investment becomes important. Optimal 
timing of adaptation attempts to optimise over three factors: 1) change in adaptation 
cost over time, 2) any immediate or short-term co-benefits of adaptation, and 3) long-
term irreversibility of the adaptation measure (Heuson et al., 2012). Timing of 
adaptation with respect to the potential timing of risk is also a factor to be considered. 
 
While costs, benefits and timing can be easily conceptualised, in practice it is difficult to 
impossible to determine specific climate adaptation costs at any level above the micro 
scale. This is partially because many adaptation initiatives are taken within the context 
of wider social, economic and environmental conditions, which may be more influential 
than the climate change component. Hence, separating out the climate adaptation 
aspect of a decision is not straightforward (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). In many 
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cases, the large uncertainties inherent in projecting future costs and benefits also 
preclude optimisation. 
 
The theory of optimal adaptation assumes to some degree that a “comprehensive 
catalogue of potential damages and adaptive measures” (Ackerman and Stanton, 
2011, p 16) can be utilised for decision-making, which is simply not the case. 
The orthodox approach described here is profoundly informed by the scientific narrative 
of gradualism (described in Section 3.2.1), and has the same cultural origins. It also 
has embedded in it the values of ‘objectivity’ and ‘fungibility’, as costs and benefits 
across the same comprehensive catalogue can be readily compared.  
 
Gradual change is also very attractive to economic theorists and modellers because it 
is analytically convenient to assume that change happens gradually. It also lends itself 
to favour market-based autonomous adaptation over government intervention. 
 
Public and private adaptation 
 
The case for government intervention in adaptation is routinely justified on the basis of 
market failures. Mitigation of climate change via reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions reduces overall climate change risk. This reduction in risk is freely available 
to everybody on the planet, therefore mitigation produces a ‘public good’. Economic 
theory purports that public goods are market failures (Aaheim and Aasen, 2008) and 
are produced at below-optimal quantities because individuals can benefit from the 
actions of others without having to take action themselves. As such, the economic case 
for government intervention in the case of mitigation is well-established.  
 
Adaptation, on the other hand, often produces private goods because adaptation 
actions generally reduce risk to a certain group. Economic theory suggests that private 
goods (adaptation) will be produced by the people who benefit from them, therefore the 
case for government intervention is theoretically less clear (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 
2008; Hallegatte et al., 2011; Productivity Commission, 2012). Despite this, 
government interest in adaptation is expanding in an effort to identify where public 
funds would be most beneficial.  
 
Aaheim and Aasen (2008) identify three broad categories where government 
intervention is warranted: 
 Public goods: adaptations that produce benefits for multiple economic actors in 
a non-exclusionary way are likely to be under-pursued privately; 
 Large transaction costs: required adjustments may be so expensive for 
autonomous actors that they will only occur with government intervention; and 
 Immobility: the factors of production are not always mobile, and may be located 
in climate-sensitive areas. Examples are fisheries and tourism. 
Gradual change has the benefit of providing actors with sufficient time and clear, 
incremental market signals that allow for adaptation – either to a new steady state or 
continuously. Because the change is gradual, costs accrue smoothly. Under such 
change, the role for government as demonstrated by the Productivity Commission 
(2012), is small relatively to autonomous market adaptation, which is preferred in 
orthodox circles as it is considered to be optimal. 
 
Equity is a key concern for all policy-makers and is a central theme for climate change 
adaptation. The neoclassical economics view is that equity issues in climate adaptation 
ought to be dealt with via the welfare and taxation system (Dobes and Bennett, 2009; 
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Productivity Commission, 2012). This way, relative prices are not distorted and there is 
transparency in government support (Osberghaus et al., 2010).  
 
This approach is favoured by the Productivity Commission’s draft report on barriers to 
climate adaptation (Productivity Commission, 2012). However, this approach is not 
always possible and/or adequate. Osberghaus et al. (2010) describes the use of heat-
wave shelters for the homeless that are increasingly being used in the US. This 
example shows the importance of considering equity in context, rather than just 
relegating it to the social welfare and taxation sphere – especially for homeless people 
beyond the reach of both. For policy-makers, economics cannot determine how equity 
should be treated in climate change adaptation policy because it is an ethical question 
(Osberghaus et al., 2010). However, economic analyses can assess how costs and 
benefits (welfare) may be distributed between different groups in society. 
 
Neoclassical methods for valuing adaptation 
 
The consensus in orthodox economics is that an adaptation initiative ought to be 
pursued if its expected marginal cost is equal to, or less than, the expected marginal 
benefit. Hallegatte et al. (2011, p. 7) state that the “cost of adapting to climate change 
is the sum of investment costs and operating costs linked to the establishment of 
adaptation strategies.” Climate change adaptation would not totally ameliorate the 
impacts of climate change, but the goal is to optimise climate change adaptation 
investment over time at no net cost (Hallegatte et al., 2011).  
 
UNFCCC (2009, p. 3) defines the costs of adaptation as “the costs of planning, 
preparing for, facilitating, and implementing adaptation measures, including transition 
costs” and the benefits of adaptation as “the avoided damage costs of the accrued 
benefits following the implementation of adaptation measure”. In this context, the costs 
and benefits are not only financial but consider wider societal impacts. 
 
Many theorists measure the benefit of adaptation in terms of climate change damages 
avoided (World Bank, 2010). The benefit of adaptation is calculated by estimating the 
total damage costs of climate change without the adaptation, then deducting the 
estimated damage cost avoided by the adaptation (because it is unlikely that the total 
damage costs of climate change will be avoided). Co-benefits that flow from adaptation 
measures are also ideally estimated and included as benefits (Huq and Reid, 2004). 
Estimating both costs and benefits of adaptation is complicated by the difficulty in 
assigning a dollar value to intangible assets such as ecosystem services; e.g., the 
cooling benefits of urban forests and flood mitigation services of wetlands. 
 
Dobes (2012) argues that the damage-cost avoided approach to benefit estimation is 
fundamentally problematic because it is, at best, “a very poor proxy for the conceptually 
correct measure of ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) for adaptation measures, or the converse 
of ‘willingness to accept’ any negative aspects associated with climate change” (Dobes 
2012, p. 6). He proposes a series of choice modelling studies to estimate willingness to 
pay to address climate disaster damages in different regions. While this critique 
identifies important issues, WTP estimates are themselves contentious 
(Venkatachalam, 2004). This places the value of adaptation in the hands of individuals 
within the market. 
 
Another literature dealing with sustainable development addresses adaptation from a 
general welfare point of view, valuing the benefits of adaptation as the avoided 
damages to both current and future climate (Smit et al., 2000; Huq and Reid, 2004; 
Adger et al., 2005; Ayers and Huq, 2009). Thus, the value of adaptation differs 
according to how it is framed in terms of economics and ethics. Institutional values are 
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an important framing for such considerations; for example, financial institutions will 
have a different emphasis on values from those concerned with social justice. 
 
Modelling costs and benefits 
 
Top-down economic models assume that the climate variability experienced over time 
will average out to a smooth change in costs; this shapes the understanding and 
perceived value of the economics of adaptation (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2009). 
 
Establishing an accurate estimate of the costs of climate change impacts is difficult, as 
top-down (macro-economic) and bottom-up (micro-economic) costs need to be 
combined. This is a problem of ‘apples versus oranges’ that challenges all economic 
costing methods, not just climate change. Macro-economic costs tally net impacts 
across whole sectors, while micro-economic costs assess individual impacts. 
Aggregating individual impact costs to estimate whole of economy costs is a 
considerable challenge. 
 
Top-down approaches utilise downscaled estimates from Global Integrated 
Assessment Models (which model the global climate-economy system). Bottom-up 
approaches utilise local or regional climate projections and estimate impacts; then with 
local decision-makers and stakeholders, evaluate potential adaptation options 
economically (Heuson et al., 2012). While the top-down approach can utilise available 
global models and thus can integrate spatially, they have been criticised their simplified 
economic models omit relevant costs. Furthermore, they lack local spatial or temporal 
detail, especially of climate extremes, so underestimate impacts (Ackerman et al., 
2009; Füssel, 2010). Bottom-up studies, are better at capturing important local and 
regional conditions relevant to decision-making at the local scale but are difficult to 
integrate at larger scales (Heuson et al., 2012).  
 
Many economists (e.g., Dobes, 2012) nominate CBA as the most appropriate 
evaluative procedure for making specific adaptation decisions. The merits and 
limitations of the CBA methodology for climate change adaptation is an increasingly 
debated topic. The most significant challenge relates to how we measure expected 
costs and benefits under compounding climate-related uncertainties. Another key issue 
relates to how ‘benefit’ is defined and estimated. Other theorists such as Hallegatte et 
al. (2011) argue that multi-criteria analysis is more able to systematically incorporate 
issues such as equity. 
 
CBA is a tool that is used to systematically “organise, appraise and present the costs 
and benefits, and inherent trade-offs of projects taken by the public sector authorities” 
(Moench et al., 2007). CBA calculates expected net present value by summing the 
probability weighted set of all possible outcomes. Traditional CBA assumes that the 
probability of each occurrence is known – however this assumption can be modified for 
a range of situations.  
 
CBA has both adherents and detractors. Dobes and Bennett (2009) assert that CBA 
can theoretically incorporate all costs and benefits to society, including social ones. 
Moench et al. (2007) claim that while this is theoretically the case, in reality most cost-
benefit analyses fail to fully include costs and benefits that are not easily quantifiable. 
The key benefit of CBA is that because all items are assessed in dollar terms, 
comparisons between projects and goals are clear (Heuson et al., 2012). However, 
there are significant challenges for CBA in terms of valuing intangible assets such as 
ecosystem services (Keating and Handmer, 2011b). 
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Ackerman and Stanton (2011, p 6) state that; “climate economics has often been 
hampered by its uncritical adoption of a traditional cost-benefit framework, minimising 
or overlooking the deep theoretical problems posed by uncertainty, intergenerational 
impacts, and long-term technological change”. Moench et al. (2007, p 16) argue that 
“[t]he primary value of CBA … lies in the analytical process itself and the manner in 
which that can be used to force project proponents to clarify the logic relating to 
proposed courses of action”. 
 
Disaster economics 
 
The field of disaster research overlaps significantly with climate change adaptation and 
the threat of increased disasters is driving action on adaptation. This report recognises 
the importance of the disasters field in informing research on non-linear climate 
change. 
 
The second half of the 20th century saw the concept of a disaster evolve. University of 
Chicago geographers, led by Gilbert White, developed a human-ecological view 
whereby negative impacts could result from interactions between humans and nature 
(e.g., Burton et al., 1993). Positive impacts were resources.  Over time, ideas about 
disasters developed to consider the interaction between the natural hazard and the 
society it impacts (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002). 
 
The IPCC (2012b) defines a disaster as:  
“Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to 
hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading 
to widespread adverse human, material, economic, or environmental effects that 
require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that 
may require external support for recovery.” 
 
An event becomes a disaster when it overwhelms local capacity, hence local conditions 
play as great a role in disaster emergence as the natural event. A natural hazard will 
have significantly different impacts depending on location; for example, a tsunami will 
create a bigger disaster if it strikes a coastal city, as compared to an uninhabited 
island. Similarly, the capacity of an affected community or society to cope varies 
significantly – both internationally and within nations. How different individuals and 
groups are impacted is mediated by social and political positions; for example, gender 
roles mean women and men can experience disasters differently. 
 
Much of the work on valuing climate change impacts, and subsequently adaptation, is 
an application of disaster economics under a changing future. The economics of 
disaster is often traced to the US Flood Control Act of 1936 (Moench et al., 2007). This 
Act formalised the use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) specifying that flood control works 
were viable “if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the 
estimated costs”. 
 
Since the 1970s, economic analysis has been applied to an increasingly wide range of 
disaster-related issues at every scale of government.  Various guides and reviews have 
been produced by research groups, government agencies and multi-lateral 
organisations. These guides and most reviews concentrate on standard cost 
assessments.  
 
However, the field has grappled with many issues of relevance to adaptation with 
varying degrees of success. Three long-standing issues in disaster economics of 
potential relevance to the economics of adaptation are: 
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 Intangibles - identifying and including ‘indirect’ and ‘intangible’ impacts –
extending loss assessments beyond damage to physical assets for which there 
are active markets.  As monetisation of intangibles could greatly increase the 
benefits of flood risk reduction strategies, considerable effort has been spent in 
this area. 
 Maladaptation - valuing the potential negative effects of strategies intended to 
reduce losses. For example, decades of research on the ‘levee effect’ shows how 
short-run risk reduction strategies that may appear economically optimal can be 
maladaptive in the long-term, and increase the risk of catastrophe.  
 Transformation – one view is that relocation is transformative, and disaster 
economics has long undertaken economic assessments of whether relocations 
are worthwhile. 
Australian studies 
 
A limited number of Australian studies on the economics of impacts and adaptation 
have been conducted, but this number is expanding. Of the individual costing studies, 
some have used CBA and others cost-effectiveness. For decisions where adaptation 
has taken place, most often decisions have been made at the political level on the 
basis of impact assessments, sometimes with costs attached, then been subject to 
feasibility or cost-effectiveness assessment. 
 
One author of this study managed a multi-sector study for CSIRO on behalf of the 
Australian Greenhouse Office in 2003–05 that was never published (A Sectoral Costing 
of the Impacts of Climate Change for Australia), but the study did increase the capacity 
of the Australian impact and adaptation research community to conduct such 
assessments, which was eventually realised in the Garnaut Review (Garnaut, 2008). 
 
The Garnaut Review (Garnaut, 2008) is the most comprehensive economic modelling 
project for Australia to date, although it concentrated on mitigation rather than 
adaptation, costing impacts in a range of sectors for baseline and policy greenhouse 
gas scenarios. These costing’s were estimated from a baseline of zero in 2008, slowly 
increasing to about 2% of GDP by 2050 (Figure 13). Although these costs were 
developed to assess the long-term benefits of mitigation and are only partial (omitting 
some infrastructure costs, non-market costs and insurance for extreme outcomes), 
they anchor current expectations in Australia as to the costs of climate change. 
 
According to this model, in 2012 the costs of climate change to the Australian economy 
would currently be about $3–$4 billion per annum (Figure 13). However bottom-up 
costs of single recent events appear be much higher (see Section 3.1.3). It is also 
difficult to separate the costs of climate change from climate variability. Figure 13 also 
shows that costs to around 2040 are locked in, independent of the effectiveness of 
global greenhouse gas reductions. This study also reinforces the widely held the 
perception of gradually increasing costs from a negligible base. 
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Figure 13. A comparison of the modelled expected market costs for Australia of 
unmitigated and mitigated climate change up to 2100 (Garnaut, 2008). 
 
Total environmental value estimates for the Great Barrier Reef have been made in 
several assessments but the most recent estimate of the present value of the reef 
calculated over 100 years at a discount rate of 2.65% is $51.4 billion assessments 
(Oxford Economics, 2009). If total bleaching were to occur today, the damage would be 
estimated at $37.7 billion at constant net present value. Estimates of direct annual 
income were $6 billion from tourism and $1 billion from commercial and recreational 
fishing in 2005–06 (Fenton et al., 2007). Non-commercial values and resilience options 
for management have been assessed (Johnson and Marshall, 2007), but specific 
adaptive strategies for this important system have not been costed. 
 
Jones and Webb (2008) undertook a vulnerability assessment for Victoria that 
examined the economic geography of sensitivity and vulnerability to climate change in 
Victoria, contrasting that with adaptive capacity across economic and non-economic 
sectors. This economic geography has been expanded to the national scale in Section 
3.1.8. 
 
State-contingent modelling using CBA has been carried out for irrigation in the Murray 
Darling Basin under a range of emission scenarios (Adamson et al., 2007, 2009; 
Quiggin et al., 2010) that manage the costs of water reductions to the point where the 
industry can no longer be viable. State contingency sets out a series of options that are 
exercised according to a simple set of rules based on different irrigation strategies tied 
to water availability, crop suitability and economic return. AECOM (2012) produced a 
framework for assessing adaptation based on modifications of cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness assessment to develop a portfolio of adaptation options for sectoral and 
regionally-based assessments. Specific options could then be evaluated with respect to 
other options and with the cost of doing nothing. Most of these options (but not all) 
involved changes to fixed assets rather than changes in operations or behaviour. 
 
3.2.4 Current policy overview 
Adaptation policy in Australia is being developed through a Council for Australian 
Governments’ Select Council on Climate Change who are considering a range of work 
plans and governance arrangements. The Climate Commission provides a key expert 
advisory role. Although a number of initiatives are presently underway, it is safe to 
conclude that adaptation policy in Australia is in a state of flux. 
 
Government operates at three levels: federal, state and local. Federal and state 
governments are included in the constitution and form the Council of Australian 
Government. Local government is not in the constitution, is largely regulated by state 
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governments but is a major area of delivery for adaptation. It is also an important link 
between government and community. Major government policies are summarised in 
Table 4. 
 
The emphasis on adaptation policy has focussed largely on avoiding duplication in 
program delivery at different levels of government. It has concentrated less on the role 
of collaborative policies that are complementary across the three tiers of government. 
Within government tiers, the concern that policy silos are barriers to adaptation is 
increasingly being identified.  
 
Brief history of policy development 
 
In 1998, the National Greenhouse Strategy recommended the development of a 
National Framework for Adaptation to Climate Change (Australian Greenhouse Office, 
1998). This was released as the National Climate Change Adaptation Programme in 
2005, which was expanded in 2007, creating the National Adaptation Flagship in 
CSIRO, a Community Climate and Earth System Simulator under CSIRO, the Bureau 
of Meteorology and the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, centred 
at Griffith University (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2010). 
NCCARF has developed eight adaptation research plans for sectors and key resources 
for a comprehensive programme of research. This is funded until mid-2013. 
 
In 2009, the National Assessment on Climate Change and Coasts provided a broad 
analysis of the risks of climate change to coastal settlements (DCC, 2009). National 
vulnerability assessments have also been produced for biodiversity, world heritage 
sites, the national reserve system, and fire regimes. The Local Adaptation Pathways 
Programs was established in 2008 to assist local councils (Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency, 2010). 
 
In 2007, COAG endorsed a National Climate Change Adaptation Framework as the 
basis for jurisdictional action on adaptation (COAG, 2007). The framework established 
two main areas of action: 
 building understanding and adaptive capacity; and 
 reducing sectoral and regional vulnerability. 
It has also established a Select Climate Change Council (SCCC) (COAG, 2011b), 
whose purpose is to: 
 support an effective response to climate change policy issues with national 
implications; and 
 provide a forum for the Australian Government to engage with states, territories, 
local government and New Zealand on program implementation issues. 
A Coasts and Climate Change Council was established to advise the Commonwealth 
government and assist with stakeholder community engagement. The Council has 
called for a 10-year national agenda for coastal adaptation, aligned “with regional 
development and population sustainability agendas to reduce the potential for perverse 
outcomes or maladaptation actions” (Gurran et al., 2011). 
 
In 2010, a new national adaptation strategy was published (DCC, 2010): Adapting to 
Climate Change in Australia: An Australian Government Position Paper. This listed key 
adaptation priorities and included the commissioning of a Climate Futures report every 
five years to evaluate the status of adaptation activity and evaluate the effectiveness of 
adaptation policy.  
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The Productivity Commission Barriers to Effective Climate Change Adaptation, Draft 
Report 2012 (Productivity Commission, 2012) outlined a number of recommendations 
in relation to reforms for all levels of governments. Two key recommendations from the 
report are: 
 The Australian Government should focus on National policy responses in areas 
such as emergency management, research and information provision. Existing 
agencies still have a role in managing policy responses in this area; and 
 The Council for Australian Governments’ Select Council on Climate Change, and 
any successor, should coordinate policy responses in areas where cooperation 
between levels of government is required. 
Currently all states have some level of adaptation policy that is either explicit or implicit, 
however there is little consistency of process. Many of the state organisations are 
choosing to take a regional approach to adaptation, and many of the funded activities 
are focused on a more regional than municipal basis. It is interesting to note that all 
capital cities in Australia have comprehensive adaptation action plans or strategies. 
(For specific details relating to policy and regulation see Table 4). 
 
Each Australian state and territory has its own arrangements for disaster planning and 
management, based very loosely on the nationally agreed Disaster concepts 
and principles (Emergency Management Australia, 1993), which essentially 
emphasises the need to work on preparedness and response as well as longer-term 
prevention and recovery planning.  Legislation in each jurisdiction underpins fire and 
emergency services organisations and their main activities. In many cases, brief 
statements and operational guides substitute for policy. 
 
Disaster and resilience policy development 
 
In related approaches, especially with respect to the capacity for change and 
adaptation, boundary-spanning institutional arrangements in government and within the 
emergency management sector are being developed.  The Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) has been taking interest in the area, although its reports lack 
any clear avenue for implementation. Historically, Emergency Management Australia 
(EMA) took a leading role in promoting reflection and change with the sector nationally 
through both its training and information arm at Mt Macedon, and through some of the 
activities of EMA headquarters in Canberra, such as subsidising the salaries of 
planners in each jurisdiction. This was concerned primarily with moving the sector from 
an immediate agency response focus to one that included prevention and people.  
 
EMA has now been combined with counter-terrorism and absorbed into the federal 
Attorney General’s Department. The relevant section of the department is promoting 
the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG, 2011a), which helped through a 
grants program, has been generally well received by state governments and 
emergency management agencies. This has the potential to promote the flexibility and 
capacity needed for climate change adaptation – but achieving this would probably 
require surrender of some power by state authorities to local communities.  
 
Less visible are a range of formal national committees working on advancing 
emergency risk management (NERAG) and dedicated to a strategic view. These 
include the RAMMS (risk assessment, measurement and management), and 
committees dedicated capacity building and community engagement.  Other national 
committees complement these such as the National Flood Risk Advisory Group 
(NFRAG) which evolved from a semi-formal group of jurisdictions and a few other 
stakeholders such as insurance, weather forecasting and research.  As with the 
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resilience strategy, these committees have funding for relevant projects on improving 
the information and knowledge base as well as examining ways of improving the 
institutional arrangements and processes underpinning an evidenced-based 
emergency management process.  
  
Separately to this government activity are the national committees of the Australasian 
Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council (AFAC).  These committees consist 
of fire and emergency management agencies from across Australia and New Zealand 
who work on developing evidence- based positions on a variety of subjects, such as 
community safety, information technology and strategic planning – among many other 
topics.  Relevant agencies – both members and non-members of AFAC – are asked to 
endorse these positions or approaches.  AFAC also led and coordinated nationally 
agreed changes to bushfire warnings following Black Saturday.    
 
These national committees are explicitly about boundary spanning, learning and 
change – as such they could provide an institutional mechanism for climate change 
adaptation. However, the absence of a regular confidential forum for all stakeholders to 
share reflections and experience may be a barrier to learning. 
 
Private sector and civil society 
The private sector and civil society have a patchy understanding of adaptation issues 
that largely depends on how exposed the sector has been to climate change. Sectors 
such as primary industry, tourism, actuaries, water providers and insurance have a 
higher awareness than the manufacturing or small to medium enterprises sector  
because climate directly affects their core business (Young and Jones, 2012; ACOSS, 
2013). The construction and logistics sectors (particularly infrastructure developers) are 
endeavouring to gain market advantage by anticipating changing needs for current and 
new products based on their assessment of projected changes. 
 
Most businesses do not have specific knowledge of climate change and adaptation, but 
it is implicit in the frameworks and processes within occupational health and safety, 
quality assurance and change management processes if they are properly observed. 
Rapid change will impact different sectors in different ways). Knock-on effects from one 
sector to another are likely. 
 
The community services sector has identified that it is particularly vulnerable to 
extreme events but currently has limited capacity to recover from such events. In a 
recent submission to the Senate Inquiry into Recent Trends in Preparedness for 
Extreme Weather Events, ACOSS stated that “25% of organisations reported that 
damage caused by an extreme weather event might lead to its permanent closure”. 
They also stated that “extreme weather events have the potential to seriously disrupt 
community service organisations’ service delivery and that the consequences of 
service failure are serious, particularly for vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors of the 
community.” (ACOSS, 2013) 
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Table 4. Current adaptation and associated policies and regulation landscape. 
 Policy Applicable regulation 
Federal National Adaptation Framework National Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan; 
and National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience  National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience  
National Disaster Resilience Framework; 
Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy 
 
National Building Codes 
National Consumer Law (2011) 
Clean Energy Futures (2012) 
NSW NSW Sea Level Rise Policy Statement 
(2010) 
NSW Coastal Planning Guideline (2010) 
NSW Coastal Policy (1997) 
NSW Coastal Design Guidelines (2003) 
Coastal Risk Management Guide (2010) 
Flood Risk Management Guide (2010) 
Coastal Protection Act 1979 and 
Coastal Protection Regulation 2011 
SEPP 71 Coastal Protection (under Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979) 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 
2000 (amended in early 2011 to 
require that coastal hazards affected by sea level rise 
be noted on ‘section 149’ planning 
certificates) 
Northern 
Territory 
Climate Change Policy (2009) 
Coastal Management Policy (and) 
Implementation Strategy 2001 
 
Northern Territory Planning 
Scheme (addresses flooding and storm surge, as well 
as ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ storm surge areas) 
Queensland Queensland Coastal Plan 2011  
Climate Smart Adaptation: 2007-2012 Action Plan 
Coastal Plan 2011  
 
Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (refers to climate 
change and sea level rise) 
State Planning Policy for Coastal Protection 
(provisions for addressing potential climate change 
impacts; nb: part of the Queensland Coastal Plan) 
Coastal Protection and Management Act 1955 
South 
Australia 
South Australian Planning Strategy  
(includes climate change adaptation) 
Coastline: Coastal erosion, flooding 
and sea level rise standards and protection policy (1992); source of sea level rise 
provisions included in all SA Local Development Plans Living Coast Strategy (2004)  
Draft Climate Change Adaptation Framework (2010) (proposes regional vulnerability 
assessments, agreements 
and adaptation plans) 
Coast Protection Act 1972 
(established Coastal Protection Board) which 
develops coastal planning policy and is a referral 
body for coastal development 
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 Policy Applicable regulation 
Tasmania Framework for Action on Climate Change 
(2008) (under review) 
Climate Change Impact Statements 
Draft State Coastal Policy 2008 
State Coastal Policy Validation 
Act 2003 
Victoria Victorian Coastal Strategy 2008 
Coastal Action Plans and Coastal 
management Plans (West Coast, Central 
Coast, and Gippsland Coast) – mechanism 
for implementing the coastal strategy 
Climate Change Adaptation Plan (pending 2013) 
Coastal Management Act 1995 
(Established the Victorian Coastal Council and 3 
regional Coastal Boards). 
Climate Change Act 2010 
Terrorism (Community protection Act) 2003 Victorian 
Government Risk Management Framework 2011 
(Department of Treasury and Finance) 
Private 
sector 
 ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and 
guidelines,  
AS/NZS 5050:2010 Business continuity - Managing 
disruption- related risk, (June 2010) 
Adapted from Gurran et al. (2011) 
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3.3 Economic responses to rapid change 
3.3.1 Heat stress and transfer 
The combination of an ageing population, population growth and step changes in 
extreme temperatures have to potential to cause very large shifts in the economic costs 
of heat stress if warming continues unabated. 
 
Extreme heat and mortality models are combined to contrast the economic impacts 
estimated using standard methods that extrapolate change between time slices and 
assess continuous gradual change, with the impacts of rapid changes in climate.  
 
Heatwaves pose significant challenges for government because they highlight the 
problem of risk transfer and risks crossing domains. They are a policy area for front-line 
health, community health, mental health, criminal justice, built infrastructure, electricity, 
water, logistics and transport systems, agriculture, food security, heat-sensitive industry 
and others. Heatwaves impact multiple systems at once, causing compounding or 
cascading disruptions. 
 
Keating and Handmer (2013) estimated the increase in deaths in Melbourne due to 
heatwave. They utilised McMichael et al.’s (2003) estimate that in 2003 heatwaves 
caused approximately 289 deaths annually in Melbourne, predicted increase in 
population aged 65+ and estimates of projected changes in the annual number of days 
over 35 degrees, under baseline (exposure increases only) and two climate change 
scenarios (adapted from Climate Change in Australia 2012). Valuations based on the 
value of a statistical life of $3.95 million using figures from Department of Finance and 
Deregulation (2008).  
 
With no adaptive change, by 2050 increases in heatwaves due to climate change will 
have caused an additional 6214 deaths (or 402 deaths annually by 2050) over and 
above the no climate change scenario (Table 5). These figures translate to an 
additional $6.5 billion (or $225 million per annum by 2050) loss over and above the no 
climate change scenario. (CSIRO3.5 climate model, 5% discount rate, 2011 $AUD). 
Table 5. Total number of deaths and valuation by 2020 and 2050 due to 
heatwaves under baseline and climate change scenarios. 
 2020 
Exposure 
only 
2020 
Miroc3.2 
2020 
Csiro3.5 
2050 
Exposure 
only 
2050 
Miroc3.2 
2050 
Csiro3.5 
Number of deaths 4287 4436 4522 23222 27161 29436 
Valuation, 
$millions 
AUD2011, 5% 
disc. rate 
$13,162.9 $13,568.1 $13,801.7 $35,057.6 $39,197.6 $41,608.9 
 
The estimate of less than 300 deaths per annum in 2003 was overwhelmed during the 
2009 heatwave in Victoria when 374 people are assumed to have died during that 
single event. This shows the current impact model to be conservative. 
 
Potential heat deaths were also tested under rapid changes in extremes.  
 
A single model run of summer temperature from a grid square over Melbourne from the 
CSIRO Mark3.5 A1B model run from the CMIP3 archive is used to show the effect of 
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rapid warming on heat deaths. Four different estimates were produced: climate only 
(1871–2099); climate plus total population growth for Melbourne (1971–2099); climate 
plus 65 and older population; and smoothed climate plus 65 and older population 
(2010–2090). Population growth was as for Keating and Handmer (2013) to 2050, then 
extrapolated to 2099 at a slightly slower rate.  
 
Figure 14a shows similar death rates to those simulated by Keating and Handmer 
(2013), which would be expected using similar models and data. Shifts in the order of 
100 people per year under constant population and 200 per year under a mid-range 
projection of population growth for Melbourne occur using this data directly (Figure 
14b). Adding population growth to climate change roughly doubles the simulated death 
rate. Higher rates of population growth aged 65 or older accelerate those at risk of heat 
deaths (as shown in Figure 14c), where the rate is roughly three times that of climate 
alone and potentially five times by 2099. In context, the current cohort of Melbourne’s 
65+ population is 18%, which is projected to increase to 30% by 2030, and under this 
model would be 48% in 2099. We do not estimate whether a roughly 4°C warmer 
planet 2099 could support such a population in Melbourne. 
 
a  b   
c  
Figure 14a) Simulated heat deaths for Melbourne using a single climate model 
simulation showing statistically significant step changes in death rates with 
constant 2011 population; b) heat deaths for Melbourne with population 
increasing according to recent estimates from the Victorian Department of 
Human Services and the ABS; and c) as for b) with population increase in 65 and 
older group. 
 
Applying the same costing’s as Keating and Handmer (2013) to estimate the economic 
impacts shown in Figure 14 shows some interesting results. Firstly, the model shows 
slightly greater baseline mortality due to its construction based on annual data rather 
than a baseline mean period. Total deaths (2010–20 due to population exposure only) 
are 5,186 compared to 4,287 from Table 5, and this is simply due to a warmer starting 
temperature. Deaths in 2020 are 5,597, an increase of 400. Total deaths by 2050 
under climate change plus exposure are 32,305 – about 2,000 fewer than in Table 5. 
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Table 6. Total number of deaths and valuation by 2020, 2050 and 2099 due to 
heatwaves under baseline and climate scenarios representing gradual and 
variable change. 
 2020 
Exposure 
only 
2020 
Gradual 
climate 
2020 
Variable 
climate 
2050 
Exposure 
only 
2050 
Gradual 
climate 
2050 
Variable 
climate 
Number of deaths 5186 5184 5597 28090 31614 32305 
Valuation, $millions 
AUD2011, 5% disc. 
rate 
 $15,929 $17,115  $45,867 $47,046 
 2099 
Exposure 
only 
2099 
Gradual 
climate 
2099 
Variable 
climate 
Number of deaths 102436 146508 147542 
Valuation, $millions 
AUD2011, 5% disc. 
rate 
 $65,166 $66,842 
 
Of more interest are the differences between the variable and gradual climate change, 
and of the effect of discount rates on those differences. Figure 15 shows the annual 
VSL for three discount rates; 0, 2.5% and 5% along with the accrued difference 
between the gradual and variable climate change scenarios. Although this example is 
using perfect foresight, if the green line is above zero, then addressing the risk of non-
linear change by treating gradual change as conservative is the better strategy. If the 
line is below zero, then addressing gradual change is the better strategy.  
 
a b c
  
Figure 15. Annual total value of a statistical life (VSL) for Melbourne, based on rate of 
change of the population 65 and over and change in maximum temperature from the 
CSIRO Mk3.5 A1B simulation, represented as individual year averages for Oct–Mar 
and the accrued differences between the two in $million AUD2011 for a) zero discount 
rate, b) 2.5% discount rate, and c) 5% discount rate. 
 
Clearly, addressing the adaptation deficit as a non-linear problem is the better strategy 
because the difference between the two potential strategies stays above zero for most 
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of the century under all discount rates. There is a benefit in acting to reduce losses to 
2020 in all cases, rather than taking a gradualist approach. 
 
The aim of this example is to illustrate gradual versus nonlinear change using a risk 
that is already affecting most Australians. Most of Australia’s major population centres 
are experiencing greenhouse-enhanced heatwaves. However, there are caveats – for 
example: 
 Death rates represent current vulnerability and age structure patterns. 
Improvements in housing and heat stress management would reduce exposure 
to heatwaves but larger urban heat islands, if unmanaged, would increase it. 
 The heat stress models used underestimate the heat death relationship at higher 
daytime temperatures as indicated by the number of anomalous deaths 
estimated in the 2009 heatwave compared to the baseline estimate.  
 Outputs for the Melbourne region and SE Australia from over 20 climate models 
show a similar pattern of step changes in maximum temperature in all models. 
Similar changes are considered highly likely under warming conditions. Whether 
they are limited by reductions in greenhouse gas emissions might be assumed, 
but this has yet to be shown. 
3.3.2 Fire risk 
Based on recent rapid increases in the forest fire danger index (FFDI) in south-east 
Australia and step changes in key climate variables that influence FFDI, fire risk has 
the potential to change rapidly under climate change putting people, forest resources 
and ecosystems at risk.  
 
As for the heat stress case study, we compare standard time slice assessments for 
2020 and 2050 and smooth projections to 2100, with those using direct model output 
estimating annual variability in fire risk. 
 
Keating and Handmer (2013) estimate current bushfire damage costs associated with 
the Victorian agricultural and timber industries developed from Stephenson’s (2010) 
estimates of the cost of five major bushfires from 1983–2009, complemented by data 
from three further fires. Two scenarios for future fire weather are taken from Lucas et 
al.’s (2007) models of predicted increases in days when FFDI exceeds 50. 
 
They estimate the current total cost to the Victorian economy due to bushfire damage 
to the agricultural industry (including business disruption costs) to be $92 million per 
annum, and then extrapolate future losses. The baseline scenario accounts for 
increases in exposure only (Table 7). 
 
With no adaptive change, by 2050 increases in bushfire damage to the agricultural 
industry due to climate change would cost the Victorian economy an additional $1.4 
billion (or $47.9 million per annum by 2050) over and above the no climate change 
scenario. (Table 7; High Mk3 climate change scenario, 5% discount rate, 2011AUD). 
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Table 7. Total damage costs to Vic agricultural industry under baseline and 
climate change scenarios by 2020 and 2050, $millions $AUD 2011 
Scenario for change in 
number of days where 
FFDI>50 
2020 
No 
climate 
change 
2020 low 
mk2 – 
11% 
2020  
high mk3 
– 40% 
2050  
No 
climate 
change 
2050 
low 
mk2 
– 
19% 
2050  
high mk3 
– 138% 
Present Value 
(discount rate = 5%) 
$922.2 $972.0 $1,090.8 $2,457.3 
$2,8
01.6 
$3,874.5 
 
The current total cost to the Victorian economy due to bushfire damage to the timber 
industry (including business disruption costs) is estimated to be $185 million per 
annum. The baseline scenario accounts for increases in exposure only (Table 8). 
 
With no adaptive change, by 2050 increases in bushfire damage to the timber industry 
due to climate change will have cost the Victorian economy an additional $2.85 billion 
(or $96.2 million per annum by 2050) over and above the no climate change scenario. 
(High Mk3 climate change scenario, 5% discount rate, 2011AUD). 
Table 8. Total bushfire damage costs to Vic timber industry under baseline and 
climate scenarios by 2020 and 2050, $millions AUD2011. 
Scenario for change 
in number of days 
where FFDI>50 
2020 No 
climate 
change 
2020 
low 
mk2 – 
11% 
2020 
high 
mk3 – 
40% 
2050 No 
climate 
change 
2050 
low 
mk2 – 
19% 
2050 
high 
mk3 – 
138% 
Present Value 
(discount rate = 5%) 
$1,850.9 $1,950.8 $2,189.4 $4,931.9 $5,622.9 $7,776.3 
 
Keating and Handmer (2013) also estimate the cost of bushfires to the intangible 
assets of ecosystem services. They find that by 2050, increases in bushfire damage in 
south-eastern Australian ecosystems due to climate change will have cost an additional 
$1.5 billion, over and above the costs if no climate change took place. 
 
The estimates by Keating and Handmer (2013) are considered to be too low because 
current cost estimates are limited by data availability. These estimates are based on a 
simple, linear extrapolation that assumes a one-to-one relationship between damage 
and increases in extreme heat days, which is methodologically convenient but likely to 
under-estimate losses. 
 
Non-linear changes in FFDI estimated from changes in annual temperature and rainfall 
anomalies were estimated from data taken from the Laverton station and calculations 
of FFDI from Lucas (2009) adjusted to remove inhomogeneities in wind data. They 
were applied to the same economic data as sued by Keating and Handmer (2013) and 
applied to model climate output using a transfer function for days above high fire 
danger. Figure 16 shows statistically significant step changes in the early 2000s and 
mid-2050s, with intervening periods showing a mild trend. The changes in the early 
2000s are similar in scale to recent changes in FFDI for Victoria (Figure 17).  
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Figure 16. Estimated changes in days of high to catastrophic fire danger based 
single model run of annual maximum temperature and total rainfall from a grid 
square over Melbourne from the CSIRO Mark3.5 A1B model, based on Laverton 
data. 
 
 
Figure 17. Average number of days of high to catastrophic fire danger days per 
year from nine Victorian stations, adjusted for inhomogeneities in wind speed. 
Original data from Lucas (2009). 
 
Resulting total losses are similar for both gradual and variable scenarios (Table 9), and 
are slightly higher than those of Keating and Handmer (2013) for 2020 and slightly 
lower by 2050. This is because from 2010–2050, there is little trend in the input data, 
followed by a step change in 2056, then another period of little trend to 2100 (Figure 
18a). 
 
Figure 18b–d shows the potential losses can increase significantly in dollar terms in 
future, with Figure 18c showing close to the net costs of climate change has the 
discount rate is almost equal to the underlying increases in exposure. The model 
shows that an early investment in adaptation would pay off compared to a wait and see 
strategy, but lack of change mid-century sees wait and see take over as the best 
strategy, except that the step change in 2057 causes damages to escalate rapidly even 
under discounted losses. 
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Table 9. Total losses to agriculture and timber production by 2020, 2050 and 2099 
due to changing fire risk under baseline and climate scenarios representing 
gradual and variable change. 
 2020 
Gradual 
climate 
2020 
Variable 
climate 
2050 
Gradual 
climate 
2050 
Variable 
climate 
2099 
Gradual 
climate 
2099 
Variable 
climate 
Agriculture loss, 
$millions AUD2011, 
no disc. Rate 
$1,498 $1,467 $10,697 $10,521 $70,623 $71,150 
Timber loss, 
$millions AUD2011, 
no disc. Rate 
$3,006 $3,304 $21,470 $21,115 $141,742 $142,800 
Total loss, $millions 
AUD2011, 5% disc. 
Rate 
$3,501 $3,875 $11,145 $11,210 $18,175 $18,415 
 
a b  
 
c  d   
Figure 18. Average number of days of extreme–catastrophic fire danger for 
Victoria derived from maximum temperature and rainfall from the CSIRO Mk3.5 
A1B simulation. a) Data represented for fire years, showing output (red line), 
trends (brown dashed line), separated by a step change (2057), along with a 
simple trend (dotted red line). Annual loss and accrued difference between the 
raw data and trend line in $million AUD2011 for b) zero discount rate, b) 2.5% 
discount rate, and d) 5% discount rate. 
 
Many of the caveats for this case study carry through from the previous one. One 
reason why the fire risk case study shows less non-linear behaviour than heat alone is 
that rainfall in model output shows fewer step changes than temperature. Statistically 
significant step changes occur in only about half of twenty models investigated for 
south-east Australia, whereas temperature showed multiple step changes in all models. 
This may be due to climate models not representing hydrological sensitivity to climate 
change well enough, rainfall being less prone to such changes or a combination of 
both. 
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3.3.3 Assessing risks and risk propagation 
Management of domain crossing – also conceptualised as boundary crossing – 
requires clear ownership and responsibility for the risk concerned and, in many cases, 
for the impacts resulting from an event connected with the risk.  A focus on the impacts 
alone will likely result in the risk or threat being ignored or treated as someone else’s 
responsibility.  It also requires coordination across government and across society, as 
the risk crosses into many sectors, jurisdictions and temporal and spatial scales.  The 
risk needs to be owned, and considered as a whole so as not to inadvertently 
facilitate maladaptation – adverse impacts as a result of the risk management process 
in a sector or domain that should have been, but was not involved.  
 
Climate risks are defined here according to a modification of Rosa (2003) as a climate-
related situation or event where something of human value (including humans 
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.  
 
Values at risk can be considered as any monetary or non-monetary value attached to 
the function or existence of an entity or process. Values can be determined by a wide 
range of economic or survey methods and range from monetary, fungible values 
(readily substitutable) through to a stated value expressed in qualitative terms.  
 
Often there is a tension between who values a risk and who has responsibility for 
managing that risk, especially for intangibles attached to social and environmental 
values. Often risk ownership is shared – institutional analysis can be used to determine 
shared ownership and thus the context and potential for adaptation. In governance 
terms, one institution may set the formal rules (e.g., state or federal government), 
another may manage the risk in its current status (e.g., local government or industry) 
and yet another may be responsible for planning future adaptations (e.g., another state 
department, a regulator or appointed working party). 
 
A key concern of this project is the propagation of risks across domains. An identifiable 
geographic, sectoral or institutional scale is referred to as a domain. A domain is 
considered as an area of institutional influence that is exercised through governance. 
That sphere of influence is delineated by rules, control, knowledge and agency. 
Regions and levels of government form an important link between geographic and 
institutional domains (Figure 19).  
 
Climate-related risks, mainly extremes, will occur singly or combine in generally 
unpredictable ways, propagating across domains if they are large enough, if several 
are in quick succession or stress accumulates over time. The crossing point between 
domains can be considered as thresholds or boundary crossings. These thresholds 
mark the point where an impact crosses into another domain or where the 
responsibility for responding to or managing a risk crosses domains. These thresholds 
are equivalent to those in Section 3.1.3, where some form of coping capacity is 
exceeded, inviting a management response. If an impact crosses domains and there is 
no corresponding institutional responsibility for responding to the resulting risk or to 
future risks, then those risks are un-owned. 
 
Areas of risks crossing domains based on recent climate-related events include the 
high-income flood levy to pay for the Commonwealth support for the Queensland 
2010–11 floods; enquiries in Queensland, Victoria and the ACT to investigate fires and 
floods; land buybacks after the Victorian and Queensland floods and Victorian fires; 
Commonwealth support for rebuilding after tropical cyclones in Queensland; responses 
to the drought of the century via state intervention in desalination, and so on.  
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Figure 19. Schematic representation of spatial and government domains with 
some extreme events likely to cross domains either singly or in succession. 
 
Domain-crossing brings up the following concerns:  
1. Who values the risk and who is responsible for it before it in its normal state?” 
And if it propagates from one domain to another: 
2. How does that risk manifest in the new domain, who accepts the responsibility in 
its new domain and who may be responsible for adapting?”; and  
3. “What is the threshold/limit that marks the crossing of domains?” 
Managing risk domain crossing in Australia 
Cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional collaboration are needed to reduce the negative 
impacts of domain crossing.  We consider the readily available national mechanisms 
for risk identification and management, and the main impediments to this occurring.  
 
National mechanisms and institutional framework: 
 
National approaches to managing climate (and other) risks such as NERAG (National 
Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines (National Emergency Management 
Committee, 2010)) and its four national implementing committees, NFRAG (National 
Flood Risk Advisory Group), and AFAC (the peak association of Australian fire and 
emergency management agencies) and its national committees, the National Police 
and Emergency Management Ministers Council and occasional action by COAG, the 
national recovery and hardship grants system, as well as the national Emergency 
National
State
Regional
Local
Drought Fire Storm
Flood Heatwave
Threshold
Threshold
Threshold
Spatial and government 
domains
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Manual series by EMA (now Attorney Generals) appear to provide a national 
institutional framework of long standing for the identification and management of 
climate related hazards and risks in Australia.  The national research bodies of 
NCCARF and the Bushfire CRC (and to a lesser extent VCCCAR and its NSW 
equivalent), have provided research support.   
 
There is a national standard (based on the Australian standard AS/NZS4360, now the 
international risk management standard ISO31000 (ISO, 2009)), for the management 
of emergencies, which prescribes a process and, to some extent, suggests a national 
approach if all relevant agencies adopt them.  This is set out in the NERAG guidelines 
mentioned above.  There is not a standard for Climate Change Adaptation at present, 
but the mechanism for its development exists.   
 
The most recent addition to a national approach for the management of emergencies 
and climate risks was in 2011 with the announcement of the National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience (COAG, 2011a). This is a document setting out a strategy where 
the responsibility for the management of natural hazards would be revisited and all 
parts of Australian society, including communities and individuals, would be expected 
to play their role.  There is more on the strategy’s main themes below.   
 
The main gap in terms of clear processes is with exposure to hazards.  Exposure, in 
terms of people and economic activities, appears to be expanding steadily, despite 
calls from COAG (2004) and post-disaster enquiries (Teague et al., 2010), for example,  
the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2011. It is driven by other factors considered 
in the planning process and natural hazards are rarely seen as a significant issue.  
Given that national projections are for a doubling of Australia’s population over the next 
50 years, exposure will become much more of an issue.  Increasing exposure is not 
simply an Australian issue – globally it is the main driver of increasing disaster losses 
(IPCC, 2012b).  
 
Another significant gap in national cross-domain institutional capacity appears to be in 
learning from disasters and, just as importantly, learning from near-misses. Australia 
holds many post-impact enquiries which make many, often high-profile  
recommendations.  It is unclear to what extent these are implemented so as to improve 
practice and outcomes both for the risk and for response in an emergency.  This issue 
is of particular concern with climate change adaptation, as learning and change to 
adapt to new circumstances is seen as fundamental.  Without learning, adaptation will 
be accidental.   
 
National processes, committees and guidelines exist and there is a strengthening 
commitment to national uniformity suggesting that the future could bring greater 
collaboration across jurisdictions and sectors.  However, ownership of risk in terms of 
action, as opposed to policy and guidelines, is not as well catered for.  It is very easy to 
blame constitutional arrangements, but compared with the EU and most federations, 
Australia’s system of government is relatively simple.  Nevertheless there is partial risk 
ownership through ownership of the risk identification and assessment processes, but 
cross-domain arrangements fall away when it comes to implementation on the ground.   
 
The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
 
The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) was released in 2011, just after 
the severe floods in Queensland (COAG, 2011a).  Its introduction quotes the Prime 
Minister’s National Security Statement of 2008; “Climate change represents the most 
fundamental national security change for the long-term future.”  It is based around a 
number of actions emphasising collaboration, capability development, knowledge and 
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responsibility.  It is important to note that at present “resilience” is not defined by the 
strategy and no quantitative criteria for measurement are proposed.    
 
Senior officials have been tasked, and government committees have been established, 
in many Australian jurisdictions to promote the strategy and its implementation. It has 
generated intense interest and debate about the role of government and the 
appropriateness of a “resilience” approach.   
 
The strategy (as set out in its published form) appears to fit well with the concept of 
domain crossing by risks, as it contains some of the key elements needed to manage 
cross-domain issues.  It explicitly addresses the questions of risk ownership and 
responsibility for that risk in a whole of society context.  It does not answer these 
questions or provide solutions, but it highlights their importance and suggests an 
approach based on building a resilient society.  
 
The strategy argues for much more than a whole of government approach – it 
advocates a whole of national approach integrated across government, commerce and 
civil society.  Part of this would involve interoperability, resource-sharing and expertise 
across the country.  At this stage there are no details on implementation, although a 
high degree of collaboration and sharing of knowledge, expertise and resources should 
reduce the issues associated with domain boundaries.   
 
Domain crossing by risks 
 
Larger complex risks and events are more likely to cross multiple domains because 
they naturally spread across jurisdictions, involve multiple parties and sectors, and are 
loosely bounded in space and time (see also “complex unbounded problems” in 
Handmer and Dovers (2013)).  More frequent extreme climate events could result in 
more frequent domain crossing, but climate extremes alone are only part of the picture.  
Increases in exposure are probably the major factors behind increased disaster losses 
(IPCC, 2012b), and the apparent increased complexity of disasters. Increased 
exposure includes: 
 increases in population; 
 changes in population location to higher hazard areas such as bushfire-prone 
forests; 
 greater use of bush areas for recreation and lifestyle changes; and  
 economic activities, in particular infrastructure and recreational, in hazard-prone 
areas. 
Changes in livelihoods and the complexity and interdependence of our systems and 
society, the ready mobilisation of national and international assistance, expanding use 
of the military in emergencies, aid and compensation from national and international 
sources, and what can be seen as a tendency to allocate blame and responsibility to 
identified individuals rather than to sectors or to social priorities, all contribute to 
complexity and multiple domains in disaster.   
 
Domain crossing is not simply a large complex event. A well-defined event, such as an 
intense hail storm or building fire, can have far-reaching, even global, repercussions 
through, for example, the subsequent enquiry, decisions made by insurers, or litigation.  
These can involve sectors and jurisdictions that have no direct impact from, or role in, 
the event or even in the management of the risk.  They can make the risk appear 
unbounded in space or time.  A specific example is provided by food security.  In 
Australia, most food is distributed through a few nodes or transhipment points from 
where it is sent to local distributors.  The national food logistics chain is an outstanding 
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example of ‘just in time’ management, and at any one time contains a few days food 
supply (Keating, 2013). Severe disruption of a node by a bushfire (an emergency 
management incident), could have a major impact on food supply logistics (commercial 
food transport and logistics) in a capital city (people, food dependant and related 
commerce, and state and local government) with flow-on effects to more isolated 
regional locations.  If a significant food shortage developed, rationing would be required 
and critical facilities such as hospitals and schools would need priority.  The event 
would quickly become a crisis of confidence in risk governance. 
 
3.3.4 Adaptation clusters 
Impacts have a range of values with different economic and ethical characteristics. 
Impacts on values can range from immediate loss to long-term erosion of values; their 
recovery time will also vary. The economic effects of impacts range from being direct 
(tangible) to indirect (intangible), they range from being substitutable to irreplaceable 
and from being a permanent loss to being recoverable through various means. 
 
Based on these broad effects, we have divided impacts into five types of adaptation 
clusters: goods (production systems); services (operational systems); capital assets; 
human and natural assets; and infrastructure. This so that these different values can be 
explored using a variety of valuation methods, rather than trying to monetise them all 
into a single, fungible value system where any value can be exchanged with any other. 
 
The five clusters are summarised below: 
 Goods – production system threats and opportunities range from being climate 
centric (e.g., food and fibre, some tourism, water supply, power supply) to climate 
influenced (e.g., mining, tourism, construction, power generation and distribution), 
in order of decreasing sensitivity. Loss of production comes at a direct cost to the 
economy. 
 Services – includes operations not included in production systems such as 
transport and logistics, communication and general commercial services – the 
largest proportion of the Australian economy. Interrupted services and supply 
chains will come at a direct cost to the economy. Services range from being 
climate sensitive (tourism) to being relatively insensitive to all but disasters. 
 Capital assets and infrastructure – standing assets affected by climate and 
weather events, climate-induced deterioration and sea level rise processes may 
need protection, retrofitting or retirement. New assets and infrastructure may 
need to be built to cope with a changed climate. The net economic impacts of 
rebuilding existing assets and building new fit for purpose assets are opportunity 
and transaction costs that will be returned as avoided damages at a later date.  
 Social assets and infrastructure – changes to society and human welfare that 
include health, education, social connectedness, finance and savings and the 
arts and humanities. These largely constitute adaptive capacity, but also may 
have inherent value (e.g., human health, knowledge and art). Links between this 
cluster and the economy may not be direct and are often difficult to measure, but 
are notable if they degrade or become absent. 
 Natural assets and infrastructure – changes to the environment affecting 
ecosystem services in the form of green infrastructure, direct goods and services 
including cultural services and amenity value. The direct cost to the economy 
through the loss of natural assets is extremely difficult to calculate. At the global 
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scale, ecosystem collapse can lead to catastrophic economic impacts. At the 
national scale, long-term economic and social returns could be substantially 
reduced by a failure to invest in maintenance and ecological resilience. 
 
A sensitivity analysis assigned each of 168 economic activities to a particular cluster, 
as classified by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Each activity was then classified 
according to high, medium and low sensitivity to climate change after Jones and Webb 
(2008).  
 
Table 10 shows fifteen Australian economic sectors divided into the five clusters. 
Asterisks mark particular sectors as having important attributes of adaptive capacity. 
Opportunities for adaptation are also briefly described. 
 
We summed gross income from the financial year 2005–06 to get a rough estimate of 
the contribution of each cluster to the economy. Figure 20a shows a national summary 
of adaptation clusters as a proportion of gross national income. This is approximate 
because at the activity level, some activities combine adaptation clusters. For example, 
some tourism and agricultural activities will draw income from environmental assets 
and infrastructure. There is also a two-way relationship between many services and 
social assets and infrastructure.  
 
These clusters show differing weights in the monetary economy (Figure 20). These 
relative differences, rather than the exact numbers themselves, are important for 
addressing the different values at risk from climate change. Expenditure patterns will 
show a somewhat different picture. For example, governments and private landholders 
both spend money on social and natural assets and infrastructure, which would raise 
the proportion of those clusters above 12.6% and 0.1% respectively. They would, 
however, remain comparatively small compared to the other three, whether assessed 
in income or expenditure terms.  
 
To create a more complete picture, national accounts for environmental and social 
assets need to be integrated with financial accounting, but in such a way that combines 
income and assets without double counting. 
 
Figure 20b shows the sensitivity of total gross annual income to climate impacts at the 
national level. Because the sensitivity of each activity was rated at the national rather 
than regional scale, some activities rated at low or negligible levels nationally may be 
highly-exposed in certain regions (e.g., infrastructure in fire prone areas or on the 
coast). A regional breakdown of exposure and sensitivity according to statistical 
divisions or local government level would show greater levels of sensitivity to rapidly 
changing risks than can be achieved using a national assessment. 
 
Having a more detailed picture of values at risk as a function of hazards, sensitivity and 
exposure is necessary for undertaking a comprehensive economic assessment of rapid 
change scenarios. 
 
  
64 Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change  
 
Table 10. Australian sectors showing adaptation situation with main threats and 
opportunities, couched in general economic terms. 
Sector Cluster type Main threats Potential 
opportunities 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
Goods Production losses, asset 
damage 
Goods gains, lifestyle 
diversification, research 
to value more fully the 
worth of these assets 
Mining Goods Production losses, asset 
damages, supply chain 
disruption 
Raw materials for new 
tech, development of 
resilient strategies, 
policies and 
infrastructure. 
Manufacturing Goods Supply chain Adaptation products 
 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply 
Goods/Services/Capital 
assets 
Raw material supply and 
operations, service 
delivery 
Transformation, inclusion 
of redundancies. 
Construction Goods/Capital assets Delays, supply chain, 
asset write-offs, 
diminished capital 
Adaptation of assets – 
Development of new 
materials and processes 
Wholesale Trade Services Supply chains, raw 
materials 
Flexible supply, good 
forecasts 
Retail Trade Services Supply chains, raw 
materials 
Flexible supply, strategic 
alternatives  to  fulfilling 
consumer needs,  
Accommodation, 
Cafes and 
Restaurants 
Services Disruption to food and 
energy supply, damage 
to assets, diminished 
capital, increase in 
demand 
Strategic sourcing of 
food, alternative energy 
supplies,  
 
Transport and 
Storage 
Services* Infrastructure damage, 
damage to assets,  
Flexible arrangements for 
disaster and recovery. 
The development of new 
technologies and material 
Communication 
Services 
Services* Infrastructure damage, 
disruption of service 
delivery  
Flexible arrangements for 
disaster and recovery, 
new tech for adaptation. 
Backup systems 
Finance and 
Insurance 
Human Assets* Large insurance losses, 
finance shortages 
Services for adaptation 
Property and 
Business Services 
Capital Assets* Economic dislocation at 
regional scale 
New ownership models, 
part in setting standards 
Government 
Administration 
and Defence 
Services/Human 
Assets* 
Lack of capacity to be 
able to respond 
effectively. Poor 
communication, poor 
coordination, poor 
information 
Policy, emergency and 
disaster, funding for 
adaptation, support for 
building adaptive 
capacity 
 
Education Services/Human 
Assets* 
Severe weather events 
and disasters affecting 
operations. Poor 
information, lack of 
appropriate policies 
Policy development and 
awareness building and 
training in relation to 
rapid changes. 
 
Health and 
Community 
Services 
Services/Human 
Assets* 
Lack of capacity to 
deliver services to 
vulnerable communities. 
Poor information 
Capacity building for 
sector, the development 
of appropriate information 
and strategies 
Cultural and 
Recreational 
Services 
Services/Natural 
Assets * 
Loss of services and 
basic system functions. 
Community 
disconnection 
Models for community 
engagement, making the 
invisible economies 
visible. Capitalising on 
the current  cultural and 
social systems 
* Sectors carrying a significant degree of adaptive capacity 
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a  
b  
Figure 20. National summary of adaptation clusters according to a) gross income 
2005–06, and b) sensitivity as a proportion of income. 
 
3.3.5 Understanding the problem at the national scale 
In this project, we have summarised localised case studies in order to illustrate the 
issue of rapid climate change. The elements of the problem that need to be understood 
at the national scale include: 
 The regions likely to be most affected by rapidly changing extremes. Although 
this can be judged qualitatively, some quantitative studies using climate model 
data would be beneficial; 
 The values exposed in those regions measured according to adaptation cluster 
and exposure to rapidly changing hazards. This will comprise an economic 
geography of current and potential future risks; and 
 The resulting institutional structures most likely to be affected by rapidly changing 
risks at the regional to national scale. 
20.1%
22.0%
0.1%
45.2%
12.6% Capital Assets & 
Infrastructure
Goods
Natural Assets & 
Infrastructure
Services
Social Assets & 
Infrastructure
3.7%
4.5%
62.6%
29.2%
High
Medium
Low
Negligible
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The first two points combined can be used to develop an economic geography of 
climate risk, building on the preliminary version in the previous section. A more detailed 
version could be developed using regional economic data and past and future hazards. 
As yet, Australia does not have a national hazard database, although Geoscience 
Australia is in the process of building one. Risk Frontiers at Macquarie University has a 
database of historical insurance events under intellectual property protection. The last 
published national hazard map was by Blong (2005), who integrated six hazards: 
bushfire; earthquake; flood; landslide; thunderstorm; and tropical cyclone into a map of 
existing hazard and hazard potential (Figure 21). 
 
The economic geography of exposure to rapidly changing hazards in Australia remains 
unknown, although a casual glance at the economics of the adaptation clusters, which 
will follow population density (overlain on Figure 21) would suggest that high values 
and hazards coincide on the east coast of Australia, the south-east and the south-west. 
Asset data-bases are held by private industry, Geoscience Australia and a range of 
state agencies. Spatial tools that can combine hazards with assets, such as that being 
developed by the Victorian Managed Insurance Authority, will be of immense value in 
projecting future risk. 
 
 
Figure 21. Integrated natural hazards map of Australia developed from past 
hazard vulnerability (30%) and hazard potential (70%) (Blong, 2005). 
 
The joint filters of gradualism and predictive power also limit the questions being asked 
of climate impact and risk assessments. The past few years have seen successive 
droughts, bushfires and heatwaves interspersed with flood events and tropical storms 
that are increasing the cost burden both publically and privately. Their cumulative 
impact, or the potential for such events to escalate and cross ill-defined critical 
thresholds, is unknown. Sufficient knowledge exists to create credible scenarios 
involving a rapid change and succession of extreme events, and to test various 
adaptation management strategies. 
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Our earlier analysis suggests that large-scale propagation of risks across the Australian 
economy and policy landscape due to rapid changes in climate extremes is likely to 
occur in the future. Such changes include: 
1. likely step changes in temperature; 
2. potential step changes in rainfall; and  
3. combinations of severe weather events coming in rapid succession, some 
related to climate regimes such as ENSO and others unrelated. 
 
The interval between extreme weather events will become smaller, even if some 
events (such as tropical cyclones) retain their current frequency but increase in 
severity. The recovery time between such events would then reduce, perhaps rapidly. 
Potential damages will also accelerate due to increases in exposure, especially in 
coastal and fire prone peri-urban areas. 
 
Two pieces of information are vital to understanding the potential future risk burden. 
The first is the economic geography of climate-related risks across Australia and the 
second is a comprehensive accounting of the exposure to change taking in monetary, 
social and environmental concerns. Superimposing rapid changes on this framework 
and assessing total costs may provide an approximate order of magnitude estimate of 
future risks. 
 
3.3.6 Key factors for assessing and valuing rapid change 
This section summarises a number of methods and tools that contribute to economic 
assessments. The application of these economic methods and tools is summarised in 
Section 3.2.3. 
 
Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is usually associated with predicting various outcomes of a cause and 
effect process, in this case the ‘climate change problem’, and with assessing various 
options to manage that problem. These can be considered as predictive and diagnostic 
uncertainties associated with exploratory (what happens when … ) and normative 
(what happens if … ) scenarios (Carter et al., 2007). Uncertainties that are considered 
less frequently include framing uncertainties – that shape an action situation and frame 
its boundaries, and conceptual uncertainties – that assess the existing models for 
understanding the particular problem-solution-implementation context (Mastrandrea et 
al., 2010) and whether they are qualitative or quantitative. 
 
Uncertainties that relate to understanding the problem include: 
 Uncertainty about the extent of future greenhouse gas emissions, which depends 
on future scenarios of global mitigation agreements, global population growth and 
technological change (IPCC, 2007a). 
 Uncertainty about the effect of emissions on mean climate variables. Climate 
models predict some of these variables better than others (Agrawala et al., 2012; 
IPCC, 2012b). 
 Uncertainty about changing extremes, which is larger than for mean changes 
(CSIRO and BoM, 2007) but is arguably more important for adaptation decision-
making (Jotzo, 2010). 
 Local level projections, which are more uncertain than global projections (CSIRO 
and BoM, 2007), although most adaptation decisions are experienced at the local 
scale (Agrawala et al., 2012). 
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 Uncertainty about future socio-demographic conditions and future vulnerabilities 
(Handmer et al., 2012a). 
 The evolution of values attached to impacts and risks extending over time 
(Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.4.3). Traditional economic theory has a difficult time 
calculating net present value when the probabilities of outcomes in the future are 
unknown (Ackerman and Stanton, 2011). 
These uncertainties then feed into assessments of the costs of solutions and the 
benefits of various options. Many decisions, such as infrastructure standards, 
settlement patterns and those affecting environmental and ecological resources 
resonate far into the future. When these long time spans are coupled with the 
uncertainty regarding the impacts of climate change maladaptation becomes a risk 
worthy of attention (Hallegatte et al., 2011). 
 
Of particular concern is ‘deep uncertainty’, uncertainty that results from myriad factors 
both scientific and social, and consequently is difficult to accurately define and quantify 
(Kandlikar et al., 2005). These affect investment appraisal in the following ways (Jones, 
2011; Hallegatte et al., 2012):  
 analysts do not know or cannot agree on the models that relate key forces that 
shape the future;  
 the probability distributions of key variables and parameters in these models is 
unknown; 
 There is disagreement over the concept of problem-solution development that 
revolves around the perception of risk; and  
 the value of alternative outcomes cannot be readily quantified and/or is 
contested. 
 
The problem of rapid changes in climate, especially those affecting extremes, is not 
amenable to standard climate impact and adaptation assessment methods. By 
assessing such changes at the institutional scale, we face the issue of several 
problems – many measures (Section 1.2.3). Even though an institution may be able to 
assess a problem on their own terms, the need to avoid ‘siloed thinking’ requires 
decisions to be made using a range of methods, rather than any single method or 
model, in order to be able to negotiate the results with other actors. 
 
Decision-making methodologies that are able to deal with aspects of climate-related 
uncertainty include CBA under uncertainty, CBA with real options, state-contingent 
CBA, robust decision-making, and climate-informed decision analysis (Adamson et al., 
2009; Hallegatte et al., 2012). Hallegatte et al. (2012) concludes that it is impossible to 
define the ‘best’ solution for managing uncertainty, requiring a menu of methodologies, 
together with guidance on which strategies are most appropriate in which contexts 
(Hallegatte et al., 2012). Climate-informed decision making and robust decision making 
(see also Ranger et al., 2010) involve a substantial stakeholder process with a strong 
learning capability and are more relevant to dealing with large problem uncertainty, but 
when outcomes are also uncertain, remain limited in their effectiveness.  
 
The one common thread with respect to increasing uncertainty and complexity in 
decision-making is the importance of process. Processes uncertainties can be 
managed along the following themes:  
 ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are involved in decision-making;  
 improving partial knowledge using innovation and learning processes; 
 social learning needs to be addressed at the organisational scale; and 
 using a range of tools to diagnose options under different value settings. 
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Discount rates 
 
Discounting in economics is used to determine the present value of future costs and 
benefits. Discount rates are usually positive because they reflect a preference for 
consumption today over consumption tomorrow (temporal discounting) – a dollar today 
is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. Discounting is also a measure of opportunity cost 
for available funds – in a growing economy, sensible investment will yield better returns 
than leaving the money under the mattress.  
 
The size of the discount rate determines how much the future is discounted vis a vis 
the present2. The most pertinent issue for discount rates under climate change is that 
of intergenerational equity. Because decisions made today will have significant impacts 
for generations to come, the treatment of the discount rate is crucial (Ackerman and 
Stanton, 2011). A discussion between researchers and Victorian decision makers 
concluded that the treatment of the discount rate was a critical factor for setting 
adaptation priorities Batterbury (2010). 
 
The issue is further complicated because other forms of discounting affect how 
discount rates are used. Spatial discounting suggests what is further away matters less 
(Pearce et al., 2003; Shwom et al., 2008). Risk tolerance and spatial and temporal 
inequality are only weakly correlated so need to be considered separately (Atkinson et 
al., 2009). Ackerman and Stanton (2011) argue that all analyses should include a 
statement explaining the choice of discount rate. They further suggest that when the 
case of a particular choice of discount rate is weak the discount rate should be varied 
and multiple results reported. 
 
Social discount rates in Australia 
 
In Australia, 8% SDR was used in 1991 and the Social Opportunity Cost (SOC) has 
been reviewed annually since then. The Commonwealth’s Office of Best Practice 
Regulation recommends rates around 7% real (before-tax rate of return on private 
investment, the investment or producer rate), with sensitivity testing at 3% and 11% 
(Australian Government, 2007, 2010b). The NSW Treasury also recommends using a 
real rate of 7% (with sensitivity tests using 4% and 10%) (New South Wales Treasury, 
1997). The Queensland Treasury used to recommend 6% but now requests that it be 
consulted over the appropriate rate (mainly to determine the appropriate risk premium) 
(Queensland Treasury, 2006). Infrastructure Australia recommends cost-benefit studies 
submitted to it should use ‘real risk free’ discount rates of 4%, 7% and 10% 
(Infrastructure Australia, 2008). The Department of Health and Ageing and enHealth 
Council (2003) recommends evaluating environmental health policies with a discount 
rate of 5%, with sensitivity tests ranging from 3% to 7%.  
 
According to Harrison (2010), the justifications given vary; the rate is said to represent 
the social rate of time preference, the consumers’ rate of time preference (the 
consumption rate of interest), the risk free rate, or the government’s cost of funds. For 
example, the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (2007) recommends 
3.5%, ‘a recent average of the ten year Commonwealth bond rate to determine the risk 
free opportunity cost of capital’, The Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance 
(2007) endorses 3.5% (but adds a risk premium of 6% when assessing private sector 
                                               
2
 For a full discussion of discount rates generally and as they pertain to Victorian climate change 
adaptation, see earlier work from this project Keating, A. and Handmer, J. (2011b) Options for assessing 
the cost of climate change for adaptation policy in Victoria. VCCCAR Project: Framing Adaptation in the 
Victorian Context, Working Paper 2, Victorian Centre for Climate Change Adaptation Research, 
Melbourne. 
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bids for public-private partnerships). The South Australian Treasury (2007) also uses 
the long-term government bond rate as a risk free rate, estimated to be 5% real. The 
Department of Treasury and Finance Tasmania (1996) recommends the long-term 
Commonwealth bond rate plus 1% as ‘the long-term cost of funds to the Government’. 
 
As there is no professional consensus on the value of SDR that should be used, 
Harrison (2010) suggests that the appropriate response is to conduct sensitivity 
analysis. The Office of Best Practice recommends using an appropriate rate to 
measure the opportunity cost of investment and deferred consumption (Australian 
Government, 2010b), and encourages full costs to be taken into account. However, it 
also suggests managing equity and distributional effects explicitly. It is important to 
recognise that cost-benefit analysis uses the yardstick of efficiency so is not structured 
to address such concerns (Harrison, 2010). Therefore, it is recommended that such 
considerations be made explicit via analysis, quantified as much as is feasible, so that 
alternative views are visible. Questions of equity and fairness are a policy judgement to 
be weighed up with other concerns rather than being a direct result of the analysis 
(Australian Government, 2010b). 
 
SDRs used for recent climate change assessments (Jones and Preston, 2006; Stern 
and Treasury of Great Britain, 2007; Garnaut, 2008) are generally lower than the 
Australian Government’s low bound of 3% for sensitivity analysis (Australian 
Government, 2010b). Australian government discount rates are also higher than most 
other developed countries when taking long-term social returns into account – we do 
not value the future very highly. The low SDRs used for climate change assessments, 
although controversial (Weitzman, 2007b; Yohe and Tol, 2008), have mainly 
referenced mitigation. The short to long timelines, different value settings as captured 
in the adaptation clusters, and widely different expected rates of return on those 
values, suggest that appropriate discount rates for adaptation could range widely from 
higher discount rates linked to profitable adaptation strategies to very low or possibly 
negative discount rates associated with major natural systems underpinning broader 
social and environmental values. 
 
Low-probability, high-impact events 
 
Low-probability high-impact events are a challenge for climate economics (Weitzman, 
2007a). Catastrophic disasters are one such possibility. Recent research also warns of 
the possibility of reaching a climatic tipping point that shifts the entire climate system 
with catastrophic outcomes for human welfare (Lenton et al., 2008). These types of 
events are inherently uncertain and will remain so; learning by doing or a wait and see 
approach are not appropriate options (Ackerman and Stanton, 2011). 
 
A key criticism of CBA is that the significant impacts of catastrophic events are given 
little importance because of the low-probability of these events (Hallegatte et al., 2011). 
The costs associated with catastrophes can be underestimated because traditional 
cost assessments typically ignore (potentially non-marginal) indirect and intangible 
impacts, which may be profound in the case of catastrophe. As Jotzo (2010) points out, 
the threat of these events in the foreseeable future is arguably the main driver behind 
the current impetus for climate change mitigation and adaptation action. The CBA 
methodology also does not consider the value placed on security of supply of essential 
items such as energy, food and water. 
 
These issues point towards a much more risk-averse approach to adaptation where the 
need to manage rapid changes in extremes is compatible with taking a more proactive 
approach to managing adverse outcomes, perhaps by seeking to transform, rather than 
a more conservative approach. 
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Intangibles 
 
Intangible effects are those are not measurable in monetary terms because they deal 
with assets not traded in the market place (Markantonis et al., 2012). Frequently cited 
categories of intangibles include health, environmental amenity, ecosystem services, 
cultural heritage and community cohesiveness. The mainstream approach to 
intangibles is useful within the context of a CBA, however it is rarely undertaken due to 
resource constraints and contested methodology. 
 
Including loss of life in a CBA is a relatively straightforward procedure. The Australian 
Office of Best Practice Regulation provides guidance on valuing lives in regulation 
appraisal for example (Australian Government, 2010b); they put the statistical value of 
life at $3.5 million (Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2008). While this is widely 
accepted by economists it is conceptually contentious in many other arenas (Moench 
et al., 2007). 
 
There is a significant literature on the methods available for valuing intangible impacts 
of both natural phenomena and policy initiatives. The purpose of these methodologies 
is to estimate the Total Economic Value (TEV) of the intangible asset that includes both 
use and non-use (existence) values (TEEB, 2009; Markantonis et al., 2012). 
 
Intangibles can be assessed using contingent valuation methods but this method is 
resource intensive, conceptually challenging and theoretically contentious (Barkmann 
et al., 2008). However, even conservative estimates suggest that intangible impacts 
are substantial. Using data on the impact of bushfire to ecosystems in Southeast 
Australia we estimate (Table 11), the predicted total damage cost of bushfires in 
Southeast Australia to ecosystem services by 2020 and 2050 (Keating and Handmer, 
2013). Based on these estimates, by 2050 increases in bushfire damage in Southeast 
Australia to ecosystems due to climate change will have cost an additional $1.5 billion, 
over and above the costs if no climate change took place. 
 
Table 11. The predicted total damage cost of bushfires in Southeast Australia to 
ecosystem services by 2020 and 2050 ($ millions) (Keating and Handmer, 2013). 
Total cost Discount 
rate 
No climate 
change 
Low mk2 
scenario 
High mk3 
scenario 
By 2020 i=5% $1,027 $1,079 $1,214 
 i=0.01% $1,288 $1,360 $1,549 
By 2050 i=5% $2,138 $2,348 $3,634 
 i=0.01% $4,731 $5,326 $9,817 
 
The valuation of intangibles is plagued by two significant ideological debates. Firstly, 
ecological economists argue that the possibility of trade-offs (substitutability) implied by 
aggregating methods such as CBA is invalid because there comes a point where we 
can no longer trade consumption for clean air (Neumayer, 2007). Secondly, at a 
deeper level many non-economists are uncomfortable with the prospect of attributing a 
monetary value to assets that they consider to be priceless (Farber et al., 2002; Bell et 
al., 2003). 
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Markantonis’ (2012) evaluation of willingness to pay for environmental services shows 
the broader acceptance of revealed preference (what people do) over stated 
preference techniques (what people say they do) in relation to current natural hazards. 
This method, however, is difficult to apply to future preferences. 
 
Numerous authors continue to advocate the requirement for valuations of intangibles in 
both natural hazards and climate change adaptation (Nunes and Ding, 2009; 
Markantonis et al., 2012). Studies from Australia and similar countries have shown that 
intangibles attract a very high value. For example, studies on flood loss show that 
people value the loss of memorabilia and the resulting anxiety at least as much as they 
value tangible losses (Handmer et al., 2012b). Stephenson’s (2010) assessment of the 
costs of bushfire in Southeast Australia found that estimates of ecosystem services 
values contributed significantly to the overall disaster cost. Omission of intangible 
effects in economic assessment of natural disasters can lead to significant 
underestimation of impacts and assessment bias (IPCC, 2012b; Markantonis et al., 
2012).  
 
Hard versus soft adaptation 
 
The literature on climate change adaptation distinguishes between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
adaptation options. Hard adaptation is adaptation via specific investments in physical 
assets, for example a sea wall. Soft adaptation relates to information, regulation, social 
behaviour and a range of institutional factors. The economic impact of soft initiatives 
are more difficult to estimate compared to hard options (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 
2008; Hallegatte et al., 2011). This may bias assessments to cost hard measures 
preferentially because they are more straightforward to calculate, potentially 
overlooking cheaper social options (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008).  
 
Soft adaptations should not be ignored due to estimation difficulties because they:  
 may be the most effective course of action;  
 are often be more cost-effective (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; 
Hallegatte et al., 2011); and  
 may be more flexible over time.  
Soft initiatives may also often be complementary with hard options. In this case, 
assessment complexity should not be seen as a barrier, because soft options can 
generate considerable benefits within an overall adaptation policy; an adaptation policy 
that ignores institutional issues for example, is unlikely to meet its objectives 
(Hallegatte et al., 2011; IPCC, 2012b). The use of innovation processes and of 
considering social and physical technology as complementary (as discussed in Section 
3.2.4), is important for overcoming the separation of approaches. 
 
Market-based instruments for climate change adaptation 
 
Market-based instruments (MBIs), are broadly defined as instruments or regulations 
that encourage behaviour through market signals rather than through explicit directives 
(Stavins, 2000). Stavins (2001) argues that MBIs harness market forces to redefine the 
agenda of firms and individuals for improved environmental outcomes that are in their 
own self-interest. MBIs are becoming a mainstream policy instruments for managing a 
wide range of environmental problems like climate change, biodiversity conservation, 
salinity and water management in Australia and other OECD countries. According to 
Whitten et al. (2004), environmental markets are a departure from traditional ‘command 
and control’ regulation of governments and if well-designed could drive down the 
environmental compliance costs.   
Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change 73 
 
The four categories of market failures that are addressed by MBIs are: poorly defined 
property rights, externalities, non-standard environmental values, incomplete and 
asymmetric information. According to Whitten et al. (2004), three potential levers that 
MBIs are able to employ are:  
 Price-based instruments that alter the prices of goods and services to reflect 
their relative impact. They provide certainty to industry as to the compliance 
costs of achieving an outcome but the environmental outcome generated to 
the broader community is uncertain. Examples are taxes, levies and 
subsidies. 
 Rights-based instruments designed to control the quantity of the 
environmental good or service (or a suitable proxy) to the socially desired 
level. These instruments provide certainty as to the environmental outcome 
but not as to the cost to industry of achieving that outcome. Examples are 
cap and trade and offset systems. 
 Instruments designed to reduce market friction aim to stimulate a market to 
produce a desired environmental outcome through improving the workings of 
existing markets by reducing transaction costs or improving information 
flows. Responses to market friction tend to be less certain and longer-term. 
Examples are ecolabelling or public disclosure schemes. 
A number of MBIs have been developed and employed in Australia and other OECD 
countries. Key instrument types are shown in Table 12. 
 
MBIs such as water trading, biodiversity improvement schemes and potentially carbon 
farming and biodiversity sequestration have the potential to contribute to adaptation by 
developing more resilient practises and systems and areas that are currently 
vulnerable. However, these remain controversial because of disagreements as to 
whether they incorporate a suitable breadth of values or merely reinforce an 
unsustainable status quo (Mercer et al., 2007). 
 
Table 12. Market-based instruments by type (Whitten et al., 2004) 
Price-based  Rights-based  Market friction  
Emission charges  
User charges  
Product charges  
Performance bonds  
Non-compliance fees  
Subsidies (materials and 
financial)  
Removal of perverse 
subsidies/taxes  
Deposit-refund systems  
 
Tradeable permits, rights or 
quotas  
Offset schemes  
 
Reducing market barriers  
Extension / education 
programs  
Research programs 
designed to facilitate market 
exchanges  
Labelling  
Information disclosure  
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Transformation 
 
The modelling and valuation methods described above are largely suited to assessing 
economic changes at the margins of current systems. It may be the case that some 
places and/or sectors in Victoria may have to undergo significant transformation3 or 
bifurcation in light of climate change impacts. Examples include the moving of an entire 
population due to unacceptable risk of natural disasters or the shifting of an entire 
industry due to the present geographical region becoming unsuitable for production 
(Aaheim and Aasen, 2008). These changes are not marginal and as such the 
economic techniques described here would have difficulty assessing them. Although 
they cannot be easily assessed by dominant assessment methodologies such as CBA 
(Hallegatte, 2011; Hallegatte et al., 2011). 
 
Summary 
 
Since the completion of the basic general equilibrium model in the 1950s, a massive 
volume of theoretical work has been undertaken to explore the consequences of 
varying the assumptions underlying this model. Two general conclusions seem to have 
emerged clearly from the work briefly reviewed in this section. Firstly, the basic 
neoclassical model is not robust, in that quite different results emerge from small 
variations in assumptions. Secondly, perfectly good models can be built with a wide 
range of differing assumptions, none of which can claim to be a preferred 
representation the economic world. Thus there is no longer one preferred model but 
rather many models, each appropriate for different circumstances. The implicit goal of a 
single explanatory model of the economic system now looks implausible, while the 
value neutral foundation of individual preferences or utility has been shaken. 
 
Where this leaves the issue of adaptation to climate change is that there is no single 
model that can address the full reality of the situation, but many tools which can assist 
in specific-defined situations. Many approaches to the economics of adaptation to 
climate change start from the basic model, but add specific tools to it to addressed 
perceived problems. These will be review below. But what seems to be needed is a 
broader framework which would allow diverse theories and models to be utilised as 
circumstances dictate, to understand adaptation challenges and to develop appropriate 
policy responses. The work of Ostrom (2005, 2007a, 2011) provides such a framework. 
 
The distinction between frameworks, theories and models within the IAD architecture is 
critical. The framework needs to be sufficiently general to allow for a richer ontology 
and for the wide range of economic and social characteristics that are observed 
empirically. This means many different economic and social theories can be 
accommodated within the framework. The problem-solution-implementation framework 
can be used to place these findings within a decision-making process. 
 
  
                                               
3
 IPCC (2012, pg. 3) defines ‘transformation’ as “The altering of fundamental attributes of a system 
(including value systems; regulatory, legislative, or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and 
technological or biological systems).” 
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Table 13. Comparison of neoclassical and the extended IAD framework. 
 Simple Neoclassical Model Extended Ostrom IAD Framework 
Ontology   
Organisation Market and government Polycentric forms of governance 
Types of goods Public and private Four types of goods (including common pool and 
toll goods) 
Agents Profit maximising firms and 
rational individuals 
Diverse theories/motives for human and 
organisational behaviour 
Characteristics of economy and society 
Information 
structure 
Full and complete information Allow for limited and asymmetric information, 
uncertainty and bounded rationality 
Production 
technology 
Diminishing returns to scale Possibility of increasing return s to scale and 
scope 
Interaction between 
agents 
Agents interact only through 
prices/markets 
Allow for many forms of interaction, including 
cooperation and trust 
Coordination Coordination is achieved 
through prices and the market 
Agents may fail for many reasons to achieve 
coordination; opportunities are lost 
Path dependence 
and lock in 
Given other assumptions, no 
issues of path dependence  
Various factors may generate path dependence, 
which may to lock-in of successes or failures 
 
3.4 Evaluating the solutions 
3.4.1 Valuing adaptation 
So far in this report we have established the following framings towards valuing 
adaptation: 
 We take a whole of climate approach to valuing adaptation where the current 
adaptation deficit to climate change plus variability is contrasted with future 
deficits. 
 Adaptation is being assessed at the institutional scale rather than within the 
context of event, location or sector-based approaches. 
 Critical decision points are when risks cross domains, where the risk itself has 
amplified beyond critical threshold and/or the responsibility for responding to that 
risk has crossed domains. 
 Adaptation needs to consider avoiding or mitigating the impacts of such damages 
occurring in future under rapid change. Disaster risk reduction techniques provide 
a useful starting point for such deliberations. 
The economic framework for decision-making we apply has three phases: 
1. The first phase involves valuing impacts using adaptation clusters as a valuation 
framework. Such assessments are generally scenario-driven, where scenarios 
can range from being climate, to operational to policy scenarios. The resulting 
values can range from direct monetary impacts through to intangibles measured 
using qualitative methods. This brings an assessment to the stage of assessing 
values at risk, informing the decision as to whether adaptation needs to be 
planned. A range of values may be assessed and ranked according to a given 
set of criteria using ranking techniques or multi-criteria analysis. 
2. The second phase proposes and costs a range of adaptation options. Scenarios 
to propose, sort and select options can be applied at this stage. These can be 
costed as part of CBA, cost-effectiveness, various ranking strategies such as 
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gauging stakeholder preferences or merely follow from the previous phase if a 
political decision has been made to act. The choice then concerns which action 
to take. Full cost-analysis will take in the cost of R&D to develop and evaluate 
the adaptations, and to implement and maintain them over time. 
3. The third phase then selects the actions to take (including processes and 
methods for implementation), by considering the costs along with potential 
benefits. If outcomes can be diagnosed with any reliability, then various 
permutations of CBA can be applied, multi-criteria analysis, or robust decision-
making. Benefits are measured using institutional values. In this context, 
efficiency, the principal outcome for orthodox economics is one of many 
institutional values that include equity, fairness, transparency, justice and so on. 
The choice of such values by which to assess benefits will also self-select 
potential valuation methods. If outcomes cannot be projected, because the 
solution pathway is observed by uncertainty, process-related values applied 
using innovation models will dominate. 
The methods and tools for carrying out these three steps are briefly summarised in 
Section 3.4.3. The project workshop Beyond the Mean, where we trialled this approach 
is reported on and summarised in Section 3.4.2. The process-related aspect of 
evaluating and implementing adaptation is described in Section 3.4.1. Transformation 
and maladaptation are considered in the following two sections. Developing capacity 
and supporting governance are summarised in Section 3.4.7 and finally, resulting 
policy considerations are summarised in Section 3.4.8. 
 
3.4.2 Project workshop Beyond the Mean: synthesis and results 
A workshop for the project, Beyond the Mean: Valuing Adaptation to Rapid Change 
was held at Victoria University on November 30. Over forty people from diverse 
institutional backgrounds participated. The recipients received a context paper that 
framed a set of scenario exercises looking at the economics of adaptation, rapid 
climate change, the propagation of risks across domains, risk ownership and potential 
adaptation options. 
 
A pre-scenario exercise looked at the impact of recent extreme events with reference 
to four introductory presentations on the economics of adaptation, rapid climate change 
and the economics of disasters. Consistent responses from the workshop were: 
 The risk of climate change is not adequately valued because it is not well-
understood; 
 Media plays a key role in how an event or risk is understood and valued; 
 Political objectives currently override reality; 
 The need to stay in ‘comfort zones’ is a major barrier to change; and 
 There is a need for a cross-sectoral, whole-of-organisation approach to 
managing these disasters. 
 
Scenario exercise 
A scenario exercise examined rapid changes in extremes in urban to peri-urban, rural 
and national settings. The impacts of those events were then traced over multiple time 
lines across a range of public and private institutional domains. The first part of the 
scenario exercise grouped impacts and risks into short, medium and long-term risks 
and mapped them into local, state and federal government domains, private domains 
and identified un-owned risks. Impacts were identified in the first exercise, but these 
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were later converted into risks by attaching values linked to one or more adaptation 
clusters, described in Section 3.3.4. 
 
The resulting risks were then ranked and the most important was used to propose and 
value adaptation strategies. The following tables show the first and second exercise 
from each of three scenarios (six of twelve total produced by the workshop). 
 
The scenario exercise applied a process that was both simple and complex. The 
complexity was in combining two differently structured models within a single system; 
most people work with both but are usually aware of only one. These models were:  
 A cause and effect model that traced climate events along a time line through 
impacts to risks. It followed a linear line of reasoning (although the system it 
describes is not); and  
 An institutional framework that has a variety of purposes (e.g., policy, profit, 
lifestyle, community values). Some institutions have direct responsibility for 
managing particular risks; others have separate aims that are affected by climate 
risks. This system is recursive, in that any actions taken will affect the system 
itself. 
Risk was expressed differently within part 1 and 2 of the exercise: 
 In part 1, event-based risk was expressed through the cause and effect model 
and expressed as hazard times exposure; that is, a combination of climate events 
and the systems those events impact upon. Thus the workshop identified impacts 
and resulting values at risk. The subsequent aim was to trace these values along 
time-lines and across different domains; and 
 In part 2, we were interested in addressing solutions to a prioritised risk with 
respect to the aims and responsibilities of relevant institutions across time 
frames.  
Because of the high uncertainty within the system of cause and effect, the accurate 
scientific prediction of climate-related impacts is not always possible, so scenarios 
were used to bridge the gap between impacts and risks identified in Part 1 and the 
institutional goals and solutions in Part 2. 
 
These scenarios were given to each group who were then free to embellish them in 
social and physical terms to create an internally consistent narrative underpinning their 
assessments of how impacts and risks may play out. 
 
Some of the scenarios used are detailed below: 
 
Large Regional Basin Scenario 2 
 
The drought of the century through to 2044 has been broken by two La Niña mega 
events in succession in 2044 and 2045. The first set up some major floods that were 
manageable and greeted with great cheer. The second saw record falls over 
Queensland and the eastern states. Three major floods occurring over August to 
January saw massive inundation in all major rivers of the basin. 
 
Cuts to roads, rail and power have isolated many regions for the first time. Crop and 
stock losses are unprecedented. Dengue fever has been detected in the northern part 
of the basin and Ross Rover Fever and Murray Valley Encephalitis are widespread. 
Emergency food drops and medical flights are being made across the basin. After the 
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devastation of the drought then the floods, recovery will be protracted. Depleted 
groundwater supplies mean that drinking water, apart from tank water, is at a premium. 
 
Metro peri-urban region scenario 2 
 
In 2045 a series of major storms in a wet, La Niña year resulting in combined flooding 
and storm surge that inundates low lying coastal suburbs. Major flooding occurs in the 
inner urban riverside zones and refuses to drain under the pressure of storm tides and 
floodwaters coming downstream. Numbers of people are stranded in high rise 
apartments. Many buildings inundated by sea water have absorbed permanent 
damage. 
 
Low-lying coastal infrastructure and pipe systems have taken on sea water, and 
become damage due to soil movements affected by changes in groundwater 
pressures. 
 
A hail storm occurring in the same season has cause large amounts of property 
damage, destroying the odd Mercedes. A series of rainfall and storm events on 
saturated urban catchments have led to successive flash flooding in the same 
locations, in some places, three times in the same year. 
 
National scenario 
 
The events of the mid to late 2030s and early 2040s, with droughts and heat stress 
affecting both urban and rural regions, followed by the one-two punch of successive La 
Niña events.  
 
The drought, covered in the Metro and Basin scenarios was protracted, causing large 
declines in urban water supply, and successive wildfires in the urban centres of the 
south-east, including one event in The Dandenong’s that claimed over 500 lives. 
The floods have affected every east-coast state, but the south-west remains very short 
of water and continues to be affected by drought and bushfire. 
 
Another feature of La Niña events is the occurrence of landfall tropical cyclones. Two 
cyclones, Cyril and Eric have crossed the Queensland coast. Cyril took out the 
Gladstone Port facilities, and Brisbane has finally experienced its long-awaited tropical 
cyclone, a force four. The Galilee Basin coal field has closed due to flooding. The gas 
fields of the North-west shelf is on full alert, and the potential loss of gas supply if a 
tropical cyclone does score a direct hit has been labelled a potential national 
emergency. 
 
The results in the following tables summarise the results of the exercise. 
 
Source: Young, C.K. and Jones, R.N. (2013) Beyond the Mean: Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change. 
Workshop Report, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne. 
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Values to be sustained by above adaptation strategies are: 
People :  Protect the human life, employment and general well being 
Environment: Sustain the food bowl 
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Key note: Being prepared would include being prepared to be able to maximise the opportunities that extreme events offered for change. Also people 
would need to do ‘more with less’ across all domains. 
Values to be sustained by above adaptation strategies are: Equity, Community connectedness/continuity and reputation. 
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Key note: budget resilience is path dependent and likely to require significant social and political change. 
Values to be sustained by above adaptation strategies are: budgetary resilience in private and public sector 
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Results 
 
One hundred and seventy-six primary impacts were identified across the six scenario 
groups. Groups were also asked to allocate impacts across three time lines:  
 Immediate (0–2 months); 
 Intermediate (2 months – 2 years); and 
 Long-term (2 years and beyond). 
 
Allocations were shared fairly evenly across time frames. 
 
 
Figure 22. Allocation of time scales to 176 primary impacts. 
 
Multiple time scales were allocated to 17% of total impacts. The predominant time 
scale allocated was intermediate – long-term with 45% – with intermediate to long-term 
being 39%. The lowest allocation was immediate to intermediate. 
 
 
Figure 23. Breakdown of multiple time scales to 30 lasting impacts 
Groups were asked to allocate impacts to four domains:  
 Local Government; 
 State Government; 
 Federal Government; and 
 Private (including community and industry).  
They were also asked to list any impacts that could not be assigned to an institutional 
domain as un-owned. The largest number of impacts were allocated to the private 
sector 28%, and 7% of the impacts were un-owned. The rest of the risks were 
distributed across Federal Government (21%), State Government (23%) and Local 
Government (21%).The largest group of un-owned impacts were social assets, but 
types were widely shared across natural assets and capital assets as well as being 
legal and governance-related. 
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Figure 24. Assigned domains to a total of 176 impacts 
Although the majority of impacts were allocated to single domains, 38% of impacts 
were explicitly allocated to more than one domain. These are the identified cases of 
risk crossing domains by each group. Many others identified as occurring at state or 
national scale will implicitly also affect smaller-scale domains. 
 
 
Figure 25. Number of domains assigned to a single impact. 
Values were attached to these impacts by linking them with adaptation clusters. There 
was no limit on the number of clusters that could be linked to any single impact. The 
most prominent cluster was Social Assets and Infrastructure (36%) and the smallest 
allocation was Natural Assets and Infrastructure (10%). The remainder were: Goods 
15%, Services 20% and Capital Assets and Infrastructure 19%. 
 
Allocations to adaptation clusters across the different scenarios are shown in Figure 
26. These show the strong emphasis on Social Assets and Infrastructure, with Capital 
Assets and Infrastructure being close behind.  
 
These findings show that ‘soft’ socially-constructed values were more prominent (46%) 
as ‘hard values’ that can be allocated to the monetary economy. Such soft values were 
identified as being highly relevant for policy-making, in addition to being vulnerable to 
risks crossing and amplifying across domains. Some of the most prominent were those 
that related to community wellbeing such as livelihoods, mental health and community 
cohesiveness. 
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Figure 26. Adaptation clusters assigned to impacts across the six workshop 
groups. 
Solutions  
Groups were asked to select the most prominent risk to use for the solution exercise 
and were then asked to consider the following questions in relation to the selected risk: 
 Institutionally, who is responsible for developing and implementing adaptations? 
 What resources do you need and who provides these? 
 What values are you sustaining through these adaptations? 
Some participants found this more challenging than the previous impacts identification 
exercise. This was partially due to the exercise being the last in a full day, but it may 
also indicate that this is an area of non-linear problem-solving where capacity needs to 
be developed.  
 
Table 14 summarises the core needs and values being sustained. Those values are 
complex, society-wide values that would not be out of place in any general strategic 
setting addressing issues of sustainable development. 
 
Groups were asked to allocate responsibilities across three time frames:  
 Immediate (0–2 months); 
 Intermediate (2 months – 2 years); and  
 Long-term (2 years and beyond). 
The intermediate time frame received the largest allocation (45%) and long-term 
responsibilities the smallest (19%), with 36% of responsibilities being allocated to 
immediate action. Almost one-third (29%) of responsibilities were allocated across 
multiple time frames. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Core needs and attributed value of key risk by scenario. 
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Scenario Key Risk 
 
Core Needs Values being sustained 
Peri-Urban 1 Water and 
electricity 
security 
Communication, financial 
incentives, policy, 
evaluation 
Security of key infrastructure – 
water and energy. Community 
continuity 
 Peri-Urban 2 Lack of 
Preparedness 
of Local 
Government 
Communication,  Funding, 
coordination, information, 
skills development , 
research 
Equity, Community 
connectedness/continuity and 
reputation 
 Basin 1 Lack of 
coordinated 
responsibility 
working 
towards 
adaptation 
Development based policy, 
governance - 
responsibilities, research, 
funding support, monitoring 
and evaluation 
Economic benefits to share 
including productivity, 
wellbeing and profitability,  
security 
Basin 2 Loss of quality 
of life and lack 
of food  
 
Employment, policy, 
funding, education 
People:  Protect the human 
life, employment and general 
well-being 
Environment: Sustain the food 
bowl 
National 1 Social 
vulnerability 
A resilient budget  
Public and private tax 
reform 
Budgetary resilience in private 
and public sector 
 
National 2 Disrupted 
utilities/critical 
infrastructure 
Communication, Research 
based information, 
regulation, investment , 
innovation, political will 
Consistency, our way of living 
 
For the allocation of responsibilities, the Federal Government was given the largest 
(26%), industry was slightly lower (23%) and both state and local government were 
allocated 20%. Eleven per cent were indeterminate. 
 
These responsibilities varied widely: 
 Addressing unknowns; 
 Threat of people not understanding water is everyone’s business; 
 Threat of people not understanding the role of research organisations; 
 Migrant groups; 
 Volunteerism; 
 Altruism; 
 Community attributes; 
 Funds; 
 International capital and finance; 
 Who is responsible for effective communication and the tools that are needed?; 
 Willingness to act cooperatively – political will/community education; 
 Information and analysts; and 
 Influence of younger generation. 
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Many of these are diffuse, economic intangibles and relate to perceptions of risk and 
value. One fifth of responsibilities were allocated across domains (21%). Particular 
values included:  
 Security;  
 Equity; 
 Community;  
 Continuity and consistency; 
 Connectedness; and  
 Resilience. 
These values could be considered as the institutional values of the community within 
the IAD framework. 
 
Workshop outcomes 
 
The workshop clearly viewed the issue of adapting to rapid change, where significant 
risks are crossing domains, and of adapting to those risks, through the lens of 
addressing society-wide values. The following needs were identified on the day: 
1. The need for capacity-building across public and private sectors in relation to 
long-term planning and development of long-term, multi-party policies; 
2. The importance of diversity of input when considering these issues. Who is in 
the room has a strong influence on the outcomes; 
3. The need for collaborative mechanisms that enable bottom-up, top-down 
interactions driven by the reality of what is happening – enabling dialogue rather 
than debate; 
4. The need for relevant data but also to value the usefulness of existing 
information; 
5. Tools to assist understanding how to value and cost intangible aspects of 
adaptation; 
6. Greater consideration of how impacts, such as psychological impacts of extreme 
events, can amplify over time if not addressed; 
7. Mapping of communication and information needs across public and private 
sectors; 
8. Proactive policy responses to address events before they happen. 
9. Governance to address un-owned risks, manage risks across domains and 
deliver resources where they are needed; and 
10. Research to better understand: 
 Interactions between social, economic and natural systems, where the 
thresholds are for particular impacts and at what point they cross into other 
domains; 
 The skills and tools needed to better prepare for these events, particularly in 
relation to the valuing of intangible costs associated with rapid change over 
the long-term; 
 The value and cost of primary and secondary impacts across different 
domains and time frames; and 
 Which impacts and risks amplify over time and how they amplify. 
Addressing rapid climate change at the institutional scale is challenging. Although 
participants engaged willingly in the exercise for the most part, developing solutions is 
clearly a difficult task with only a limited number of existing examples to work from.  
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The workshop supported the notion that adaptation to changing climate risks should be 
integrated into existing institutional roles, rather than being a separate exercise. The 
current institutional capacity to do this, however, was seen as limited. 
 
3.4.3 Evaluation criteria 
Economic narratives reinforce stable if not rigid arrangements that affect society's 
resilience in situations of rapid ecological change (Röling and Maarleveld, 1999). The 
economics of dealing with multiple system values and rapid changes that are difficult to 
model have been largely ignored in favour of a simplified system that is tractable in 
modelling terms but is unlikely to adequately address the risks of rapid climate change. 
 
In orthodox economics, values, costs and benefits are interchangeable, maintaining the 
same values over time as future costs and benefits are discounted from the present. 
The real world of values is much more complex, and for that reason we have separated 
the economic evaluation process into three parts in order to allow a variety of different 
methods to be used. 
 
They are (from Section 3.4.1): 
 The valuation of impacts and associated system variables; 
 The evaluation of different adaptation options or strategies based on cost and 
other considerations; and 
 The valuation of benefits. 
We outline the applicability of selected economic decision-making tools that have been 
proposed or used for climate change adaptation, particularly for managing uncertainty. 
Attention is drawn to the implications of rapid change for the applicability of these tools.  
 
Valuation methods for impacts 
 
A wide range of valuation methods are in circulation. The methods described in OECD 
(2006) provide a comprehensive description of different valuation methods for use in 
CBA, but these are all stand-alone methods that can be used separately. 
 
Balance sheet methods 
 
Time series of income-expenditure data normalised for climate can provide evidence of 
the effect of direct impacts on income. For a number of impacts, input-output tables can 
be constructed and analysed using econometric methods. Time series containing 
disasters or abrupt changes in external variables can be used to assess the impacts of 
shocks. 
 
Spatial and temporal economic geographies of economic sensitivity or exposure to 
hazard can also be constructed from insurance data, disaster costing’s or general 
economic data (Section 3.1.8). These can contribute to vulnerability assessments and 
assess values at risk (Jones and Webb, 2008). These methods favour impacts that are 
well-integrated into the conventional economy, but can be augmented by preference 
methods or shadow pricing. 
 
Stocks and flows 
 
The physical economy is an important source of value, particularly for environmental 
stocks and flows that are not well represented in the monetary economy (Turner et al., 
2011). Integrated models of stock and flows can be used to assess the impacts of 
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climate change in complex settings, producing estimates of physical impacts to which 
monetary values can be attached (Turner et al., 2007). This type of system is 
amenable to analysing shocks. 
 
Computable general equilibrium modelling  
 
Computable general equilibrium models are almost certainly incorrect in their 
assumptions but can be useful in specific circumstances. They provide useful 
information around the flow-on effect of extreme events in the economy; an example 
being the 2010–11 Queensland floods (Hartley et al., 2011), and also on trade effects 
of different impacts. Their basic assumption of marginal change from equilibrium 
means they are unable to provide meaningful estimates of future impacts other than in 
a qualitative way. 
 
Shadow pricing 
 
Shadow pricing methods estimate the value of an asset or commodity by the benefits 
associated with closely linked economic variables. For example, property prices are 
higher near open space providing shadow prices for the benefits of open space 
amenity in urban settings (Hatton MacDonald et al., 2010). It is a method for assessing 
mean conditions and not suitable for assessing rapid change. However, it has great 
potential for assessing the co-benefits of adaptations where social and environmental 
outcomes are important.  
 
Expert assessment 
 
One way to gauge impacts and value where models aren’t available or are too 
resource-intensive is to interrogate experts in a structured manner producing a 
conclusion with a given range of uncertainty that can act as a vote of confidence in the 
underpinning theory, data and models – albeit through a socially-influenced filter 
(Brooks et al., 2005; Doria et al., 2009).  
 
Preference methods 
 
Three formal methods for eliciting value preferences are willingness to pay, willingness 
to avoid damages, which are both stated preference methods (what people say) and 
survey of how people behave in given circumstances, or revealed preference. These 
methods are subject to framing effects where the first two are asymmetric but measure 
the same thing (Bateman et al., 2009) and the second only deals with past but not 
future values. 
 
Aligned with this are a range of survey methods that can elicit peoples’ psychological 
and cultural preferences in order to better understand social and cultural influences on 
valuation linked to adaptation preferences (Reser et al., 2011). 
 
Cost and benefit methodologies 
 
Probabilistic CBA is used when subjective probabilities can be assigned to input 
assumptions, Real options techniques, also called sequential analysis, minimize the 
‘cost of error’ caused by uncertainty (Hallegatte et al., 2011; Dobes, 2012).  
State-contingent CBA also builds flexibility into adaptation (Adamson et al., 2009), 
where different activities designed to maintain maximum returns or bolster resilience 
can be triggered based on a given set of signals. Again, this methodology is suitable for 
assessing rapid changes in conditions, but diagnosing the correct set of signals would 
be paramount. 
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The largest limitations of CBA are that it is restricted to situations that involve one, or a 
few decisions, and that it requires sufficient information about the potential benefit to be 
computable. 
 
Costing and evaluation methods 
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis 
 
Cost-effectiveness assesses the cost of acting without specific assessments of the 
resulting benefits. This may be for the following reasons:  
 An a priori decision has been made on the basis of expediency or for political 
considerations, and the cheapest or most effective option is being sought. 
 That the benefits are self-evident and cost-effectiveness is common sense. 
 The benefits and costs are incommensurate, but that costs are perceived as 
being less than the potential benefits over the long-term. This consideration is 
most relevant to environment and social assets. 
 That the benefits of different options are considered roughly equivalent. 
 
Ideally costing will look at the whole project cost from R&D through to implementation. 
A weakness of this approach is that often the different options may themselves be 
incommensurate and the relative benefits uncertain, so ‘effectiveness’ is very difficult to 
measure. An example is where a town vulnerable to sea level rise, storm surge and 
groundwater contamination may weigh up building a sea wall and safeguarding 
groundwater supplies as opposed to relocation. 
 
Multi-criteria analysis 
 
Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is extremely flexible in approach. As a fully quantitative 
technique it will score options according to various criteria, resulting in a combined 
score that identifies the most optimal outcome. At its most qualitative, it can involve a 
room full of people with a given set of criteria making a subjective selection from a set 
of proposals. 
 
This latter form of MCA and variants using hybrid methods that combine quantitative 
estimates with subjective judgments is probably the most common form of evaluation 
used in adaptation assessments. At this level, it is vulnerable to the social 
constructions of the stakeholders making the collective decision. By conducting an 
institutional analysis (where the respective values of the different participants are made 
explicit in addition to the institutional value at play), much more well-informed decisions 
can be made. 
 
While a room full of people making a decision can look very imprecise, if they are 
informed by analyses of value consistent the methods above and a rigorous analysis of 
the hidden values and assumptions being used at the organisational and institutional 
level is facilitated, the MCA can be very useful. 
 
Robust methodologies 
 
Robust decision-making approaches seek optimality for a given situation or best-guess 
outcome, but instead seek decisions that will perform well over a wide range of 
plausible climate futures, socio-economic trends, and other factors (Dessai and Hulme, 
2007; Groves et al., 2008; Wilby and Dessai, 2010; WUCA, 2010; Brown et al., 2011; 
Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change 93 
 
Lempert and Kalra, 2011). Robustness criteria can often illuminate trade-offs that help 
decision-makers achieve consensus on actions, even when they do not agree on 
expectations about the future (Lempert and Collins, 2007). Resilience tends to describe 
a property of systems, which might be affected by decision-makers’ choices (Folke et 
al., 2010), while robustness is a property of the choices made by those decision-
makers. Methods also exist to summarise trade-offs for decision-makers for multiple 
objectives and values, and at higher levels of uncertainty, by exploring decisions that 
are robust over many futures and objectives (Kasprzyk et al., 2013). Robust decision-
making can also be used to satisfy a range of institutional values inherent in the 
operation of a system, satisfying criteria such as distributional equity, procedural 
fairness and affordability in the case of water or energy. 
 
The process of robust decision-making is a collective process that brings stakeholders 
together in dialogue regarding values, vulnerabilities, performance metrics and 
acceptable risks (Hallegatte et al., 2012). The use of multiple scenarios allows the 
possibility of scenarios representing extreme events (Hallegatte et al., 2012) that can 
easily test different realisations of plausible rapid change. Such testing would also be 
able to investigate system resilience, investigating the potential to enhance that 
resilience and respond better to future events. 
 
Robust decision-making is resources-intensive and the stakeholder process can be 
unpredictable. If quantitative modelling is being used with a wide range of scenarios, 
this can also be resource-intensive (Kowalski et al., 2009; Hallegatte et al., 2012; 
Ranger and Garbett-Shiels, 2012).  
 
Bounded cost and trade-off methods 
 
Situations may be resource-constrained where there are only a certain amount of 
resources available to adaptation, or where low-risk and broadly effective solutions are 
preferred over others that may be unfamiliar, or high-risk but potentially more effective. 
 
Low-regrets 
 
Low-regrets approaches (sometimes called no-regret) have net benefits under all 
climate scenarios, including current climatic conditions (Hallegatte, 2009; Hallegatte et 
al., 2012). For example, increased disaster risk reduction would have a benefit today 
and under all future climate scenarios. 
 
Satisfying over a wide range of futures 
 
Low-regrets adaptations described above are a subset of robust approaches that are 
widely-recognised (Productivity Commission, 2012) to be a suitable starting point for 
adaptation investments. Extending the idea of low-regrets adaptations that are of 
benefit now and under future scenarios, we can utilise formal robust decision-making 
approaches that are designed to be acceptable under a wide range of futures (Lempert 
and Collins, 2007). 
 
Safety margin strategies 
 
Safety margins incorporate a low or no-cost measure within a design that enables it to 
operate under changed conditions in future, commonly known as head room.   
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Soft adaptations 
 
Soft adaptations can offer more flexibility than hard adaptations, so may be able to 
manage a wide range of conditions. They are more difficult to predict and cost, so 
require measures of social rather than economic performance to evaluate and sustain. 
For example, warning and evacuations combined with insurance may be cheaper in 
areas subject to storm-tides than dikes and sea walls, and can be readily adapted to 
new conditions (Hallegatte et al., 2012).  
 
Reduce decision time horizons 
 
Reducing the operating lifespan of investments is a way of managing uncertainty in a 
changing environment (Hallegatte et al., 2012). Shorter-lived and cheaper buildings in 
sea level rise affected areas with managed retreat are two examples.  
 
Evaluating benefits – environmental accounting  
 
Systematic undervaluation of the environmental services and resources is an ongoing 
problem. The need to measure and incorporate environmental assets into the broader 
social asset base was emphasised by Stiglitz et al. (2009): 
 
'What we measure affects what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, 
decisions may be distorted. Choices between promoting GDP and protecting the 
environment may be false choices once environmental degradation is 
appropriately included in our measurement of economic performance. So too, we 
often draw inferences about what are good policies by looking at what policies 
have promoted economic growth; but if our metrics of performance are flawed, so 
too may be the inferences that we draw.' 
 
Recently, the ABS (2012) published Completing the Picture - Environmental 
Accounting in Practice describing how environmental accounts can be used to improve 
decision-making processes for a range of processes including adaptation to climate 
change. The System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA), which was 
elevated to an international statistical standard in early 2012, is used as the basis of 
these accounts. The SEEA framework links information on the economy and the 
environment to provide a range of useful metrics and an integrated database for policy 
analysis and decision-making (ABS, 2012). 
 
Four main types of accounts in the SEEA framework are added to the existing 
monetary stock and flow accounts of the System of National Accounting: 
 Physical flow accounts record flows of natural inputs from the environment to the 
economy, flows of products within the economy, and flows of residuals generated 
by the economy (including water and energy used in production and waste flows 
to the environment); 
 Functional accounts for environmental transactions record the many transactions 
between different economic units (i.e., industries, households, governments) that 
concern the environment;  
 Asset accounts in physical and monetary terms measure the natural resources 
available and changes in the amount available; and 
 Ecosystem accounts are structured to summarise information about complex 
plant, animal and micro-organism communities, their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit and their changing capacity to operate as a 
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functional unit and their delivery of benefits to humanity. These accounts are not 
yet part of the international statistical standard.  
These different accounts can be used to measure changes in environmental stocks 
and flows to assess both impacts and progress in adaptation (ABS, 2012). In particular, 
they address monetary flows to adaptation, mainly using transactions relating to 
environmental protection. New methods based on SEEA are being developed to set up 
separate adaptation accounting (Statistics Sweden, 2012), an important part of the 
innovation process. 
 
3.4.4 Knowledge, innovation and transformation 
Adaptation requires the development, adoption and implementation of new knowledge 
and technologies. At its core is innovation and the need to transform our current 
institutions. 
 
Although the solution phase of adaptation – especially implementation – has often 
been innovative in its nature and practice, it has primarily been framed using risk 
management and conventional change methodologies. This creates challenges for 
practitioners because risk frameworks only contain part of the methods needed to 
understand and implement actions. Innovation recognises that because outcomes are 
uncertain, ongoing processes, rather than final outcomes, need to be the main activity 
focus. Innovation processes contain established frameworks and processes that are 
needed for adaptation actions in the areas of: 
 the introduction of new technologies – both social and technological; 
 sociological aspects of change and transformation; 
 management of uncertainty and the associated risks; and 
 Iterative systems-based approaches. 
Innovation 
 
Innovation is the key to developing and applying solutions because it can place 
uncertainty in a context that is already understood and allows for an established 
methodology to be used. 
 
Innovation is the development of new values and ways of doing things through 
solutions that meet emerging or existing needs (Rogers, 2003). This can be achieved 
through a number of different methods such as the development of new products, 
processes, services, technologies, or ideas, which are then are taken up by markets, 
governments and society (De Tarde, 1903).The process of innovation can be 
incremental or abrupt and disruptive.  Innovations can be social, economic or 
environmental.  
 
Historically, these areas of innovation have been treated as separate and are often 
seen to have conflicting values. Until recently the costs and benefits of innovation have 
been recorded in primarily financial terms and have focused on social innovation 
inputs, without ‘counting’ social and environmental outputs or outcomes in a structured 
or systematic way (Australian Innovation System, 2011).   
 
There are indications that this is changing. For example, the European Commission, 
United Nations and the OECD are currently developing a new economic growth 
accounting framework to incorporate social investments and environmental 
degradation into measurements of national prosperity(Australian Innovation System, 
2011).   
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Innovation has been the key driver in the agricultural, industrial and knowledge 
revolutions. In each case, the adoption and implementation of new technologies has 
transformed how individuals, organisations and economies operate and think. 
 
Innovation has three key stages: 
 development; 
 diffusion and adoption; and 
 Implementation. 
Central to innovation is the development, adoption and implementation of new 
knowledge and the frameworks that enable its use. Rogers (2003) defines diffusion as 
the process by which (1) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels 
(3) over time (4) among members of a social system. 
 
At its core, innovation consists of knowledge and the people and institutions that 
generate and use it. Workers as generator of knowledge are seen as a valuable 
resource and a key component of the modern economy (Drucker, 2011) and end-user 
engagement is seen as pivotal (Hippel, 1988). This requires specific ‘innovation 
systems’ that enable collaborative development of knowledge and knowledge sharing 
networks across diverse sectors. 
 
Innovation also considers the systems that it is applied to – an innovation system is 
considered as a framework for understanding and implementing innovation (De Tarde, 
1903).It contains the interactions between the actors needed to achieve effective 
realisation and implementation of new ideas. Knowledge transfer, technology and 
communication are central to this. 
 
How innovations are adopted and why they are adopted is key to being able to manage 
areas of innovation effectively. Adopters can be categorised into five categories: 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rogers, 2003). 
The adoption innovation curve below shows how potential adopters perceive adoption 
over time and where critical mass is achieved. 
 
 
Figure 27. Adapted from adopter categorization on the basis of innovativeness 
(Rogers, 2003). 
 
  
Early 
innovators
Early 
adopters
Early majority Late majority Laggards
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Five variables listed as key to determining the rate of adoption are (Rogers, 2003): 
 perceived attributes of innovation; 
 types of innovation decisions; 
 communication channels (e.g., mass media or interpersonal); 
 nature of the social system (e.g., modern of traditional norms, degree of 
communication integration); and 
 Extent of the change agents’ promotion efforts. 
The decision to use an idea (adoption) is not the same as the use of an idea 
(implementation) (Zaltman et al., 1973). During the implementation stage, the 
innovation is often subject to change as it is adapted to specific end-user needs. 
Difficulties in implementing new ideas in organisations can either be seen as evidence 
that the new innovation either does not suit the organisation’s perception of the 
problem, or that the problem is seen terms of negative rather than positive outcomes 
(Van de Ven and Rogers, 1988).  
 
To date, adaptation has largely been framed by the problem phase of risk 
management, where the main focus has been identifying specific climate risks and 
developing direct responses to those risks (Van der Sluijs et al., 2003). This tends to 
reinforce the status quo, as these responses are often applied to activities that are 
assumed not to be subject to change.  It can also lead to disengagement, because the 
articulation of the solution is not based on action but rather further contemplation of the 
problem. 
 
Aspects of innovation summarised above resonate with many core aspects of 
adaptation. Knowledge development and transfer, technology transfer and diffusion, 
and social learning are present in both bottom-up adaptation and innovation processes 
– all of which are essential for transformative action.  
 
As Dovers (2009) points out, the initial capture by physical scientists of the adaptation 
process means that many methodologies have used concepts and language that are 
quite foreign to practitioners; this can be overcome by using appropriate pre-existing 
frameworks. As innovation practice is already established in operational and policy 
areas, it is already familiar and can assist with the integration of unfamiliar (new) 
knowledge and technologies. For example, although many in business and industry 
remain unfamiliar with the basic concept of adaptation (Young and Jones, 2012), they 
are familiar with some of the change processes embedded in social adaptation, 
business innovation and other change processes that can used to implement 
adaptation actions.  Innovation models can also help practitioners understand how to 
action the solution phase of the adaptation process and more effectively manage 
uncertainty and the associated risks. 
 
The understanding of adaptation as a process with purpose and a mix of the old and 
new, with an evolving language feeding into a narrative of change, is a very useful 
construct for developing communities of practice around that technology. These 
communities are an essential part of enabling innovation. 
 
Social technology 
 
Social technology is an aspect of innovation and covers a group of “soft” technologies 
such as democracy and legal frameworks. Technologies have a stated purpose and 
combine practises with components (Arthur, 2009). Each technology has a specific 
language and grammar forming the narratives that guide its social application. The 
application of technology can also change the narrative informing technology leading to 
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further evolution of new technology (e.g., social media and Web 2.0). Technologies are 
hierarchical and are built from older technologies, with the innovation being supplied 
through a new purpose, recombination of older components, or with a new component 
added to older parts. 
 
Adaptation to climate change is a relatively new social technology. It combines older 
technologies of social adaptation with specific innovations such as climate modelling, 
impact assessment and planning over intergenerational timescales. The narratives 
accompanying adaptation are both old and new, which is why adaptation appears both 
familiar and unfamiliar.  
 
The reason for identifying adaptation as a technology is because of the role it plays 
between the generation of scientific knowledge and practical application of adaptation 
actions. Science researches the phenomena that feed into adaptation. In the case of 
climate change, the scientific narrative that comes from the climate research 
community has a large influence on how adaptation is framed and communicated.  
 
Governance and policy 
 
Governance and policy related to innovation can be complex because it needs to 
accommodate novel processes and unexpected outcomes over time. For example, the 
spread of new ideas can lead to socioeconomic gaps being widened due to uneven 
diffusion through society (Rogers, 2003). Research also needs to be integrated into the 
process. 
 
Innovations can change as they move through the implementation stage by being 
adapted to specific end-user needs (Rogers, 2003). Policy and governance need to 
foster iterative processes to accommodate this and manage emerging risks that arise. 
 
Core innovation needs are also consistent with those commonly identified for adaptive 
capacity (Figure 28). Innovation, like adaptation, is a social process that relies heavily 
on social capital because it requires the interaction and engagement of a number of 
diverse players to achieve end goals. Like adaptation, it is also uncertain and subject to 
change, requiring different frameworks and ways of thinking.  
 
The application of innovation frameworks has great potential for the adaptation process 
– particularly in relation to implementation, capacity-building and communication, and 
knowledge transfer. Using an innovation lens is also potentially useful for policy-makers 
and organisations undertaking adaptation work, as it will help to better understand 
uncertainties surrounding operational aspects and to manage the risks associated with 
implementation. It will also assist with the understanding of the type of funding needed 
for aspects of adaptation and how it can be structured. 
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Figure 28. Key innovation needs (C. Young). 
 
Knowledge and communication 
 
How knowledge is developed and communication is undertaken has a direct impact on 
how effectively climate risks are understood, perceived, valued and responded to. 
Knowledge also needs to be seen in context of the systems it is used with, the 
institutions it is used in, and the people it is used by. 
 
A key finding of the Beyond the Mean workshop (Section 3.2.2) was that climate 
change risk is often not valued because it is not understood. Communication was also 
seen as a core component of solutions by workshop participants. A key part of being 
able to effectively address this is an understanding of the roles that knowledge 
development and communication play.  
 
Adaptation is a complex social process that is multi-tiered and involves multiple parties 
and knowledge from different sources. This knowledge needs to be applied practically 
in specific contexts. Communication in this field has three main purposes: to inform; to 
enable decisions; and to enable action (Young, 2012). Each purpose requires a range 
of communication tools and methods to be tailored to particular adaptation tasks.  
 
Knowledge development and the communication enabling its implementation and use 
have been seen as separate functions that only interconnect when the process of 
knowledge development has been completed. In such circumstances, knowledge 
communication and transferral is seen as a bridge between separate functions as in 
Figure 29, which is a linear model of a systemic process. 
 
 
• Investment, stakeholders, ideas, networks, researchers 
Resources 
• Research, stakeholders, communication and knowledge transfer, 
networks, frameworks, defined contexts Knowledge 
development 
• Practitioners, communication, expert guidance, information, skills 
development, tools, networks,iterative processes, research Capacity 
• Practitioners , reflexive frameworks and methods, governance,  
coomunication networks, expert guidance, dynamic risk management, 
analysis, iterative processes, monitoring and evalutaion, communities of 
practice, research 
Diffusion/ 
Implementation 
• Frameworks, governance, strategy, engagement, 
transformation/change management, iterative processes, multi tiered 
communication  Culture 
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Figure 29. The linear technology-transfer view of how K* would link research to 
policy and practice (Shaxson et al., 2012). 
 
Adaptation knowledge development cannot be effectively actioned if seen as a single 
transaction. Adaptation has a number of core knowledge functions that include: 
knowledge management; development; transfer; translation; brokering; exchange; and 
action (Shaxson et al., 2012). 
 
Knowledge frameworks incorporating all aspects of knowledge from development to 
implementation have knowledge communication and transfer as a central component 
(see Figure 30). These types of frameworks are a pivotal part of building the capacity 
needed to enable transformation. Because of this, two-way communication with key 
actors needs to be part of the knowledge development from the onset of any activity.  
 
There are two key aspects to the knowledge process. The first is the development of 
knowledge, and the second is the diffusion and implementation of this knowledge. To 
create ‘useable’ knowledge for adaptation requires a combination of both local and 
expert knowledge. To achieve this effectively requires a process of ‘deep collaboration’ 
with long-term, reflexive communication processes across a range of stakeholders. It 
also requires mechanisms that allow for the knowledge sharing and the translation of 
complex ideas and specific languages used by the different actors.  
 
For example, the translation of aspects of scientific findings in relation to increases in 
temperature into visual maps that can be understood by social planners. This enables 
a common understanding to be achieved. These mechanisms also allow for two-way 
communication so that that the knowledge developed is ‘fit for purpose’ for the end-
users as it has been informed by them. 
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Figure 30. Adaptation knowledge framework (Young, 2013). 
 
As much of the diffusion of adaptation knowledge requires new understandings, it has 
strong synergies with the innovation diffusion process outlined by Rogers (2003). This 
process works with the understanding that communication of new ideas is different to 
communication of established knowledge and is based upon the concept of 
communication being a two-way process of convergence, rather than a one-way linear 
act in which individuals seeks to transfer a message to one another in order to achieve 
certain effects (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981).  
 
The role of interpersonal communication is very much key to the adoption of a new 
ideas (Mahajan et al., 1990) and remains a key aspect of how personal knowledge is 
obtained. This has implications for the communication of adaptation as it requires an 
understanding of the key phases of innovation and the social and technological aspects 
that inform the types of communication needed at different stages of the adaptation 
process. 
 
Communication is also complex because of the nature of climate change and people’s 
responses to this. Table 15 outlines common conflicts between the nature of climate 
change and common barriers encountered by practitioners. 
 
Overcoming this conflict requires the use of tools such as collaborative narratives that 
allow groups of people to work through the conflict and develop common 
understandings around adaptation that enable decision-making and action. 
 
There is also growing awareness that the ‘conversations’ being built around adaptation 
are different and require long-term time frames. This has ramifications for not only the 
process of how we develop practice, but also the need to transform current institutions 
and rebuild communities to enable this.  
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Table 15. Comparison of climate change attributes with widely held preferences 
for the types of decision-making people prefer (Young, 2012). 
What climate change is What most people want 
Complex Simplicity 
An evolving field and cannot be solely 
based upon historical evidence 
Things they know and have experience of 
Innovative - not every solution will work Solutions that work 
Time consuming to address effectively Quick fixes 
Difficult Things to be easy 
Uncertain 
Security 
 
Requires large scale social change Things to stay the same 
Questions Answers 
 
 
The role of research 
Research and research institutions have a key role in adaptation in the development 
and provision of expert information, evaluation and monitoring of adaptation actions 
and assisting practitioners and policy-makers with understanding and decision-making.  
 
Currently the role of research institutions in adaptation is widely-acknowledged but 
poorly understood. Research needs to be embedded in the adaptation process serving 
a variety of purposes that are task-specific (Table 16).  
 
Table 16. Summary of task-oriented needs for research. 
Task Key aim  Research 
required 
purpose 
Identification of  
the problem 
To create 
understanding of 
what the problem is 
and how it works. 
Climate sciences, 
economic, social, 
environmental, 
political. 
To assist with the collation, analysis 
and valuation of climate impacts. 
Development and provision of 
knowledge and information to enable 
better understanding of the problem. 
Development of research 
communication that is fit for purpose 
Assessment and 
decision-making 
To assist with 
assessing what risks 
should be actioned 
and how they should 
be actioned. 
 
Climate sciences, 
economic, social, 
environmental, 
political. 
To provide support in the form of 
guidance regarding analysis of 
options required by decision-makers. 
Development of research 
communication that is fit for purpose. 
Implementation To monitor and 
evaluate actions and 
support analysis and 
decision making 
 
Climate sciences, 
economic, social, 
environmental, 
political. 
To monitor and evaluate adaptation 
implementation and provide comment 
and guidance to assist decision 
making during this process. 
Development of research 
communication that is fit for purpose. 
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Adaptation and innovation research are highly synergistic. At the institutional scale – to 
manage multiple and competing values in a research environment – adaptation 
research needs to be transdisciplinary. Because this research needs to be applied 
practically, it also requires mechanisms for collaboration and knowledge sharing 
between research bodies and stakeholders, which is a key part of the transdisciplinary 
research process (Welp et al., 2006). 
 
Although research aims to deliver information for policy formulation and other forms of 
decision-making, the current ability of researchers and research institutes to achieve 
this aim is inconsistent. Much of this has to do with the way research is being 
developed and communicated. Science communication and knowledge transfer and 
application both need to be strengthened in order to manage the risks associated with 
rapid changes in climate. The role of boundary organisations to assist in this translation 
also needs to be supported, and should be developed in collaboration with 
stakeholders to identify where this strengthening should occur.  
 
 
3.4.5 Transformation 
The impact of a 2 degree or more temperature rise on the earth’s systems would 
change the environments we live in ways that we have yet to experience. We will have 
to change how we think about these environments and the way we live in them. 
Transformative actions that combine key aspects of innovation and adaptive 
management are needed to ensure future sustainability. 
 
Currently many of the systems that we operate under, such as our legal systems, are 
based upon the assumption that the ecological systems they rely on will remain stable; 
therefore, the overriding aim is to preserve this status (Craig, 2010). Under gradual 
change, the assumption is that we can maintain this status by ‘nudging’ conditions back 
to normal. Step-like climate change is likely to increase instability resulting in 
unpredictable non-linear changes within our social and environmental systems, the 
outcomes of which we may have little ability to predict or control (Section 3.1.3). This 
leads to a pressing need to transform systems that we currently manage based on the 
assumption of stationarity and gradual change. 
 
(IPCC, 2012b) define transformation as: 
“The altering of fundamental attributes of a system (including value systems; 
regulatory, legislative, or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and 
technological or biological systems)”.   
 
Transformation is the point at which these changes occur within or to a system. 
Transformation can be spontaneous or by default and the result of a trigger such an 
extreme event, as in the case of the town of Grantham in the Lockyer Valley (see Box 
1).  
 
It can also be planned through a deliberative process as is often the case in industry 
with a specific transformation goal in mind which is enabled by transformative 
processes. In 2007, for example, Siemens, one of the world’s leading manufacturing 
and engineering companies, launched a transformation program called “Integrate, 
Enable, Collaborate” that was driven by the introduction of a PLM – a single platform 
for all processes involved in designing, building and developing multiple products. The 
strategic goal of the program was to transform their business practice to “halve the time 
to market” (Atos, 2012). 
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Box 1:  Lockyer Valley region – Voluntary relocation case study 
 
In January 2011, floods devastated Grantham in the Lockyer Valley region in 
Queensland, home to approximately 360 people. The flash flooding resulted in 
unprecedented levels of property damage and destroyed more than 130 homes 
(Lockyer Valley Regional Council, 2011). The council, in close collaboration with the 
community, decided that due to the profound effects of this event they would take a 
proactive stance when rebuilding their community by developing a planned voluntary 
relocation scheme.  
 
935 acres of land was purchased by the council adjacent to Grantham that was above 
the flood lines reached in January. This was to ensure that residents could rebuild in a 
safer environment. The council also committed to invest $30–$40 million over the 
coming year to support development. Lockyer Valley council worked with the 
community to develop the master plan for the new community through the 
Strengthening Grantham Community Workshops. This final plan included a community 
centre, show grounds and a possible new school. 
 
The Lockyer Valley Regional Council Community Recovery Plan (23 February 2013) 
and the Grantham Relocation Policy (11 May 2011) were developed and a flood study 
of the region was undertaken. 
 
The first release of land was in June 2011 when 80 parcels of land were made 
available to the owners who had been most impacted by the flood. (This was later 
extended to 90 due to the uptake of the scheme.) These parcels were offered as 
exchanges of ‘like for like’ parcels of land and owners incurred no cost. They were then 
allocated to the residents through a ballot system. 
 
 
Although current literature highlights the need for transformation and some research 
has been undertaken by sectors such as agriculture, Rickards and Howden (2012), 
further research is needed to understand more fully what sort of system changes are 
likely and how they will impact in different sectors. Transformation is not predictable in 
nature, and seeking to control the process of transformation through rigid structures is 
unlikely to be successful. As a result, transformation requires guiding processes that 
enable and contain a number of different elements such as iterative systems, 
collaboration, leadership and continuous learning (O'Brien, 2012).  
 
Assessing transformation 
 
Very little is known about the costs and benefits of transformation, which makes it 
difficult to quantify. Transformation is non-marginal and is required when marginal 
change is not cost-effective or is technically impossible (Hallegatte et al., 2011). 
 
Costs are often presumed to be very high (IPCC, 2012a) requiring large initial 
investment with benefits not realised for many years. Because transformation is 
context-specific and has geographical, institutional and temporal aspects that 
encompass both tangible and intangible costs, it requires a combination of economic 
methods for effective assessment. As a result, costs are often under-estimated (World 
Bank, 2010) – in particular ‘soft costs’ and ongoing costs that will persist for years to 
come. There is a need to understand more fully how to assess these costs. 
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A key recommendation of the World Bank (2010) to avoid the (often intangible) costs of 
community disintegration and anxiety/anger over the relocation is to ensure that there 
is meaningful community engagement as part of the process. This type of community 
engagement is challenging because it may be seen as time-consuming, constraining 
and costly. However, numerous studies in the disaster field have highlighted the 
importance of community engagement as a key factor in the success of transformation 
processes such as relocation of communities (e.g., Perry and Lindell, 1997). 
 
Institutional values can direct decision-making in transformation. For example, a profit-
making company might be interested solely in economic sustainability. How and what 
they choose to transform will be different to a company who have social and 
environmental sustainability as a core part of their value system. Communities who 
choose to transform may focus on the core value of the community, such as social 
cohesion or community resilience, and this will determine the nature of the 
transformation and the priorities.  
 
This is an emerging area that will develop. However, there are a number of economic 
tools that are currently available that can assist this process (see Section 3.4.3). 
  
The role of policy 
 
This report has highlighted several salient issues for climate change adaptation policy 
and the decision-making approaches that inform it. We have shown that: 
 The dominant presentation of the climate science leads to an assumption of 
gradualism that is highly contestable. A stepped trajectory is more likely to occur. 
 The current economic, policy and institutional models are not equipped to deal 
with non-marginal changes. 
These points indicate a need for a re-thinking of economic, policy and institutional 
models if they are to facilitate the transformation of social, environmental and economic 
systems required for adaptation. 
 
Policy may foster transformation incidentally by altering system interactions, or 
purposefully in order to achieve a desired outcome. The complexities of the interactions 
governing our social, ecological and economic systems are well-established. The 
potential for transformation, either by default or design, is important for adaptation 
planning to consider because of the long-term impact of policy decisions. The 
transformation literature shows – both in response to climate events and more 
generally – that if transformation is to be a deliberative process, it needs to be actor-
driven and innovative in order to succeed. 
 
Institutionally, this is challenging because many institutions are top-down, using linear 
frameworks within siloed organisational environments. Cross-sectoral and whole-of-
organisation models are required. Current policies also tend to operate on short to 
medium-term time frames, are reactive in their nature and can be subject to political 
expediency, which acts as a barrier for transformation.  
 
Land use change, either gradually via regulated planning or abruptly by relocation, also 
offers both challenges and opportunities. Land use planning via regulation systems is 
frequently cited as a key site for both hazard mitigation and climate change adaptation 
(e.g., Productivity Commission, 2012). Despite the potential of the planning system, 
even in developed countries with strong institutions, an enduring theme in disasters 
research is the staunch obstacles to utilising it for disaster risk reduction. Travis (2010) 
cites legal and social opposition to land use regulation in high-risk areas in response to 
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powerful economic pressures which highlights the need for clear leadership in this 
area. 
 
Transformation is important as a concept and a strategy because it offers an approach 
to adaptation specifically for step or non-linear change. It allows institutions, sectors, 
communities and people to adjust to new circumstances or prepare for anticipated 
major change. This is in contrast to more normative approaches that are, at best, 
incremental or resistant to change. 
 
3.4.6 Maladaptation 
Because adaptation is uncertain in its nature and its interactions cover multiple 
systems, domain, timeframes, processes and actors, the risk of maladaptation is high. 
Managing these risks to avoid increased vulnerability is a key task for all actors in the 
adaptation field. 
 
The IPCC (2012b) defines maladaptation as: 
 “Any changes in natural or human systems that inadvertently increase 
vulnerability to climatic stimuli; an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing 
vulnerability but increases it instead.” 
 
Maladaptation has been identified as a serious threat to the success of climate change 
adaptation initiatives (Hallegatte et al., 2011). 
 
Barnett and O'Neill (2010) identify five types of maladaptation. They state that actions, 
relative to alternatives, are maladaptive if they: 
 increase emissions of greenhouse gases; 
 disproportionately burden the most vulnerable; 
 have high opportunity costs; 
 reduce incentives to adapt; and 
 set paths that limit the choices available to future generations. 
 
As Jotzo (2010) points out, it is highly likely that it is the threat of these low probability 
catastrophes that is driving concern about climate change in the first place. In section 
1.2.3 we outline how the application of orthodox economic approaches to situations 
with uncertain catastrophic risk may be a source of maladaptation. 
 
The issue of low probability/high-impact events has been flagged in the climate change 
adaptation economics literature as having significant potential to skew the entire 
direction of adaptation action. Travis (2010) contends that the literature on climate 
change adaptation focuses on gradual change that there is a lack of attention to 
extremes and rapid climate change. Climate change seen only through this lens can 
increase maladaptive responses and vulnerability. 
 
Options highlighted by the disasters field to reduce maladaptation include giving high 
priority to low-regrets adaptations (Hallegatte et al., 2011; IPCC, 2012b) because they 
are seen as ‘adaptive’ in all situations. In the context of rapid changes, such measures 
may no longer qualify if they do not cope with the rapidity of change. This highlights the 
need for measures that  are iterative and respond to new information as it becomes 
available (Hallegatte et al., 2011). 
 
Merz et al.’s (2009) example of flood mitigation via levees in Germany shows that when 
traditional and analytically convenient models do not consider the indirect and 
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intangible costs of catastrophic events and/or assume risk neutrality, they under-
prepare for extremes (Box 2). 
 
 
 
Box 2. Levee Effect 
 
The levee effect occurs when extra development occurs behind a flood protection 
levee; thereby increasing potential future damages (see also Travis, 2010). 
Unfortunately, levees often fail; in 1982 the National Research Council found that levee 
failures were responsible for approximately a third of flood disasters in the USA 
(Freudenberg et al., 2009). In building behind the levee and not taking further 
protection, people are assuming that they have adequate protection against all floods. 
In fact, levees are only designed to protect against flooding up to a certain point, say a 
1/100 year event. Finally, there is evidence that levees actually increase flood levels by 
altering regional hydrology, reducing natural flood mitigating features and shifting flood 
risk downstream (Freudenberg et al., 2009). 
 
The levee effect highlights how maladaptation may play out under orthodox climate 
change adaptation economics. Adaptation decision-makers must consider the complex 
reactions different groups may have to adaptation initiatives – they may be maladaptive 
if they result in high opportunity costs and reduce incentives to adapt (Barnett and 
O'Neill, 2010; Travis, 2010). The IPCC (2012b) highlights the importance of 
considering the spatial and temporal dynamic of exposure and vulnerability when 
assessing adaptation measures. This is supported by the levee effect which is 
maladaptive in if it either increases the penalty of failure or limits the choices available 
to future generations (Barnett and O'Neill, 2010). 
 
 
Without the transformation of current institutional models, the risk of maladaptation is 
significant. It is possible for policy to facilitate catastrophe as seen in the example of 
Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans. Burby (2006) states: 
“In summary, federal policies have sought to make areas at risk from natural 
hazards safe places for urban development by reducing the degree of hazard 
and by shielding hazard-area occupants from financial risks of loss. Over time, 
these policies have facilitated the development of these areas, as illustrated by 
urban growth in New Orleans, but they have increased the potential for 
catastrophic losses in large disasters. In this sense, Hurricane Katrina and the 
flooding of New Orleans could be viewed as an expected consequence of federal 
policy rather than an aberration that is unlikely to be repeated.” 
 
This assessment of long-term disaster risk reduction planning resulting in catastrophic 
maladaptation provides a lesson for climate change adaptation and highlights the need 
for a consideration of how factors such as risk, complex interactions between systems 
and the values they engender, can compound. The potential for possible maladaptation 
needs to be identified in advance and reviewed regularly. The use of scenario planning 
can be useful in this process. 
 
The experience of the disasters field has key lessons for climate change adaptation 
economics in relation to avoiding maladaptation: 
 Catastrophic impacts ought to be given more weight in decision-making. 
Catastrophes have wider intangible and indirect costs to which the community 
is strongly averse. 
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 The phenomena of the levee effect demonstrates that complex social reactions 
be considered in planning adaptation. This is essential even though it requires 
more complex economic modelling and analytical rigour. 
 The dynamic interaction between disaster risk reduction and socioeconomic 
development shows that outcomes are improved when due consideration is 
given to both areas. Equity and vulnerability also needs to be balanced with 
economic analyses.  
 Decisions have the potential to be maladaptive if they increase vulnerability 
and/or neglect to consider the impact on all stakeholders, requiring 
comprehensive engagement with stakeholders in decision-making. 
 
The role of economics in maladaptation 
 
The levee effect is an example of a broader issue of perverse incentives when a 
‘rational’ response to an adaptation increases vulnerability. Uncertainty and/or the 
possibility of irreversible catastrophic damages mean that alternatives to the standard 
CBA framework, such as those discussed in Section 3.4.3 become valuable. 
 
Research with regard to risk perception and averseness indicates that people have 
little or no control over disasters; they are risk averse (which is in contrast the standard 
CBA approach, which is risk neutral). More generally, CBA assessment of flood levels 
tend to only return a positive result for very low levels of protection (for example up to a 
1/10 year event), whereas the social standard is often a lot higher (a 1/100 year event). 
These non-linear explosions of costs at the level of catastrophe are not captured within 
the CBA framework. Furthermore, it is often the case that decisions are made politically 
before any formal costing takes place. On the other hand, people who have control 
over how a risk plays out are much more tolerant, suggesting that ‘soft’ options for risk 
management may promote risk tolerance and increase community resilience. 
 
These points make a strong argument for a revision of the current theory to better 
reflect practice and society’s expectations. This approach might see society identify the 
level and type of risk that is tolerable and then identify, via CBA, the optimal way of 
achieving this level of risk. This approach has the dual benefit of circumventing the 
problem of assumed risk neutrality in CBA, and providing a formal and transparent 
framework for what is a nebulous process. 
 
3.4.7 Developing capacity 
Adaptation is a relatively new field. In the context of rapid change, several areas of 
capacity need to be developed by institutions, particularly in relation to understanding 
and valuing the resulting risks. Innovative frameworks, mechanisms that allow for the 
development of new skills and understandings and the resources to support them are 
needed to enable this. 
 
Adaptive capacity is defined by the IPCC as ‘the ability of a system (region or 
community) to cope and thrive in the face of change’ (IPCC, 2007b) and is closely 
linked to resilience as the ability to buffer change, learn and develop (Folke et al., 
2002). It is closely linked at the institutional scale with governance and is needed to be 
able to effectively address rapid change by identifying the problems and action the 
solutions needed to enhance the ability of institutions to recover from disturbance 
and facilitate transformation (Preston and Stafford-Smith, 2009). 
 
Increased decision support, R&D, data and information to support adaptation and 
policies to reduce vulnerability are all aspects that increase adaptive capacity. 
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Capacity-building may be needed due to increasing economic vulnerability exacerbated 
by climatic stress, as is occurring in regions of Australia that experienced the 
millennium drought followed by fire and heat stress, then flooding. Nelson et al. (2010) 
propose five types of capital for consideration in relation to adaptive capacity: natural; 
manufactured; social; human; and financial. These provide the resources for 
developing capacity, but the real impact of capacity is in the processes that enable it to 
be used. 
 
Of special interest is institutional capacity, which can be summarised under the 
following three topic areas (Urban Capacity Building Network, n.d.): 
 Human resource development – the process of equipping individuals with the 
understanding, skills and access to information, knowledge and training that 
enables them to perform effectively.  
 Organisational development – the elaboration of management structures, 
processes and procedures, not only within organisations but also the 
management of relationships between the different organizations and sectors 
(public, private and community).  
 Institutional and legal framework development – making legal and regulatory 
changes to enable organisations, institutions and agencies at all levels and in all 
sectors to enhance their capacities 
 
Current institutional frameworks rely upon siloed operational structures that project the 
future from the past. As rapid changes will result in risks that exceed those of past 
experience, the capacity to plan effectively requires institutional frameworks that can 
make decisions in advance rather than relying on post-event responses to fulfil their 
KPIs. They also require collaborative rather than competitive mechanisms; for 
example, the development of collaborative narratives for sustainability and change that 
can be shared between institutions.  
 
A lack of understanding about the risk of rapid change leads to those risks being 
undervalued, which affects the level of preparedness and response. Knowledge 
transfer and communication are key to enabling this. Communication sources across 
different levels of government and boundary organisations need to be mapped so that 
information can be disseminated effectively (Young, 2012b). 
 
The development of tools and supportive frameworks that are ‘fit for purpose’ and 
create better understanding of the problems faced and the solutions pathways, assist 
decision-making and are an important part of the capacity-building process (Webb and 
Beh, 2013). 
 
Factors that enable institutional adaptive capacity include (Preston and Stafford-
Smith, 2009; Shaxson et al., 2012; Webb and Beh, 2013): 
 resource availability – financial, technological, human; 
 communication, knowledge development and transfer systems; 
 governance; 
 innovation and transformation of current intuitional frameworks and processes; 
and 
 development of specific products – tools, methods and processes; e.g., 
programs for innovative adaptation, and monitoring and evaluation tools. 
 
These are elaborated on in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Summary of capacities needed to deal with rapid changes in climate 
extremes. 
Core Capacities  Rationale 
Risk management 
 
Greater understanding of the impacts of rapid changes and 
the risks they pose. Valuation of risks and the identification 
of ownership at the institutional scale. This includes the 
need to review and develop economic tools and methods 
that are fit for purpose 
Collaborative capacity 
 
Development of effective working relationships between 
stakeholders to enable effective decision-making and 
implementation. 
Transformation/Change 
Management 
Current institutional systems are not designed to effectively 
deal with the onset of rapid changes due to their siloed and 
competitive nature. These systems need to develop an 
innovative culture that is comfortable with managing 
transitional processes. 
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
 
Methods for monitoring and evaluating adaptation are a key 
part of the innovation process. Iterative methods ensure 
that new learning is captured, especially from unexpected 
outcomes. Multiple values across different time frames 
need to be included. 
Knowledge development 
 
Knowledge derived from research needs to be developed in 
such a way that it addresses the problem-solution space 
and is not framed the way that researchers see the 
problem. Collaboration with end users is required to ensure 
that knowledge developed is useable and fit for purpose. 
Knowledge transfer and 
communication 
Knowledge transfer and communication will transmit, adapt, 
adopt and implement new and evolving ideas. Narratives 
and creative processes need to become much more 
prominent in preference to toolkits and traditional decision 
support systems. 
Policy development 
 
New policy mechanisms that enable an ‘all agency’ 
approach to proactive, iterative and non-competitive policy-
making. Positive incentive-funding models can support 
innovative policy initiatives.  
Innovation theory and 
practice 
Innovation theory and practice will help provide thinking 
frameworks and tools for operational aspects of 
implementation.  
Process and systems 
development and 
integration 
Adaptive processes can become part of everyday business. 
The integration of adaptation options into operational 
systems and processes will ensure a whole-of-organisation 
approach is adopted.   
Decision-making under 
uncertainty 
 
Skills development, especially how to make decisions under 
uncertainty, would benefit from a better knowledge of the 
innovation process. New frameworks, tools and systems of 
monitoring can enable this. 
Strategic capacity 
Visualisation 
 
Strategic capacity and visualisation are key elements for 
planning and important elements for developing proactive 
policy and activities. 
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Private industry and civil society 
 
Private industry and civil society have a limited understanding of conventionally framed 
adaptation. Building the necessary understanding that enables clear decision-making in 
relation to planning and response to rapid change is pivotal. Knowledge and 
information that is sector and context specific is a key requirement to support efficient 
markets under rapid change (Table 18). Accessibility to relevant information about 
climate change and adaptation is important especially for private adaptation by 
individuals and small and medium enterprises. Investment is also needed to support 
markets for adaptation goods and services. Peak organisations have a pivotal role in 
assisting this. 
 
Table 18. Industry sector specific adaptation requirements 
 
Sector  Needs in relation to rapid change 
Logistics and Supply 
chains 
Plan for disruption regional to international levels. An understanding 
of how these disruptions may occur and the threats and 
opportunities this offers for businesses. 
Building industry Change has to be well planned and incremental. Education of 
organisations and consumers; e.g., consumers are more concerned 
with fittings than the structural integrity of dwellings, and with capital 
costs compared to running costs. Promotion of fit for climate 
housing needs. 
Changes in practice are driven by regulation, requiring fast-tracking 
of appropriate standards. Ongoing skills development in relation to 
best practice in relation to climate-resilient buildings. 
Parks  Extreme weather events impact on parks organisations and 
management – and have been apparent for the last 20 years. Post 
event response is becoming more expensive, and the human cost is 
also increasing.  Need standards for consistent monitoring and 
costing in additional to tools that can assess the full value of parks. 
Small to medium 
businesses 
This sector is financially vulnerable, as it is hard for many 
businesses to plan long-term. They need information that is 
accessible and relevant. Many small businesses are not always 
connected into networks, so communication is an issue. 
Tourism 80% SME and micro businesses, very vulnerable to climate shocks 
Improved communication is needed. 
Health Evidence-based tangible activities and strategies are needed. 
Capacity building in relation to responses to climate change and 
also greater understanding of organisational aspects of climate risk. 
Agriculture Agriculture is already adapting because it has to, but farmers are 
financially vulnerable to cascading climate events. Need for policy 
that addresses economic and social and environmental aspects in 
an integrated way.  
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Sector  Needs in relation to rapid change 
Finance Expansion of financing tools and mechanisms to increase the level 
of social and environmental investments through bonds and other 
investment funds.  
The industry needs to explore how it can assist long-term financial 
planning and increase collaboration with the sectors they service.  
Collaboration within the finance sector can address how to maintain 
economic stability by preparing for rapid change. Higher risk due to 
rapid change will require higher levels of investment at all levels 
from infrastructure through to social investments. 
Greater policy surety is needed to allow proper planning of future 
investments. 
Insurance Possible need for a new regulatory structure that is more resilient to 
rapid and large increases in payouts that may exceed premiums. 
Consideration of how reinsurance will be affected by cascading 
events, and how it can promote future economic stability through 
the development of new products. 
Emergency Sector  Different modes of communication that engage more effectively with 
vulnerable aspects of the community, such as the CALD sector. 
Encouragement of pro-active responses in the sector and 
communities. 
Manufacturing  Vulnerable to supply chain disruption, resources restrictions and 
physical risks to employees. Fit for purpose information can create a 
better understanding of adaptation and the opportunities and risks 
associated with it.  
Community Sector CSOs are highly vulnerable and poorly prepared to respond to 
climate change and extreme weather impacts. There is a need for 
inclusion into policy and research settings where the impacts of 
climate change are more fully supported. 
 
Financial arrangements 
 
Financial arrangements, particularly for areas such as infrastructure, need to be long-
term and not constrained by election cycles: 
 Funding need to address both soft and hard infrastructure requirements rather 
than create siloed funding, which may result in maladaptation. 
 Conventions such as drip-feed funding can work if they are guaranteed over the 
long-term. This enables bodies that access these funds to invest in long-term 
strategies using shorter-term investment cycles. 
 Reimbursement models, such as the one used by Austrade, where a percentage 
of expenditure on specific tasks are returned after the actions have been 
implemented. This is particularly useful for stimulating early innovation in the 
private sector. 
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Three key areas for funding infrastructure that are relevant for both hard and soft 
infrastructure are: 
 the development of new infrastructure;  
 the maintenance of existing structures; and 
 the upgrading of existing infrastructure to meet a new need. 
 
Governance 
 
The development of appropriate governance is required for both adaptation policy and 
for supporting adaptive capacity to ensure that risks are adequately managed.  
 
At a national level, coordination by COAG is needed to determine the best vertical and 
horizontal structure that addresses:  
 the propagation of risk through the governance system involving government, the 
judiciary and civil society; and 
 the institutional arrangements required to manage the risks of rapid change via 
adaptation. 
The institutional arrangements would require a large-scale effort under COAG similar in 
scale to the development of the mitigation agenda. It would also include research and 
development to be more integrated into the adaptation process. Monitoring of 
implementation at the local and regional level would help collate lessons, identify areas 
of innovation and transfer capacity and governance arrangements that work. An 
assessment of current assurance systems and tools used by industry and their 
applicability for monitoring and evaluation aspects of adaptation activity would also be 
useful (Webb and Beh, 2013). 
 
Governance in relation to adaptation at state government level is evolving; areas that 
are currently being developed are:  
 development of multi-portfolio projects; 
 monitoring and evaluation;  
 knowledge development and communication; 
 planning and responses in relation to effective management of extreme events 
and their impacts; and 
 collaborative partnership frameworks 
In relation to rapid change, governance frameworks need to effectively plan for 
propagating risks across domains and to manage the potential impacts of thresholds 
being exceeded in different sectors or systems. These will also need to be understood 
in terms of tangible and intangible costs that include fiscal, social and environmental 
currencies. 
 
Developing governance is a major challenge at local government level because actions 
at this level revolve around implementation and communication, especially with local 
communities and businesses. There is still a lack of clarity in key areas such as: 
 areas of roles and responsibility;  
 monitoring and evaluation;  
 understanding of appropriate governance systems;  
 legal responsibilities in relation to planning and public liability; and 
 ascertaining tangible and intangible values across multiple time frames  
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Lessons for governance and the development of adaptive capacity can be gained from 
the failure of water policy and governance to achieve sustainable integrated catchment 
management (Table 19). 
Table 19. Catchment Management Organisations (CMO) Governance Criteria 
(Roberts et al., 2011) 
Governance 
criteria 
Analysis of criteria  
 
Performance 
Clear institutional 
objectives 
 
Currently CMOs have strong statutory powers in Victoria 
and South Australia (1), limited ones in NSW, and no 
statutory powers in Queensland and ACT 
Low 
 
Transparency CMOs have low access to scientific data; have problems 
handling complex information; focus on outputs rather 
than outcomes; and find it difficult to report meaningfully 
Commonly 
low 
 
Accountability Upward accountability processes (reporting on budgets, 
activities, outputs) are well established, however need 
streamlining of reporting 
High 
 
Interconnection – 
formal and 
informal 
institutions 
All stakeholders are not equally represented in CMO 
decision-making. While governments and primary 
producers are well represented, urban residents and 
indigenous communities are not 
Moderate 
 
Adaptiveness The different institutional structures operating in the Basin 
states for CMOs suggest that their adaptive capacity is at 
least moderate. 
Moderate 
 
Appropriateness 
of scale 
 
CMOs are well suited to manage natural resources at a 
regional / catchment scale, but find it difficult to plan for 
cross-boundary issues and maintain hydrological 
connectedness at larger scales 
Moderate 
 
Integration 
 
Capacity of CMOs for vertical and horizontal integration is 
‘‘weak to moderate’’ and cross-regional integration is a 
challenge.  CMOs generally do not use formal decision 
frameworks to integrate different types of information 
 
Moderate 
between 
agencies 
Low for data 
integration 
Capability Capability varies greatly depending on size, resources 
and maturity, having implications for establishment of 
effective systems. Most CMOs do not have sufficient 
resources and have difficulties in attracting and retaining 
staff 
Highly variable, 
ranges from 
low to high 
 
 
3.4.8 Policy implications of rapid change 
The policy implications for responding to rapid changes in climate-related risks are 
substantial. COAG has already stated that a national, coordinated and cooperative 
effort is needed to enhance Australia’s capacity to withstand and recover from 
emergencies and disasters (COAG, 2011a). As these disasters are likely to increase 
both in severity and frequency with rapid change identifying the solutions to reduce the 
risk are pivotal. 
 
The knowledge that extremes can change much more rapidly than estimated by the 
latest climate projections suggests that a proportionate policy response is needed.  
As mentioned in Section 3.3.4, even though recent policies dealing with emergency 
management and disasters apply the language of resilience and advocate breaking 
down institutional silos and community engagement, the institutional structures that 
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support policy-making and application still contain implicit assumptions that fail to 
recognise the need for transformation (Folke et al., 2002). Instead, they are linear, 
work on prediction and control and treat human and natural systems as 
independent. 
 
 
Recent examples of the recognised need to change: 
 
“ ... the emergency services agencies in Victoria operate in a siloed structure with 
each agency focused on legislated obligations to address specific hazards.” 
(Comrie, 2011). 
 
“A resilience approach to managing the risks to critical infrastructure encourages 
organisations to develop more organic capacity to deal with rapid-onset shock. 
This is in preference to the more traditional approach of developing plans to deal 
with a finite set of scenarios”.(Australian Government, 2010a)  
 
The mismatch between intentions and actions may be in part due to the lack of 
understanding as to how to actually transform across diverse institutional sectors. 
Other barriers may include the size of the investment of time and resources needed to 
enable transformation to be achieved.  
 
Transformation at the institutional scale needs to be supported by a proactive policy 
environment. All relevant decision-makers need to see all hazard risk mitigation and 
response as part of their role, and be empowered to carry it out… (Australian 
Government, 2010a, p 13). As recent investments in policies for disaster are currently 
reactive and more focused on disaster recovery rather than disaster risk reduction by a 
ratio of greater than 50 to 1 (Productivity Commission, 2012), it is clear that this 
imbalance will need to be addressed to reduce considerable futures losses. 
 
Increased levels of climate risk in future may lead to lower standards of protection, but 
this proposition needs to be accepted as part of a broader social contract. Increased 
levels of community resilience could counteract this trend. Social acceptance, if it were 
to occur, would be helped by risk ownership becoming better acknowledged at the 
institutional scale. This includes the sharing of public and private risk, individual risk 
and that associated with the commons, an area dominated by natural assets and 
infrastructure. 
 
Whether a given activity or location can thrive depends on the balance between 
market-driven adjustments to mean climate shifts that remain within the coping range 
of climate and extremes that exceed subcritical or critical thresholds. Rapid changes 
will tip this balance much faster than anticipated. Changes above a critical threshold – 
particularly one that crosses domains – will cause significant distress in a system if 
unprepared for. However, for the bulk of climate variation below critical levels, existing 
adaptation analogues are likely to be available. Markets will generally manage such 
changes readily but may need increased information to do so. 
 
Figure 31 shows an idealised distribution of temperature frequency, with thresholds 
denoting extreme hot and cold. If distribution shifts rapidly to warmer conditions as in 
the lower chart, then extreme heat thresholds will be exceeded at an unprecedented 
rate. 
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This model suggests that managing extremes requires a considerable policy response, 
whereas managing changes around the mean can be largely managed by market 
forces as described above. Rapid changes will tip the balance more to policy 
responses, suggesting that such changes may need stronger industry-government 
dialogue in order to better understand which changes are manageable and which 
require increased cooperation in order to balance market-driven and policy-driven 
adaptations. 
 
 
Figure 31. Schematic of temperature frequency about the mean showing a shift 
to warmer conditions with a greatly increased exceedance of extreme heat 
events. 
This has ramifications for both public and private sectors and highlights the need to 
define more clearly who is responsible, how they are responsible and what 
mechanisms are needed to ensure resilience is developed effectively. It also points to 
the importance of better understanding the relationship between public and private 
sectors in relation to these events. 
 
Table 20 summarises risks, risk propagation and potential adaptation policy for the 
major adaptation clusters. Climate risks at the local, sectoral and regional scale can be 
managed by local government, regional and catchment bodies, sectoral and state-
based strategies. As mentioned earlier, climate variability falling within the standard 
coping range can largely be managed through local plans and market-based strategies 
supported by policy that fosters innovation, provides appropriate standards and 
protects the vulnerable. The exception is when mean climate approaches a critical 
threshold and the activity or location is at risk of becoming unviable. 
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Table 20. Summary for each of the five adaptation clusters detailing risk, risk 
propagation and major types of adaptation policy for each (examples need 
further development). 
Services 
 
Scale Local District/Region State/National Global 
 
Impacts Small events 
at local scale 
Regional events or 
accrued local stresses 
Large events 
and accrued 
regional 
stresses 
Global load of 
shocks 
Risks Insured and 
uninsured 
losses of 
property and 
incomes, loss 
of stock and 
trade, possible 
injury or death 
Lost income, possible 
community stress, local 
government services, 
damage to LG 
infrastructure, reduced 
natural resources, local 
businesses affected, 
local supplies disrupted 
Current 
accounts 
affected, 
government as 
insurer of last 
resort, large 
insurance 
payouts, supply 
chains disrupted 
Global 
insurance 
burden, food 
and oil prices, 
trade 
exposure, 
economic 
climate, 
availability of 
finance  
 
Risk 
propagation 
Risks pass 
from commons 
to local 
systems 
affecting  
production and 
wellbeing 
Losses accrue from 
local areas 
Government as 
insurer of last 
resort, industry 
viability affected 
by regional and 
global 
influences (e.g., 
insurance, 
finance) 
Reinsurance, 
loss of 
governance, 
environmental 
refugees 
Adaptation 
policies 
Local 
knowledge, 
information 
transfer, 
community 
exchange, 
local 
volunteers 
groups, health 
groups, small 
business 
Local government 
plans, regional, 
development/adaptation 
plans, CMA-scale 
planning, regional 
infrastructure, 
emergency services 
(SES, CFA) 
State and 
federal 
government 
policies, peak 
industry bodies, 
professional 
bodies, large 
business and 
industry  
Adaptation 
funds, 
international 
policy 
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Goods 
 
Scale Local District/Region State/National Global 
 
Impacts Changes to 
resources 
(soil, water, 
temperature), 
events causing 
loss of 
production 
Catchment-scale 
(inland) or coastal 
region resource effects 
and events, some 
downstream effects on 
secondary businesses 
Large 
production 
areas affected, 
flowing into 
other major 
industries 
International 
prices, trade 
impacts 
Risks Risks to local 
viability, 
environmental 
and economic, 
employment 
Risks to regional 
viability, loss of income 
and employment, flow-
on effects  
Major industry/ 
resource reform 
may be needed, 
regional 
adjustment 
schemes, could 
affect essential 
services 
Differential 
effects on 
commodity 
and 
manufactures, 
and input 
costs, 
international 
trade, food 
security 
Risk 
propagation 
 Local viability 
aggregated at regional 
level 
Major conflict 
between 
changing 
resources, 
social capacity 
and 
environment 
likely 
Place of 
resource 
within 
globalised 
economy 
Adaptation 
policies 
Maximise 
production, 
diversify or 
switch 
Industry and regional 
development policies, 
securing underpinning 
resources 
National policies 
at industry and 
sector scale, 
transfer of 
capacity to 
regional scale, 
R&D 
Trade policy, 
international 
treaties, aid 
and 
development 
assistance 
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Capital Assets and Infrastructure 
 
Scale Local District/Region State/National Global 
 
Impacts Extreme 
events, 
changed 
exposure to 
chronic events 
Regional events, 
accrual of local 
maintenance loads 
 
Large events 
and accrued 
regional stresses 
Global load of 
shocks 
Risks Increased 
maintenance, 
rebuilding, 
retrofit, higher 
establishment 
costs 
Repair/rebuild after 
extreme events 
Retrofit and new 
infrastructure 
requiring state 
and national 
government 
investment 
International 
cost of finance, 
global 
engineering 
pool (skills) 
Risk transfer Inability to 
source local 
infrastructure 
transferred 
from larger 
scale  
Under-adaptation 
and maladaptation 
increases 
exposure of 
current 
infrastructure 
Under-
adaptation and 
maladaptation 
increases 
exposure of 
current 
infrastructure 
Nations under-
adapt risking 
regional and 
global security 
Adaptation 
policies 
Insurance, 
planning better 
manages risk 
and 
responsibility, 
better 
education of 
risk to 
individuals and 
small orgs 
Quality control 
accounting for 
adaptation & 
changing climate, 
fore-sighting, 
planning ongoing 
investment in 
infrastructure over 
decadal timescales 
National 
infrastructure 
policy, financing, 
major policies for 
regions and 
sectors including 
coasts, 
communication 
and transport. 
Infrastructure 
and logistic 
planning at 
international 
level 
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Social Assets and Infrastructure 
 
Scale Local District/Region State/National Global 
 
Impacts Increased 
social 
vulnerability 
and damage to 
other clusters 
affect health, 
livelihoods and 
community 
Large-scale loss of 
production and/or 
natural and capital 
assets reduce 
livelihoods, income 
and amenities 
Large urban 
and/or rural 
regions become 
moribund with a 
loss of public 
income, 
stagnation at the 
national level 
Global impact 
burden leads 
to reduction in 
national 
impacts, loss 
of security in 
key regions 
Risks Reduced 
health and 
livelihoods, 
reduced 
amenity, 
endemic 
poverty 
Loss of health, 
livelihoods, 
community 
connectedness, 
migration out of 
region to 
unsustainable 
levels 
Outmigration of 
people, business 
and institutions 
to other states 
and nations 
Globalised 
spread of 
poverty, walled 
off areas of 
privilege 
Risk 
propagation 
External 
resources 
required to 
sustain local 
amenity 
External resources 
required to 
maintain order and 
supplement local 
rate base 
Large migrations 
cause issue with 
displaced 
people, loss of 
taxation income 
 
Regional loss 
of security 
requiring 
international 
intervention, 
mass migration 
Adaptation 
policies 
Significant 
adaptation will 
be required in 
other clusters 
contributing to 
loss in addition 
to social 
programs 
Significant 
adaptation will be 
required in other 
clusters 
contributing to loss 
in addition to social 
programs 
Triage taking 
place where 
limited resources 
for adaptation 
are at a premium 
Significant 
regret that 
mitigation was 
less successful 
then it should 
have been. 
Triage at 
international 
levels 
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Natural Assets and Infrastructure 
 
Scale Local District/Region State/National Global 
 
Impacts Degradation 
and loss of 
natural goods 
and services 
and 
underpinning 
processes at 
local level 
Degradation and 
loss of natural 
goods and services 
and underpinning 
processes at 
catchment level 
Widespread 
degradation and 
loss of natural 
goods and 
services and 
underpinning 
processes, major 
systems 
threatened or 
lost (e.g., GBR, 
MDB) 
Loss of 
regional 
environmental 
security across 
multiple 
countries 
requiring 
international 
response 
Risks Local loss of 
income and/or 
ability to 
operate, 
tourism and 
recreation 
affected 
Regional loss of 
function and 
amenity affecting 
production, 
increased costs of 
natural resources 
or replacement of 
ecosystem function 
Major loss of 
ecosystem 
function, regions 
become 
moribund, 
population 
movements 
affected by 
environmental 
security 
Environmental 
refugees, loss 
of regional 
function and 
security 
Risk 
propagation 
Unsustainable 
adaptations 
made to relieve 
environmental 
pressure 
Loss of skills and 
populations as 
people move away 
Concentration of 
pressures into 
particular 
regions, accrual 
of unsustainable 
adaptations 
putting pressure 
on regions and 
budgets 
Inability to 
manage 
environmental 
security having 
a flow on affect 
to other regions 
Adaptation 
policies 
Increased 
community 
involvement in 
environment, 
better 
monitoring and 
understanding 
of ecosystem 
process 
More integrated 
management at 
catchment and 
regional 
development scale, 
ecology and 
economics are 
integrated 
Biodiversity 
funds, national 
monitoring, 
supply of 
adaptive 
capacity to 
smaller scales, 
R&D, increased 
investment 
securing long-
term returns 
International 
treaties 
enabled, 
increased 
international 
co-operation 
including R&D 
and funds 
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Public-private policy strategies 
 
Government and markets both have roles in managing rapid change and there 
different strategies for pursuing an appropriate mix. (Jones et al., 2013) suggest 
four policy-based scenarios: 
 Business as usual – Governments and financial markets have a low sensitivity 
to resource limitations. Prices for resources are set based on short-term 
availability (supply and demand) and government regulation focuses on 
managing the flows of these resources rather than their stocks. Decision making 
for both the finance sector and government does not take into account limits to 
resources. 
 Price driven change – Governments have a low sensitivity to resource 
limitations, while markets have a long-term outlook of the stock availability of 
resources. Price signals within the market are set based on the long-term 
availability of resources. However, no regulation is put in place to manage the 
availability of resources. 
 Regulation driven change – Governments operate on a long-term basis and 
regulate the stock of resources rather than the flows. The market responds to 
regulatory change in a short-term way. The feedback from market change to 
policy development is not always effective. 
 Consensus driven change – Governments and the market operate on a long-
term basis by pricing and regulating the stock of resources rather than the flows. 
 
 
Figure 32. Scenario map showing sensitivity of the governments and financial 
markets. Each quadrant corresponds to one of the four scenarios (Jones et al., 
2013). 
Their preference on the basis of a future resource constrained world was the 
consensus-driven change. We believe that rapid change in climate produces high 
sensitivity to changing risks in both government and the private sector, suggesting that 
Consensus driven changePrice driven change
Business as usual Regulation driven change
Market
Government
Low 
sensitivity
Low 
sensitivity
High 
sensitivity
High 
sensitivity
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a cooperative consensus driven model for policy change be developed to better 
understand and manage the resulting risks. 
 
Key areas of responsibility 
 
Risks crossing institutional domains are likely to create new and heightened 
vulnerability, redistribute the ownership of risks and make a lack of ownership visible in 
areas where vulnerabilities become acute, if not managed proactively. Figure 33  
shows risk propagation across domains with the need for adaptive response following 
the direction of risk and the need for resources to meet increased demand for 
adaptation. Both governance and capacity will be needed at multiple scales. Key areas 
of responsibility for activity are summarised below: 
 
Local government 
 
Local government’s primary purpose is at the implementation level with particular 
respect to planning, risk management and operations. It has the most direct links to the 
community, receiving important community feedback (Productivity Commission, 2012), 
and therefore has a key role in the provision of information and monitoring and 
evaluating of actions at the local level. The propagation of shocks through the system 
is likely to exceed the current capacity and resilience of local government to prepare 
and respond to these events. Extra resources will be required from the state and 
federal levels to support adaptation actions. Project governance is particularly 
important at this level. 
 
Local critical threshold
Individual organisation 
and local tolerance 
exceeded
Regional critical 
threshold
Local and regional 
tolerance exceeded
State critical threshold
State tolerance 
exceeded
National critical 
threshold
National tolerance 
exceeded
 
Figure 33. Diagram of risk propagation across domains showing the need for 
adaptive response following the direction of risk and the need for resources to 
meet increased demand for adaptation. 
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State governments  
 
State government can support capacity building and work with local government to 
develop projects in this area. State-based policy-makers will need to consider the 
development and oversight governance that includes monitoring and evaluation 
processes for adaptation actions.  
 
Planning may require coordination at the national level through COAG to achieve 
consistent management and property rights. Mechanisms that enable greater levels of 
cooperation between state and local government with the private sector will also be 
needed. Further clarification of roles and responsibilities across different government 
levels (local, regional and state) in key areas such as coastal planning and emergency 
management are also needed (Productivity Commission, 2012, p 121).  
 
Federal government  
 
The increased propagation of risks will require more activity at the national scale, both 
in planning and in response. The Federal Government provides oversight at a national 
level, assisting with coordination and resourcing of activities across state areas. It 
sponsors national programs of research and monitoring the results of which need to be 
made available at the state and local levels. Renewed research programs to 
investigate re-orienting climate research from its gradualist framing to concentrate on 
the understanding of the causes and effects of the rapid changes detailed in this report 
is a priority. The provision of communication and policy to enable leadership and 
proactive decision making is also important. 
 
Industry 
 
Industry will need cooperation from government to develop the regulatory frameworks 
for new products and markets. Innovation will benefit large businesses but small to 
medium enterprises (SMEs) will also need to build a better understanding of their 
exposure to risks and of potential opportunities. Greater clarity around disclosure and 
legal liability is needed. Information provision that is sector-specific is also necessary to 
assist in planning. Accessibility to information is especially important for SMEs and 
especially micro businesses. Investment is also needed to support markets for 
adaptation goods and services and to support the transformations needed to build 
resilience.  
 
Civil society 
Community understanding of adaptation is varied and needs to become much more 
proactive. Populations in vulnerable regions potentially subject to rapidly changing risks 
need cogent information as a matter of public safety. Vulnerable communities, 
individuals dependent on welfare, people from culturally and linguistically diverse 
(CALD) backgrounds, and elderly people have specific communication needs. 
Successful adaptation, particularly transformative actions can be promoted as 
exemplars and communicate widely. Specific investment will be needed to support the 
development of resilience in both soft and hard infrastructure particularly in 
communities that have limited resources and high exposure under rapid change. 
Mechanisms that enable the community sector to contribute to key plans and policies 
will assist in expanding the responsibility for risk management across civil society 
(ACOSS, 2013). 
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Policy for infrastructure 
 
Queensland Community Recovery Minister David Crisafulli said that current federal 
policy rules for infrastructure only allow for like-for-like reconstruction. 
 
"It is absurd that we continue to replace the same bits of infrastructure with like 
for like and it gets ripped up," he said. 
"In some cases I've stood on bridges that have been replaced three and four 
times in the last five years."(ABC News February 4, 2013) 
 
The long-time spans of fixed assets provide an opportunity to consider future needs 
and build back better. Current regulation and policy such as Natural Disaster Relief and 
Recovery Arrangements support this, and the recent inclusion of the Provision of 
Betterment Funding that will provide partial costs of essential public assets. However 
some assets do not qualify for this and local government may lack the funds to 
improve infrastructure to the required standard. Mechanisms that combine the needs 
of both soft and hard infrastructure are needed at to ensure the development of 
effective actions that serve the communities they are designed for. 
 
 
Summary  
 
As extreme events are likely to become more frequent and cascade together under 
rapid change, the need to start developing transitional policy to adapt to these 
extremes becomes increasingly important. Future policy outcomes in this area will 
need to be informed by a comprehensive understanding of the value impacts of these 
events and the risks they pose. Key tasks for future policy-makers will need to include: 
 delegation of ownership and responsibility of risk, in particular risks that are un-
owned at the institutional level; 
 building of capacity; and 
 transitional and transformative outcomes. 
This will require:  
 The rebalancing of competing agendas in both public and private sectors (e.g., 
imposed economic efficiency that reduces resilience, tightly regulated programs 
that reduce adaptability, highly programmed policy that reduces innovation). 
 Mechanisms that allow for improved coordination across the Government, 
community and private sectors. For example, integrated policy frameworks that 
lead to complementary rather than competitive working arrangements. 
 A greater emphasis on planned transitions over multiple time frames, with less 
focus on the very short-term, and a greater emphasis on innovation and 
transformation.  
 Better understanding of realistic tangible and intangible costs of rapid change 
across short, intermediate and long-term time frames. The inclusion of non-
monetary values, as identified in the adaptation clusters as part of this evaluation 
process. 
Key policy opportunities: 
 The potential for combining risk governance across policy portfolios. For 
example, measures to protect the security of essential infrastructure and services 
from extreme events are compatible with those for dealing with military security.  
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 Combining mitigation and adaptation in the management of natural assets to 
assist productivity and sustain rural regions through investment. 
 The inclusion of local government and the community sector as part of the COAG 
process. 
 Mapping and integration of relevant current policies across departments and 
different levels of government. 
 The inclusion of innovation frameworks in policy and operational systems. 
 The development of economic tools and frameworks that enable multi criteria 
assessment. 
 Further development of knowledge and communication in this area that is sector 
and context specific. 
3.5 Implementation 
3.5.1 Question-based process for policy assessment 
This report challenges the status quo for the application of climate change science to 
impact and adaptation assessment and of the tools used to evaluate and cost 
adaptation options. It has also discussed the notion of risks crossing institutional 
domains, of risk ‘ownership’ in that context and of adaptation at the institutional scale. 
These are all unfamiliar topics at both the policy-making and practitioner level. They will 
require new ways of thinking and of working. For that reason, the policy guidance being 
developed by the project in its final phase will be query-based. The following set of 
draft questions are intended to assist policy-makers think through the process of 
assessing actions needed for rapid change (Table 21).  
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Table 21. Key questions for policymakers 
Key 
questions 
Considerations 
 Note that all questions can apply to single or multiple situations. 
What is at 
risk?    
 
 What is the nature of the risks faced? (e.g., fire, flood sea level rise, 
extreme winds, droughts, heatwaves, cyclones, heavy rain or a 
combination of these; inc. frequency and magnitude). 
 Who and what is at risk? (What are the domains impacted by this 
risks?)  
 How are they at risk? (How are these domains impacted by these 
risks?) 
 How do these risks operate across short, medium and long-term 
horizons? (Are these risks acute, chronic or cumulative?) 
 Are these risks likely to cross domains?  (Where are the institutional 
thresholds for these risks? i.e., what are the levels of tolerance? 
What values 
are at risk? 
 
 How are they valued? (What currency/currencies are being used to 
value e.g., political, social, economic, environmental, fiscal, cultural?) 
 Who values them? 
 How to the different values associated with these risks interrelate? 
 Will these values be compromised if no action is taken?  
 Over what time and geographical area are the costs of impacts being 
calculated for? 
What are the 
solutions 
required to 
address these 
risks? 
 
 What solution options are available? 
 Are these solutions needed to address these risks known and can 
they be applied? (Do the solutions have to be developed?) 
 What is needed to enable the solution? (resources, policy, processes) 
 What is the time frame for this solution to be implemented and used? 
 What are the risks associated with implementing the solution?  
 What are the criteria for assessing the most preferred adaptation 
option (effectiveness, cost, value?) 
 Who has responsibility for these solutions  (implementation, resource, 
monitoring and evaluation) 
What 
governance is 
needed? 
 
 Who provides governance?  
 What type of governance is needed? 
 Who should provide resources for this? (What financial arrangements 
are needed to achieve the desired goal?) 
 What is the capacity of the body/bodies involved in delivering this 
action? 
 How is this project to be evaluated 
What are the 
benefits? 
 
 What are the benefits? 
 Who will benefit? 
 How will they benefit? 
 What are the co-benefits? 
 Over what time scale can these benefits be realised? 
What is the 
priority for this 
decision? 
 Value – what value is being preserved by these actions? 
 Cost – is this action cost-effective? 
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Scenarios are a key tool in the adaptation process, but to date understanding of how 
and when to use these tools effectively in both the problem and solution phase of 
adaptation has been a source of confusion for many practitioners and policy-makers.  
 
Scenarios are an enabling tool that can assist exploration of a situation that may occur 
and which has not been experienced in a way that enhances understanding. The high 
level of uncertainty about what the future means that it is not possible to predict what is 
going to happen but it is possible to interpret what the future might be to enable 
decisions to be made and actions to be taken.  Scenarios are a structured process that 
combines both current knowledge and visions of the future in a way that allows the 
synthesis of a number of possible options from information compiled from diverse 
sources. Use of scenarios by sectors such as the military and business is well-
established and is generally used to gain understanding and the development of 
strategies to manage risk and assist planning and action in the future.  
 
In areas of innovation where new knowledge is emerging and uncertainty is high, 
scenarios provide a way of exploring possible outcomes and paths of action. 
Regardless of how scenarios are created, they have been shown to alter people's 
expectations about the depicted events Gregory and Duran (2001) and can assist with 
acceptance of idea. It is important that all types of scenarios are understood in terms in 
indications of possible futures rather than predictions of a future when they are being 
used. 
 
Key phases where scenarios are used in adaptation are: 
 scoping of projects or activities; 
 synergy mapping; 
 identification and assessment of climate risks; 
 development and selection of possible solutions; 
 development of shared understandings; and  
 decision-making. 
 
Scenarios are diverse in their make-up and are usually designed for a specific purpose. 
Some of the types of scenarios that can be used in adaptation area listed below: 
 Technical scenarios, where a number of ‘modelled’ options are presented. For 
example, CSIRO future climate scenarios, IPCC assessments. Adaptation Use: 
Support of decision-making in relation to planning, risks and policy. 
 Risk based scenarios – these can be used to assess and prioritise risk. For 
example, scenarios that explore the likelihood of a number of possible risks. 
Adaptation use: Identification of risks through group-based scenarios for the 
analysis of risk. 
 Actor-based scenarios where experiential learning is a key part. For example, 
mock trials to explore aspects of environmental law. Emergency exercises 
where mock situations are undertaken in a controlled environment to allow 
people to work through what they do in a situation such as a flood. Adaptation 
use: Training for responses to future conditions and possible outcomes and 
options, building of collaborative understandings. 
 Situation-based scenarios where a situation is explored through a number of 
contexts. For example, business scenarios which examine possible future 
outcomes are explored by a group of key stakeholders. Adaptation use: 
Assessment of climate risk, exploration of adaptation solution options, 
collaborative solution finding, learning, synergy mapping. 
 Back-casting scenarios – these take a future vision and work backwards, 
exploring what possible paths can be taken from this point in time to achieve 
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the desired goal. Adaptation use: planning support, exploration of solution 
pathways, building of collaborative plans of action. 
 
 
Using group scenarios 
 
Due to the diverse stakeholders involved in the process of adaptation and the need for 
collaborative decision-making, group scenarios are particularly useful. They allow for 
aspects of ‘wicked problems’ associated with adaptation to be teased out in a 
collaborative way that can create new understandings and also capture new learning’s. 
Because this is a ‘creative’ exercise, having a rigorous process is important to ensure 
that ideas are guided and converge at the end. There is no specific time for a scenario 
and they can range from a brief afternoon session to one that is worked through over a 
number of days or months. 
 
Key parts to planning the process are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This process can be uncomfortable for some people because it requires that 
participants engage with the ‘messiness’ of the process at the beginning of the exercise 
(which is divergent), and work through the process of exploration to convergence. It 
also requires that they engage and accept ideas that may be different to their own 
during the scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key aspects needed for group scenarios: 
 a clear purpose and structure that is specific to the task; 
 plausible information that has credibility and can be justified; 
 take into account the experiences of the people in the room; 
 require reflection and sharing of ideas from the participants; 
 guidance and facilitation rather than direction towards solutions; and 
 documentation and synthesis of findings. 
 
Using scientific scenarios is an important part of adaptation as they allow for credible 
data to be used to inform in a way that allows for interpretation into the context of the 
person using them. These scenarios can be in a number of forms such as in graphs, 
pictorial forms such as videos or GIS maps, spoken or written in reports. These sorts of 
Select 
problem 
Select 
scenario 
type 
Implement Evaluate 
Outcome 
Select 
information 
needed 
During the scenario 
exercise 
(Exploration of ideas) 
 
 Investigation  
 Analysis  
 Visualisation 
 Clarification 
 
Completing scenario 
exercise 
(Convergence of ideas) 
 
 Clarification  
 New learning’s 
 New perspectives 
 Insight 
Beginning scenario 
exercise                                              
(Divergence of ideas) 
 
 Uncertain 
 Multiple perspectives 
 Confusing 
 Unrestrained ideas 
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scenarios will particularly important for assisting decision making under rapid change 
which requires the exploration of a number of options across a diverse range of areas.   
 
Credible scenarios of rapid change can be derived from climate model output and used 
to test action situations at the institutional scale. These can be used to evaluate the 
circumstances under which domains might be crossed and therefore to evaluate the 
need for adaptation at the institutional scale. Given the likely demand of changing 
extremes on policy needs, these would be a more timely scientific contribution than 
trying to develop predictive tools that may be delivered over the medium term. 
 
The types of scientific scenarios needed for rapid change will include scenarios that 
examine: 
 Future hazards across a range of different contexts; 
 Climate scenarios that are able to calculate the possible effects of multiple or 
cascading events and the interactions between geographical and social 
aspects; 
 Institutional scenarios that examine where the possible thresholds might be and 
the consequences of crossing that threshold; and 
 Integrated scenarios that explore possible adaptation options and solutions in 
relation to rapid change. 
 
The development of a range of creative media to portray scenarios of both climate and 
impacts would also be useful.  
 
3.5.2 Application of economic tools 
A significant implication of rapid change for Australian governments is that government 
itself, businesses and communities may not have adequate time to engage in the 
autonomous adaptation anticipated by models built under the assumption of 
gradualism. Without policy that accounts for the possibility of rapid change, costs will 
increase as social, environmental and financial impacts are experienced faster than 
anticipated. Instead of gradually making the transition from one state to another, 
businesses and communities are likely to be subject to rapid changes. This may result 
in unanticipated damages and reactive responses that increase expenditure and 
potentially lead to maladaptive responses. 
This project has described a variety of economic tools for valuation and costing that 
each have strengths and weaknesses, but that collectively suit a wide range of 
circumstances. We have also demonstrated the important of process in decision-
making, particularly in circumstances where values are uncertain or contested and 
where both problems and outcomes cannot easily be predicted. This section provides a 
broad framework for the selection of tools and methods described throughout Section 
3.4. 
Selection of economic tools 
Uncertainty is a key determinant in the selection of economic methodologies for climate 
adaptation decision-making, as shown in Figure 34. Problem uncertainty on the vertical 
axis describes predictive uncertainty, where external drivers and internal processes 
produce uncertain futures. Solution (outcome) uncertainty is also often hard to predict, 
especially at the institutional scale where it will be affected by a large range of internal 
and external factors. 
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Figure 34. Problem/solution uncertainty matrix with economic strategies. 
 
Optimisation methodologies 
 
These can be used when uncertainty around both the problem and the solution can be 
constrained in some way. Given that uncertainties under climate change will be greater 
than for most other purposes, many of the modifications for such methods suggested in 
this report and by authors such as Hallegatte (2009); Hallegatte (2011); Hallegatte et 
al. (2012) and Quiggin et al. (2010) will still need to be used. 
 
Methods suitable for this type of assessment include cost benefit analysis, cost-
effective analysis and multi-criteria analysis. The valuation of impacts separately to the 
costing of adaptation options may be needed. 
 
Portfolio management 
 
Portfolio management works best when problem uncertainty can be constrained but the 
potential success of adaptation measures remains uncertain.  
 
Portfolio management is a term used in the finance sector and refers to the concept of 
risk spreading. By not putting all the adaptation eggs in one basket, the risk of 
widespread maladaptation due to uncertainty is reduced because the chances of some 
approaches being successful are increased. Not all adaptation actions will yield 
significant benefits, however the spread is wide enough so that some will (CCS, 2011) 
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and those can be diffused amongst other actors. These strategies are likely to be most 
successful in market-dominated situations. 
 
For example, diversifying the tourism industry to take advantage of both summer and 
winter seasons means that the industry is viable under various future tourism trends 
(CCS, 2011). Because risk is diversified, the capacity to take on trial risk, despite 
uncertainty, is enhanced. The use of trials and suites of adaptation measures also 
allows for community-driven approaches and iterative learning. 
 
The suite of tools that can be used here is similar to those for optimisation 
methodologies, but monitoring strategies become much more important in order to 
gauge the success of different trials. 
 
Robust management methodologies 
 
Robust management methodologies come into play when problem uncertainty is high, 
but when the solutions are fairly well understood. Because this set of methods has 
been discussed in Section 3.4.3, the reader is referred to there and the literature 
therein. 
 
These methods are very flexible and can utilise a wide range of tools. 
 
Innovation processes and adaptive management 
 
Innovation processes and adaptive management become necessary when both 
problem and solution uncertainty are difficult to constrain. This will happen in a range of 
complex settings where risk is best managed through innovation processes.  
 
As described in Section 3.4.4, a range of innovation processes being used in business 
and other areas of deliberative can potentially be brought into the adaptation arena. 
Adaptive management has been widely promoted in the sustainability and resilience 
literature but has not been used as widely and successfully as hoped. This may be 
because innovation processes have not been widely incorporated into adaptive 
management. 
 
This type of process is not amenable to conventional economic tools but such 
assessments, which always should involve stakeholders in interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary collaborations, may well involves a variety of economic tools in a 
larger valuation process. The choice of which tools to use will be highly context 
specific. Innovation processes most need the development of ‘soft’ or socially-
dominated infrastructure. 
 
A major strategy that requires both innovation and adaptive management processes is 
transformation. Rapid change increases the need for systems to transform, especially if 
they are to suffer severe or irreversible damage in their current state. Transformation 
takes considerable resources, requires the involvement of key actors and often 
requires assessments that look beyond the obvious to ensure that maladaptation does 
not occur. 
 
Values at risk 
 
Capital assets and infrastructure are identified as being a central theme for climate 
adaptation. These assets have lifespan, and consequently decision horizons, at the 
same scale as climate change (hundreds of years). Furthermore, because they are 
physical entities in the environment, climatic conditions are significant. These two 
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characteristics make capital assets and infrastructure particularly climate-sensitive. 
Water infrastructure, building and house and transportation infrastructure are 
particularly exposed to climate change, and decisions taken today will have significant 
impact under climate change. Likewise, energy infrastructure, critical to transportation 
and production, is often climate-sensitive due to its coastal location. 
 
For settlements and physical infrastructure, long-term planning is one of the most 
effective ways of reducing long-term risk; for example, urbanisation plans that account 
for flooding risk. Taking long-term decisions in an era of uncertain (potentially rapid) 
climate change means that infrastructure decisions need to be robust. 
 
Social assets and infrastructure are also very climate-sensitive because decisions have 
consequences over long periods of time. Land-use planning is particularly exposed to 
climate change and decisions taken today will have significant impact under climate 
change. Social assets are difficult to capture and quantify monetarily, and social 
infrastructures are dependent upon uncertain future socio-economic conditions. Here 
we see that a collaborative and iterative process of decision-making that captures 
multiple stakeholder conceptions of value may be applicable. 
 
Natural assets and infrastructure are also identified as being very climate-sensitive and 
decisions have consequences over long periods of time. Ecosystems are not simply 
capital to be protected in their own right. Their functioning is intrinsically linked with the 
adaptability of all human systems to climate change (Hallegatte et al 2011). Coastline 
and flood defences are particularly exposed to climate change and decisions taken 
today will have significant impact under climate change (Hallegatte 2009). 
 
In regards to the goods and services sectors, direct decisions do not have quite as long 
time horizons as infrastructures; however the sectors are dependent upon the quality, 
structure and functioning of capital, social and natural assets. Therefore, long-term 
decision-making regarding these assets and infrastructures impacts the goods and 
services sectors. This interconnection highlights the possibility of risks crossing 
domains and the need for integrated decision-making at the institutional level. This 
decision-making would utilise multiple methodologies to inform the process at 
appropriate points. 
 
Adaptation across institutions  
 
The sections above outline key considerations on the issue of institutional-level 
adaptation and governance, particularly where risks cross domains. 
 
Planned adaptation, and responses to events will also differ across the institutional 
scale, with the federal government doing national economic planning, large scientific 
research programs, policy design for specific sectors (water, agriculture and forestry), 
state government doing planning and program delivery in many areas including 
regulation, and local government being the interface between the economy, society 
and environment at the local scale. 
 
The Federal Government has a direct role in adapting existing and planned 
infrastructure to climate change. This includes transport networks, energy, water and 
telecommunications networks. These responsibilities also overlap and interact with 
State-level responsibilities.  
 
In regards to long-term national-level planning we argue that the political process of 
prioritising economic trajectories, ecological preservation and sociocultural values is 
complex. Optimisation techniques may be important at the federal level in order to 
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explore high-level trajectories and potential trade-offs. The outputs from such 
optimisation would ideally be used as an input into a broader decision-making 
framework.  
 
At the state level, many planning and regulatory responsibilities have very long time 
horizons and are very exposed – such as urbanisation plans and building design and 
standards. Land-use planning must contend with multiple stakeholders and values and 
is dynamically interconnected with environmental, climatic, economic and sociocultural 
factors. Similarly, local level planning is extremely climate-sensitive and has long-term 
impacts. 
 
Public (government)-based climate adaptation has the interests of all constituents, 
groups and businesses at its core, not simply government-owned assets. The role of 
government in adaptation has been widely identified to facilitate private adaptation and 
build resilience. Current approaches to government decision-making incorporate 
multiple considerations including traditionally defined economic efficiency, equity and 
vulnerability, and long-term preservation of natural and cultural assets. In public and 
private decision-making and from the local to the Federal scale, such values are not 
routinely assessed using economic tools. A wider use of different economic tools would 
help to quantify ‘intangible’ values, thus making them more visible and perchance 
giving them higher priority in decision-making. The role of discounting in assessing 
long-term values at risk, and in weighing up the cost of adaptation with the social 
returns of adaptation, needs to be examined closely and recommendations provided for 
practical use. 
 
Both optimisation and robust techniques are essential to the adaptation process. To 
ignore either would be folly, as they both have appropriate applications and bring 
important analysis to the decision-making process. The most important economic 
method to explore at the institutional scale, though, may be transformation. Exploring 
its role in adaptation to rapid change is a priority. 
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4. GAPS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The objective of this study is to develop an economic methodology at the institutional 
scale to support decision-making on adaptation actions and investments ranging from 
adjustment to transformation, given the likelihood of rapid changes in regional climate 
leading to rapid changes in extremes and accompanying risk of disaster. 
 
This report has endeavoured to develop an economic methodology that fulfils these 
aims and in Section 3.5.3, we provide a broad framework for doing so. However, we 
have not managed to fully integrate the institutional scale in to this framework, despite 
developing Ostrom’s IAD framework for this task. The issue of domains, risk 
propagation across domain boundaries and risk ownership is in important one that 
needs to be explored. So too, does the task of planning adaptation at the institutional 
scale to ensure that capacity and governance is adequately managed. 
 
Of the aims detailed in Section 1: 
 Understand the appropriate mix between public and private adaptation and risk 
sharing; 
 Understand the impacts of changing climate extremes on the economics of 
valuing adaptations;  
 Identify critical points where the economics of adaptation has not yet integrated 
recent findings from climate science and offer suggested improvements; and 
 Identify valuation tools for end-users that cope with the realities of uncertain 
damage functions, ambiguous climate futures and the potential for non-marginal 
change. 
 
We believe we have made progress in all four aims. These a briefly summarised in the 
following section. 
 
Summary and next steps 
 
The questions asked in this project are not easy to answer because existing scientific 
and institutional structures are not structured to address them. In previous sections we 
articulate reasons for this.  
 
These reasons include: 
 The framing of climate science around predicting future climates using the signal 
to noise model. The interpretation of model results using reproducible patterns of 
mean change as a measure of model skill favours the scientific narrative of 
gradual change. 
 The scientific narrative of balance and conforming to the mean has thrived since 
the scientific enlightenment over two centuries ago. This narrative has informed 
both the physical science and economics (which uses the mathematical tools of 
classical physics more often than not, even though physics has moved on). This 
mutually reinforces the use of tools that map gradual change and optimisation in 
both science and economics. 
 When this is added to the proposition that the current costs of climate change are 
negligible or scientifically unattributable, and therefore ‘unprovable’, any urgency 
to be proactive in managing climate change extremes is dissipated. 
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 The science of impact assessment is concentrated on models that (appropriately) 
simulate a wide range of conditions but are not structured to assess extreme 
events. Some of these models are national in scope but others are local or 
regional. A national capacity exists for grazing and major crops, and is being 
developed for water resources but does not exist for flooding, cyclone damage, 
severe storms, coastal impacts, wildfire or severe heat. Nor is there any serious 
capacity to investigate the joint burden of such hazards. 
This report has explored recent rapid changes in climate, its origins, potential impacts 
and the possible consequences of such events continue to escalate at an institutional 
scale. In particular we have examined the notion of risks crossing institutional domains 
and risk ‘ownership’ in the context of rapid change. This has brought into question the 
current economic and science generated tools used for impact and adaptation 
assessments and the way they are being used to evaluate at a practitioner and policy 
level. Valuation of adaptation under rapid is complex and current systems and 
frameworks are not adequately able to value or cost this. 
 
This report also examined current economic tools, systems and policies to see how 
they create barriers and they might be of use in addressing these sorts of events. In 
particular, the economics of disaster and resilience and the associated policy and 
innovation frameworks and their use in relation to rapid change. 
 
COAG has instituted a process of dealing with emergency management to disasters, a 
significant component of which is the principle of proactively mitigating risks to future 
hazards rather than relying solely on improved emergency response. This process has 
been catalysed by the recent burden of extreme climate events on the economy and 
communities.  
 
Policy responses for this latest generation of disaster management strategies are 
framed according to the language of resilience, breaking down institutional silos and 
community engagement. However, the language of extreme events is still focused on 
the construct of random variability surrounding gradual change. Therefore, the dual 
policies of adaptation to climate change and improving disaster response have not yet 
been integrated to the degree they need to be if the risks of rapid climate change are to 
be dealt with seriously. 
 
The idea that markets can adapt to gradual change occurring far off into the future is 
also challenged in this report. The potential for rapid increases in climate extremes to 
lead to risks crossing domains will affect both public and private interests, but will tip 
the balance for action from markets to policy. However, the need to adapt will be 
shared by both public and private institutions as does the task of determining who 
might take responsibility for un-owned risks under climate change. Ownership may rest 
with individuals as well as organisations and institutions. New arrangements between 
public and private interests and between government, industry and the community will 
need to be explored. 
 
A key finding of this report is that future rapid change, if not prepared for, poses a 
major risk to our communities and their future sustainability. Effectively addressing 
such issues will require new ways of thinking and working which include the following: 
 
 The guided transformation of current institutional structures and systems. In 
particular the development of collaborative frameworks that enable decision 
making within and across a number of institutions and frameworks to assist 
with decision making under uncertainty. 
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 The development of fit for task economic frameworks, capable of integrating 
and assessing a diversity of costs and values across different time scales. In 
particular ‘intangible’ costs need to be included more fully in these 
assessments. The disparity between different discount rates used in different 
institutional settings needs to be addressed. 
 The integration into adaptation practice and policy of frameworks and methods 
that are iterative and reflexive, such as innovation and assurance processes. 
These are already in use and have established mechanisms that allow for: 
decision-making with uncertain outcomes, the introduction of new ideas and 
technologies, social interactions, knowledge development and collaboration 
across a broad range of stakeholders. 
 Further research to better understand the full ramifications of rapid change and 
how it will impact current systems and institutions, especially to assess where 
possible thresholds might be and where they cross institutional domains. In 
particular the development of models that include different types of extreme 
events in a number of contexts and sequences. 
 Development of capacity through appropriate resourcing, the development of 
knowledge and communication that is ‘fit for purpose’ for end users and 
governance to support this. 
 
Future research directions 
 
The research described in this report is largely in the discovery and exploration phase. 
Tasks that would benefit from further development and funding include: 
 
 Identify underlying social, economic and natural systems influence particular 
thresholds and at what point they cross into other domains. 
 Assess current frameworks and tools that can be applied to assist valuation, 
monitoring and evaluation of adaptation under rapid change; e.g., innovation 
based tools and methods used in business.  
 Assess current adaptation governance and how it is being applied, mapping of 
current institutional approaches to assessing climate risk and impact propagation 
across domains.  
 Examine how climate risks propagate across domains and along timelines, and 
how those risks are likely to respond under rapid change. This would include the 
valuation of primary and secondary impacts.  
 Analyse of how ownership of key values vulnerable to rapid changes in climate 
are shared across institutions. Identify where responsibilities for managing those 
risks lie and identify un-owned risks. 
 Assess the role of public and private finance in reacting to rapid changes. For 
example, the insurance industry plans on 1–2 year’s projected income from 
premiums – a sudden escalation of costs where reinsurance is limited can create 
premium and underwriting pressures. 
 Identify vulnerable industry and community sectors under rapid change.  
 Explore the role of narratives in adaptation decision-making – how and where 
they are used. 
 Assess the role of land-use planning in creating legacy effects where new 
cohorts of residents and landholders can suddenly be exposed to risks they were 
unaware of when developing/buying a property. 
 
138 Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change  
 
Activities and research that could better support the above needs are: 
 
 Improve the science of non-linear climate change, sufficient to develop credible 
scenarios that can be used to assess the propagation of risk at the institutional 
scale.  
 Within the scientific community, re-visit how model skill is interpreted. Given that 
climate models contain step changes in key variables, develop measures of 
likelihood for the frequency and magnitude of such changes. 
 Develop scientific narratives that accurately reflect the nature of change, recent 
climate events to be integrated into the adaptation narratives used by 
organisations. This may be a role for boundary organisations such as regional 
Climate Change Alliances and Industry Peak Bodies. 
 Improve the ability of scientists to engage with the broader community in order to 
link their research with personal experiences of climate change, variability and 
adaptation.  
 Improve ability of economists to engage with the broader community over values 
and valuation. 
 Develop spatial models able to combine urban growth with future hazards to 
assess rapid changes in exposure to rapid changes in hazards. This is especially 
important for heatwaves, flash flooding and fire. 
 Develop the institutional capacity to use a range of different methods to assess 
the value of adaptation. 
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GLOSSARY 
Adaptation 
In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its 
effects, which seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural 
systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human 
intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate (IPCC 2012). 
 
Aggregate cost 
Sum of the distributed costs of an event or set of events across a system that need to 
be collected in order to understand the total cost. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis 
Systematic process for balancing the costs and benefits of a project or action. It usually 
involves changes in marginal values over time discounted to allow for factors such as 
the cost of finance, preference for risk, the value of externalities and the cost of 
opportunity. 
 
Cost burden 
Cost borne by an actor in order to be able to operate. 
 
Critical threshold 
The level of system change or impact that prompts a response in terms of 
management, jurisprudence, legislative requirement or similar. Can often be managed 
at critical control points within a system. 
 
Deep Uncertainty 
Uncertainty that results from myriad factors both scientific and social, and consequently 
is difficult to accurately define and quantify. 
 
Delayed costs 
Sometimes synonymous with deferred costs, the costs ensuing from an action or event 
that occurred in the past. 
 
Gradualism  
The belief that a process changes by small, incremental steps over time (policy, 
evolution). 
 
Learning by doing 
The process of studying a set of actions to determine how they impact on the system 
being acted upon, and whether they are producing the intended outcomes. This is a 
reflexive process intending to maximise the benefits of acting and avoiding 
maladaptation. 
 
Linear 
A direct relationship between one or more variables that remains constant over time 
 
Maladaptation 
The adverse outcomes of adaptation efforts that inadvertently increase vulnerability to 
climate change. Action that undermines the future ability to adapt by removing 
opportunities and hampering flexibility is also maladaptive (modified from IPCC 2012). 
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Mean 
Technical definition of average. The total of all values divided by the number of values 
in a sample. 
 
Mean change 
Change in the mean of a sample occurring over a specified amount of time. 
 
Non-linear 
A relationship between one or more variables that changes over time. This change may 
be gradual, abrupt or the relationship may cease to exist. 
 
Reflexivity 
An attribute of complex systems where cause and effect form a feedback loop meaning 
that actions taken can change the system itself. Reflexive decision-making in a social 
system has the potential to change the underpinning values that led to those decisions. 
 
Secondary impacts 
Flow-on impacts from primary impacts, e.g., economic costs from property damages.  
 
Social Technology 
After Arthur (2009), a technology has a purpose and is an assemblage of practises and 
components. It is organised around a central concept or principle, is modular and 
recursive, and therefore evolves over time. Social technologies are “soft” systems such 
as adaptation, democracy and legal systems. 
 
Value-added 
Calculation of industry contribution to Gross Domestic Product as calculated by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, largely gross output minus expenses. 
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APPENDIX A: ORIGIN OF THE GRADUALISTIC SCIENTIFIC 
NARRATIVE  
Abstract 
 
This paper describes the general structure, origins and influence of scientific narratives 
of climate change and how they have come to dominate formal and informal narratives 
used to inform adaptation. These scientific narratives have deep historical roots that 
have been used to measure, interpret and communicate climate science for well over a 
century. They are constructed around the signal-to-noise model of linear forcing and 
response relationships, and forecasting using such models. The resulting narratives 
describe climate change as a gradual process influenced by random variability. While 
such models are useful for attributing climate change and describing in general terms 
how climate may change with its attendant uncertainties, they do not adequately 
describe how the climate will change over the timescales that most inform adaptation. 
These timescales, extending from several years to several decades, inform how 
adaptation is carried out with reference to problem uncertainty (how risks may evolve), 
solution uncertainty (how likely solutions are to manage risks) and the life of specific 
decisions. Furthermore, narratives of gradual change are not fully supported by 
observations, climate models or scientific theory: rather, the available evidence points 
to climate changing in a series of steps punctuating periods of reduced or no trend. The 
construction of a gradualistic narrative suggests that climate change is remote in time 
and that there is plenty of time to adjust to such changes. The idea that climate can 
change abruptly, challenges the notion that incremental change can be responded to at 
leisure. 
 
Introduction 
 
Scientific narratives are important tools for explaining the cause and effect sequence of 
processes and phenomena interpreted from scientific theory. They are also key tools in 
framing how science is viewed within a broader social and cultural context, contributing 
to narratives of cultural origins and identity and framing themes around issues such as 
progress and risk (Shackley et al., 1998; Edwards, 1999). While recent literature has 
explored how scientific narratives of climate change are influencing broader social 
narratives, especially via framing effects (Jasanoff, 1996; Hulme, 2009; Jasanoff, 2010; 
Viehöver, 2011), there has been very little work on the first step: how science is 
developed into narrative. This is where formal scientific narratives are developed from 
scientific findings by the expert community that produces those findings. This process 
is important because scientific narratives influence how scientific findings are 
interpreted in both formal and informal settings. 
 
For narratives informing adaptation to climate change, scientific narratives describe the 
way in which climate change is expected to change and by how much (Edwards, 
1999). The narrative describing how the climate changes that is constructed by and 
shared within the scientific community informs climate scenario construction. These 
narratives in turn inform the construction of adaptation methods, but will also combine 
with others’ experience of climate in the general community to inform how adaptation is 
carried out. The initial scientific narratives of climate change constructed by the 
scientific community are therefore critically important in shaping how subsequent 
narratives about adaptation are constructed. 
 
The model we are using to explain this sequence of narratives is shown in Figure 12. 
This figure shows scientific knowledge as being constructed through narratives of how 
science is carried out; such knowledge becomes robust through review, criticism, 
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modification and consensus-building. Discipline-based narratives, such as those that 
accompany climate change, develop from these narratives but also develop their own 
modifications as a community of practice. These then inform broader public narratives 
but are also used to develop methodologies for assessing and managing risk. A recent 
literature has critiqued the framing of science communication to policy makers and the 
public by bodies such as the IPCC as carrying specific frames that influence public 
narratives and the perception of risk (Hulme, 2009, 2011).  
 
However, there have been few assessments of the basic scientific narratives of climate 
change informing adaptation to see whether they properly assess the evidence of 
climate change (c.f., Beven, 2002). Most have concerned themselves with how 
scientific information is being framed for use in informing decision-making. However, 
there is a distinction between the straightforward communication of science and the 
communication of scientific information for risk (Jones, 2011), a distinction that has not 
been clearly recognised in the IPCC uncertainty guidance material (Mastrandrea et al., 
2010). Obviously they influence each other, but also need to be recognised as 
different. 
 
The communication of science for risk needs to take the nature of the problem into 
account but also relies on how the science is prepared and presented. The sequence 
of narrative development investigated in this paper culminates in the development of 
the gradualist narrative of how the climate changes. This feeds into adaptation 
narratives that plan to make incremental adjustments to impacts because they are only 
expected to become severe far off into the future and, in most cases, are assumed to 
be small in the present day.  
 
The main thesis is that the communication of climate change as a gradual process is 
socially constructed through long-standing narratives of the scientific method that date 
back to the scientific enlightenment. The use of forecasting using such methods that 
has become the dominant method of constructing scenarios for calculating climate 
risks, serves to reinforce the gradualist narrative. However, the available evidence from 
observations, climate models and scientific theory points to climate changing in a 
series of rapid changes punctuating periods of reduced or no trend. This has significant 
implications for how adaptation is conducted and for the construction of scientific 
narratives informing adaptation. 
 
The structure of the paper investigates scientific paradigms and their structure, 
summarising the knowledge claims, methods and tools and cognitive values associated 
with the current narrative of gradual climate change. It then goes onto look at the 
theory of climate change, finding that the overwhelming emphasis on gradual change in 
not supported by observations, climate models and the theory itself. The paper 
concludes with suggestions as to how to overcome this bias. 
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Scientific paradigms 
 
Scientific narratives, ‘stories about science’, are drawn from scientific paradigms. 
Paradigms themselves contain not only scientific theory but have important sociological 
aspects. Narratives drawn from climate science describe how the climate is expected 
to change, so provide a major input into the decision-making and practice of 
adaptation. Scientists provide their expert summation of scientific knowledge but also 
make their own judgements as to how to frame that knowledge and as to what 
knowledge is relevant to the issues at hand (e.g., Hulme, 2009, 2011; Kitcher, 2011). 
Laudan (1984) lists Kuhn’s paradigms as containing:  
 
1. Claims to knowledge of the world;  
2. Appropriate methods and tools for studying the domains covered by the theory; 
and  
3. A set of cognitive values or ideals attached to that paradigm.  
According to Masterman (1970), Kuhn’s paradigms have a strongly sociological aspect 
where aspects of a paradigm become identified with a particular group who invests 
their identity in these claims, methods and ideals. Here, we are interested in how 
hypotheses and theory become communicated as scientific “rules” and those rules feed 
into scientific narratives. 
  
The climate science community has a very strong institutional structure overseen by 
the World Meteorological Organisation and exercised through programs such as the 
World Climate Research Program and those of the IPCC. The WMO and IPCC also 
auspice the development of methods for forecasting and prediction, assessing climate 
stationarity and change, climate modelling conventions and so on. These 
methodologies shape narratives as strongly as the science content they contain, so are 
critically important in how they shape decision-making. 
 
Knowledge claims 
 
The study of climate change is a branch of climatology. The role of greenhouse gases 
in changing Earth’s radiative balance is part of the core theory of climate change, which 
is well established (Pierrehumbert, 2011; Sherwood, 2011). As such, this falls into the 
area of science that Kuhn referred to as normal science (Kuhn, 1962). Continuing work 
developing this science can be described puzzle solving: unresolved questions are 
addressed without any expectation that the underlying core theory will be drastically 
changed, although it may be modified.  
 
Claims to knowledge of how the climate changes are described by two competing 
hypotheses (Corti et al., 1999; Hasselmann, 2002): 
1. Anthropogenic climate change occurs independently of climate variability; and 
2. Anthropogenic climate change interacts with climate variability. 
Corti et al. (1999) stated:  
“ … a crucial question in the global-warming debate concerns the extent to which 
recent climate change is caused by anthropogenic forcing or is a manifestation of 
natural climate variability. It is commonly thought that the climate response to 
anthropogenic forcing should be distinct from the patterns of natural climate 
variability. But, on the basis of studies of nonlinear chaotic models with preferred 
states or ‘regimes’, it has been argued that the spatial patterns of the response to 
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anthropogenic forcing may in fact project principally onto modes of natural 
climate variability.” 
 
The first hypothesis supports a gradual climate response to forcing, whereas the 
second would result in nonlinear responses that would also affect extremes. The key to 
deciding between these two hypotheses is in assessing climate behaviour over decadal 
time scales. 
 
Research on this point has been inconclusive, with evidence supporting both 
alternatives. Seidel and Lanzante (2004) investigated temperature records from 
surface to the stratosphere testing a number of alternatives: linear trends, flat steps, 
piecewise linear and sloped step. They decided that for surface data (1900–2002), the 
piecewise linear and sloped step were the best statistical models. For upper air data, 
conclusions were more elusive. Results for tropospheric (mid and upper atmosphere) 
data (1958–2001) suggested that most warming occurred in the climate regime shift of 
1977. Stratospheric cooling could be explained by both step and trend and simple trend 
models.  
 
These two hypotheses also influence weather and climate predictions. Lorenz (1975) 
identified two kinds of predictability:  
1. The first kind is due to initial conditions with fixed boundary conditions. It is 
associated with weather and shorter term (interannual to decadal) climate 
predictability, and  
2. The second kind is due to changing boundary conditions with fixed initial 
conditions. It is associated with long-term (multi-decadal to centennial) climate 
predictability (Lorenz, 1975; Hasselmann, 2002; Collins et al., 2011). 
The first kind provides a temporary window of predictability before a system becomes 
too chaotic to predict with any skill. For weather forecasting, this is seven to ten days. 
In the second kind, outcomes are bounded by external forcing; e.g., as in the climate 
system response to 2xCO2. A climate model run multiple times under the same 
greenhouse gas scenario will show significant uncertainty in its early stages but 
reproduce very similar trends over long periods (Meehl et al., 2007). Forecasting 
climate over decadal timescales and longer subjects climate models to both types of 
predictability (Collins, 2002; Collins and Allen, 2002).  
 
Decadal-scale climate processes such as the North Atlantic Oscillation and Pacific 
Decadal Oscillation are widely recognised as having several modes that they will 
switch between, sometimes individually and at other times in concert (HM Treasury, 
2003; Schwing et al., 2003; Rial et al., 2004). Such regime changes affect a range of 
systems including fisheries, agriculture, water resources and marine and terrestrial 
ecosystems (Ebbesmeyer et al., 1991; McCabe and Wolock, 2002; Rial et al., 2004) 
and change the frequency and magnitude of extreme events (Warner, 1995; Erskine 
and Warner, 1998; Swetnam and Betancourt, 2010).  
 
Changes in decadal-scale oscillations have also more recently been implicated in 
changes in the rate of global mean warming (Tsonis et al., 2007; Swanson et al., 2009; 
Swanson and Tsonis, 2009; Wang et al., 2009). 
 
While decadal variability is widely perceived as undergoing rapid regime changes due 
to stochastically-generated processes (Rodionov, 2005; Overland et al., 2008), its role 
under the alternative hypotheses – independence or interaction with external forcing – 
is agreed to. Independence means that climate extremes will change at random, while 
interaction has the potential to produce systematic non-linear changes with 
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unpredictable timing. However, when we move to the methodological aspects of the 
climate change paradigm, the balance between these two hypotheses becomes almost 
totally one-sided. 
 
Methods and tools 
 
The dominant method of interpreting climate change as outlined in Section 2.5 is the 
STNM. Santer et al. (2011) describe it as: the warming signal arising from slow, human 
caused changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases is embedded in 
the background ‘noise’ of natural climate variability. This method selects hypothesis 1 
as the working model of how climate changes in preference to hypothesis 2. 
 
The anthropogenic warming signal is assumed to change smoothly as in Figure 35, 
with natural variability expressed as noise around that signal (e.g., Swanson et al., 
2009). Figure 35a and b both represent information about temperature change from a 
single climate simulation; Figure 35a shows the raw annual data form that simulation, 
Figure 35b shows the signal interpreted according to a line of non-linear best fit and 
Figure 35c interprets this data as a series of statistically significant step changes 
separated by trends that show varying degrees of statistical significance. 
 
a b  
c   
Figure 35. Single climate model simulation for south-east Australian minimum 
temperature (CSIRO Mk3.5 A1B TminAGW) showing a) the mean, b) annual 
variability and c) mean, annual variability and step changes for a high emissions 
pathway. 
Figure 35b represents the STNM and Figure 35c suggests that abrupt changes are 
occurring in the direction of the long-term trend, potentially leading to rapid changes in 
extremes. This aspect of variability is non-random with respect to mean change but is 
positive with respect to the direction of change. Figure 35b represents hypothesis 1 
whereas Figure 35c favours hypothesis 2, although this is not the only way by which 
hypothesis 2 may manifest. The time series in Figure 35 represents anthropogenic 
warming in minimum temperature for south-eastern Australia, attributed using the 
method of Jones (2012), so explicitly supports this hypothesis because it shows an 
episodic, regional warming signal. 
 
However Figure 35b is almost invariably the way in which regional climate change is 
represented for decision-making. Despite the presence of two competing scientific 
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hypotheses, the STNM has become the dominant influence on how climate information 
is analysed and communicated for impacts and adaptation studies (e.g., Hulme and 
Mearns, 2001; Murphy et al., 2009; Christidis et al., 2011; Hawkins and Sutton, 2011). 
The image of a gradually changing climate leads to adaptation being widely considered 
as a series of gradual adjustments to such changes (e.g., Evans, 2009). This in turn is 
the dominant scientific narrative informing decision-making on adaptation.  
 
However, other methods are used to investigate how climate changes at the multi-
decadal timescale. Of five methods investigated for assessing naturally- and 
anthropogenically-forced decadal climate variability (Solomon et al., 2010), two depend 
on the signal to noise model: Analysis of Means and Variance (ANOVA) and Empirical 
Orthogonal Functions. Of the remaining three methods, one: optimal fingerprinting 
requires large ensembles and does not distinguish between naturally and externally 
forced trends. The remaining two: linear inverse models that subtract specific modes of 
variability to estimate the signal and initialised climate model hindcasts simulating 
historical decadal variability with observed climate change (e.g., from pre-industrial to 
the current day) have not been widely applied. The method applied in Jones (2012) 
and used to analyse and display Figure 35c is a linear inverse model. 
 
Detection and attribution (D&A) studies are also dominated by the signal to noise 
model (Hegerl et al., 2007; Hegerl et al., 2010). Changes in extremes are attributed 
using the signal to noise model, but because of extremes’ generally greater variability, 
statistical significance is much harder to obtain (IPCC, 2007c, 2012b). Significance can 
only occur when the greenhouse enhanced extremes exceed the variability measured 
under control conditions. The rarity and high variability of extreme events means that 
for most variables, temperature excepted, obtaining significance requires a long period 
of observation before statistical significance can be obtained. 
 
The assumption that the human-induced effect on changing extremes is gradual means 
that any non-gradual changes in extremes will be interpreted as climate variability – 
such changes, if they occur, may have to persist for some time before being 
considered as statistically significant using trend analysis. For example, the recent 
IPCC special report on disasters and extremes concluded that this may take until mid-
century for some variables (IPCC, 2012a), especially those associated with extreme 
rainfall and storm events. Ironically, if greenhouse-induced step changes do occur, 
non-linearity offers the potential to detect changes in extremes much faster than under 
gradual change, an area of potentially rich research. Observed changes in non-linear 
extremes where mean changes have been wholly or partially attributed to climate 
change are discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
Cognitive values and ideals 
 
Science is not value free as is widely claimed but is embedded in an ethical framework 
(Carolan, 2006). Commitments to factual claims and to value judgements co-evolve 
over time (Kitcher, 2011) and differ between disciplines. Kitcher (2011) proposes three 
levels that are operating in science:  
1. The broad scheme of values that society holds;  
2. A probative set of values – which problems are most important and which rules 
best validate/invalidate scientific conclusions?; and 
3. The personal set of values that relates to an individual’s knowledge goals (a 
cognitive set of values). 
Levels one and two are most relevant to this study. Research into human-induced 
climate change is relevant to society-wide values, especially those at the international 
Valuing Adaptation under Rapid Change 147 
 
scale. The probative values covering climate change cover the methods and rules from 
scientific disciplines ranging from physics and chemistry to the social sciences and 
humanities, but have been dominated by the natural sciences. To date, science 
communication has been largely ontological – what we know – rather than 
epistemological – why we believe that knowledge. The values applied within an 
epistemological setting are an important part of knowledge generation and 
communication, but have been largely overlooked 
 
The study of climate change has been an overtly value-based exercise since Revelle 
and Suess began to examine the risks of rising greenhouse gases in the late 1950s 
(Weart, 2008). The IPCC was later established in 1988 as a hybrid organisation of 
scientists and policymakers to investigate those risks. The assessment frameworks 
and resulting discourses developed through the IPCC process are influenced by the 
norms and values of the research disciplines involved (Hajer, 1993; Siebenhüner, 
2002; Boykoff, 2007).  
 
The dominant role of the natural sciences, especially climatology, in the early stages of 
the IPCC means that the values within that broad group of scientists, such as rational 
decision-making, forecasting and a high regard for natural values, have predominated 
within the scientific discourse fostered by the IPCC. 
 
The IPCC’s emphasis on the analytic aspects of decision-making while paying 
insufficient regards to the way that people make decisions has come in for 
considerable criticism (Pielke Jr and Sarewitz, 2005; Sarewitz and Pielke Jr, 2007; 
Hulme, 2009, 2011). Although in recent years the social sciences have become much 
more prominent in adaptation research (IPCC, 2007b), the interface between the 
physical sciences on climate change and impacts and the socially-mediated process of 
implementing adaptation is still governed by traditional information transfer, although 
two-way communication and interdisciplinary collaboration are becoming more 
prominent (Rayner and Malone, 1998; Pelling, 2003; Tribbia and Moser, 2008; Sheate 
and Partidário, 2010; Kuhlicke et al., 2011).  
 
Bottom-up methods build a broader range of values into an assessment at the outset, 
making stakeholder values a core part of an assessment. This avoids stakeholders 
having to adopt and translate an unfamiliar analytic framework according to their 
particular understanding. In this way, scientific knowledge can be incorporated into a 
broader planning or management framework – climate information needs are tailored 
into this process, rather than being imposed from outside. However, this task requires 
an understanding of how knowledge is generated and validated in both scientific and 
social contexts. This is an important task for boundary organisations that sit between 
the generation of science and the users of that knowledge.  
 
Probative values consist of the rules for proof underpinning the use of a specific 
application. The two applications discussed in Section 2.5 were the STNM and 
forecasting. These are applications based on the idea of measurement, the desirability 
of balance and undesirability of imbalance that underpinned scientific rationalism. 
These ideas had their origin in the scientific enlightenment and have informed both 
science and economics (Wise, 1993). They allow coherence between different areas of 
knowledge. As Wise (1993) says Measurements are not self-justifying. They employ 
particular sorts of instruments constructed for the purpose of attaching quantitative 
values to valued things.  
 
The signal to noise model has its origins in Gaussian statistics and earlier 
developments in the enlightenment, so has a long-standing status across science and 
economics (Stigler, 1986). The act of obtaining balance from uncertainty (variability) 
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and overcoming that uncertainty with predictability are rarely questioned values, and 
have become second nature in scientific practice. The following paragraphs are not 
intended to show that these aims are undesirable, but rather to show that the 
unquestioned application of such methods may lead to the biased application of 
knowledge. 
 
Because of the success of the STNM in both D&A studies and its history and success 
in assessing long-term mean change for a range of variables, this model has become 
the main vehicle for communicating future climate change. Its ability in detection and 
attribution has been translated directly into projection, although no specific statistical 
proofs are available to assess the validity of a projection. Skill scores of climate models 
in observing current climate (Suppiah et al., 2007), and common experimental 
standards requiring certain standards for model structure (Taylor et al., 2012) are 
common methods, although various weighting methods have been tried (Tebaldi et al., 
2005; Tebaldi and Knutti, 2007; Watterson, 2008). 
 
Forecasting also has a long tradition in meteorology and is also seen as a primary goal 
for climatology. The probative component of forecasting is model skill, or the correlation 
of independent results from a given model experiment. If results are correlated in some 
way, then the model is said to have a measure of skill. There are many skill measures 
in the literature but if measured using the STNM or similar method, then model skill 
over multi-decadal scales will be interpreted as the correlation of mean change over 
those timescales. 
 
The Global Framework for Climate Services is currently being developed by the WMO 
to provide a seamless delivery of climate information users and aims to “enable better 
management of the risks of climate variability and change and adaptation to climate 
change, through the development and incorporation of science-based climate 
information and prediction into planning, policy and practice on the global, regional and 
national scale” (World Climate Conference – 3). 
 
While the Framework planning and roll out is strongly focused on meeting users’ 
requirements (World Meteorological Organization, 2011), its forecasting aspect is also 
strongly emphasised: Weather and climate research are closely intertwined; progress 
in our understanding of climate processes and their numerical representation is 
common to both. Seamless prediction (on timescales from a few hours to centuries) 
needs to be further developed and extended to aspects across multiple disciplines 
relevant to climate processes (World Meteorological Organization, 2010). 
 
How values and ideals influence the measurement of forecasting skill and the 
subsequent presentation of scenarios and forecasts is critical. By favouring the STNM 
in measuring model skill, hypothesis 1, that emphases a smoothly changing mean 
climate acts as a filter on the climate information that is passed on to users. 
The quote from (Solomon et al., 2010): “Long experience in weather and climate 
forecasting has shown that forecasts are of little utility without a priori assessment of 
forecast skill and reliability”, empathises the role of climate forecasting on decadal 
scales. Although there is ample evidence that this assumption is quite appropriate for 
weather forecasting and for climate forecasting one season ahead, for  climate 
forecasting over time periods of greater than one year there is little evidence for its 
utility. The available evidence of the success of such techniques is quite contradictory 
with stories of both success and failure (Power et al., 2005; Hulme et al., 2009; Jones, 
2010a). 
 
The probative values of science and risk are also different. The burden of proof for 
statistical methods attributing change to external drivers is 95% (a one in 20 chance 
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that a data sample is random) whereas for a risk to be worth assessing, scientific 
plausibility (<<1% event likelihood) is all that is required if the consequences of that 
event are of sufficient concern (Jones, 2011). Using the probative values of science to 
filter information to be used in a risk assessment, can bias the results of that 
assessment. To assess adaptation needs, all scientifically plausible cases need to be 
on the table, not just those selected by a particular form of rationalisation. 
 
Therefore, the current values embedded in climate science, in the use of the STNM 
and forecasting techniques that generate and use gradual estimates of mean change, 
respectively, has a significant influence on adaptation policy and practice, especially 
because it is endorsed by practices auspiced by the IPCC and WMO. However, the 
next section shows that the strong reliance on such methods and the aim to meet user 
needs may not be consistent. 
 
Theory and observations of rapid climate change  
 
If anthropogenic climate change interacts with climate variability, the resulting changes 
will be inherently non-linear and that non-linearity will be coincident with regime 
changes in decadal variability. Below, we show that to be the case. 
Figure 36 shows a variety of observed climate variables analysed using two methods: 
linear or non-linear (quadratic) line of best fit (a very simple method to extract the 
simple signal) and the step and trend method described in Jones (2012). All the step 
changes are statistically significant to the 5% level for the STARS test and the 1% level 
for the bivariate test. The results clearly show that temperature at the local, regional 
and global scale is non-linear, as are a number of other variables. In later sections we 
show that such changes will lead to non-linear economic impacts if analysed 
appropriately. 
 
The greatest heat storage in the ocean-atmosphere system is in the ocean. Rates of 
heat diffusion in the ocean affect the rate of atmospheric warming (Raper et al., 2001; 
Raper et al., 2002). The heat content of the top 700 m of ocean is shown in the lower 
right of the world map in Figure 36. The entire atmosphere holds as much heat as the 
top 3.2 m of the ocean (Trenberth, 2002). Model and observation-based studies also 
show that ocean temperature has a significant influence on atmospheric temperature at 
a range of timescales (Fraedrich and Blender, 2003; Dommenget, 2011; Lambert et al., 
2011). 
 
Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere act like a blanket trapping heat, warming the 
surface and cooling the upper atmosphere leading to a radiation deficit at the top of the 
atmosphere, so there are only two places where the bulk of that heat energy can go – 
into melting ice and into the ocean (Trenberth et al., 2009). The atmosphere cannot 
hold it and the land has a very low energy flux. In energy balance terms, the ocean 
carries about 90% of the extra heat from the past 50 years of greenhouse gas 
emissions (Trenberth and Fasullo, 2010). The ocean transports heat poleward and 
mixes heat into the deep ocean. Meehl et al. (2011) show that there is an increase in 
deep ocean mixing during warming hiatus periods where there is a slight decline in 
temperature. They associate these with La Niña-like patterns that have potential links 
to decadal oscillation mechanisms. 
 
The latitudinal temperature from the 24°–44°S latitudinal band in Figure 36 shows the 
periodic nature of this process quite clearly. This area of the world is dominated by 
oceans, so surface air temperatures are highly correlated with sea surface 
temperature. Step changes through the 20th century show a slight cooling following by 
warming episodes that persist until the late century. Similar patterns can be seen in 
other ocean-dominated records. 
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Figure 36. Selected local, regional and global climate variables covering air and 
sea surface temperature (Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS) data, 
Hadley/CRUt3 data, BoM and Jones (2012)), ocean heat content (NOAA NODC) 
and tide gauge records (PSMSL). Statistically significant step changes to the 1% 
and 5% level analysed with the bivariate test (left) and STARS test (right) are 
shown with year and size of change between periods. Method of analysis 
described in Jones (2012). 
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In the northern hemisphere, a cooling episode in the mid-20th century interrupted 
warming (Ivanov and Evtimov, 2010). Unpublished analyses of temperature change of 
several USA states using the method of removing natural variability from temperature 
records as carried out for SE Australia (Jones, 2012) suggests this cooling was due to 
natural variability. Using this method, climate was stationary for most of the 20th century 
and anthropogenic warming temperatures in continental USA did not begin until 1988. 
 
The timing of many of the changes in trend in the literature often coincides with 
extreme events or changes in decadal variability (Tomé and Miranda, 2004; Menne, 
2006; Ivanov and Evtimov, 2010; Ruggieri, 2013). Notable dates for average 
temperature changes in Figure 36 are 1936, 1968 and 1997 in the southern 
hemisphere and 1920, 1988 and 1997 in the northern hemisphere; the dates 1946 and 
1976 also occur in some latitudinal average records. These dates were selected using 
the STARS method trained with artificial data and the bivariate test using the filtering 
method described in Jones (2012). 
 
The tests show a clearly accelerating number of shifts over the latter part of the record. 
Fewer shifts occur near the equator and more occur at higher latitudes. The most 
prominent of changes in temperature at the regional and global scale coincided with 
the 1997–98 ‘El Niño of the century’ (Changnon and Bell, 2000; Karl et al., 2000). This 
registers as a 0.2–0.3°C step change within most of the GISS and Hadley data sets at 
the regional, hemispheric and global scale. 
 
Ocean heat content shows shifts in 1976–77, 1995–96 and 2002–03, the first and 
second coinciding with regime shift observed in the Pacific (Miller et al., 1994; Hare 
and Mantua, 2000; Gedalof and Smith, 2001; Mantua and Hare, 2002; Chavez et al., 
2003). Likewise, some of the northern hemisphere dates coincide with the North 
Atlantic Oscillation and/or the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation mechanism (Wang et al., 
2009; Hurrell and Deser, 2010). Closer to Australia, the Sydney and Fremantle tide 
gauge records show shifts in the early 1920s, mid 1940s and 1996–7, coinciding with 
known dates of changes in decadal regimes.  
 
Analyses for Australia shows that temperature was fairly stationary until the late 1960s 
when a step change, mainly in minimum temperature occurred. Another step change in 
1994 (sea surface temperatures) and 1997 (air temperature) mainly affected maximum 
temperature for the latter. Techniques removing the effect of natural climate variability 
based on the assumption of historical relationships remaining constant showed that the 
residual warming component of both maximum and minimum temperature showed step 
changes (Jones, 2012). An analysis of climate model output for south-eastern Australia 
shows climate models exhibit the same pattern of climate stationarity in the 20th century 
followed by step change warming initiated in minimum temperature or both minimum 
and maximum temperature. Often changes in minimum and maximum temperature are 
asynchronous, showing the influence of different environmental processes. 
 
Although model output for regions other than south-eastern Australia have not been 
assessed, step changes in mean global warming from the suite of models investigated 
show that it’s influenced by similar patterns of change as seen in Figure 36, so regional 
widespread non-linear behaviour can be assumed. 
 
Dates of observed step changes in regional anthropogenic warming coincide with 
known regime changes linked to decadal climate variability. This evidence supports 
hypothesis 2: that anthropogenic climate change interacts with climate variability, 
instead of being independent of it. If decadal variability is seen as a regulating 
mechanism for poleward heat transport (Schneider et al., 2002; Visser et al., 2003; 
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Zhang and McPhaden, 2006), then decadal regime changes would be expected to 
produce non-linear warming in both the oceans and atmosphere under external forcing. 
In fact, given the low heat storage of the atmosphere, and non-linear behaviour of the 
ocean-atmosphere system on multiple scales, it is counter-intuitive to expect the 
atmosphere to warm gradually independently of these processes. Theory and 
observations therefore support hypothesis two whereas scientific values and methods 
support hypothesis one. 
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APPENDIX B: THE PROBLEM-SOLUTION ADAPTATION 
IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK SUMMARY 
Celeste Young 
 
Figure 1: Problem solution framework for adaptation implementation 
Introduction 
This is a summary of the problem solution framework which has been designed to 
assist practitioners to understand better the process of adaptation and how it works at 
a practical level.  It is the result of countless conversations with practitioners and 
researchers and also observations in relation to how projects are currently being 
managed.  The idea of this framework is to give an over view of the process and to 
define the key phases, framing and tasks associated with it. It is also to define when 
the communication and the tools needed for the task change. Although adaptation is a 
process it is often articulated and actioned with the same framing and tools throughout 
the whole process even though it has two distinctly different phases.  This can create 
disengagement and confusion about how to manage implementation and the 
associated risks.   
 
If this was to be described through a health perspective, what some adaptation 
practitioners are doing is equivalent to a doctor who having diagnosed a cancer patient 
continues to focus on the cancer in a diagnostic way and talk about the problem of the 
cancer rather than the possible solutions to the cancer treatment needed.  The same 
doctor would continue to use the tools available to diagnose the cancer to treat the 
cancer rather than find the most appropriate tool for that task or adapting the tool he 
already uses for the new purpose. However by using a single focus for two very 
different phases of a process that is essentially what is being done.  Also no doctor 
would be allowed to undertake action without monitoring his patient’s progress and 
assessing it at regular intervals.  
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The other reason for this framework is to encourage practitioners to consider looking at 
frameworks and systems that already in plain sight. Tools have been used for some 
time in the area of business innovation that can provide a way to manage uncertainty, 
introduce new technologies and behaviour change and to monitor unknown and 
evolving situations. 
  
The phases 
The framework is divided into two primary phases: the problem phase and the solution 
phase. These two phases both inform each other as elements of innovation will be 
involved in identifying the risk and elements of risk will be involved in the solution 
phase where innovative solutions are developed and implemented. 
 
The problem phase 
The key task of the problem phase is to identify and assess what the problem is. In the 
case of adaptation this involves assessing the impacts and associated risks of climate 
change. The framing for this phase is risk.  The communication during this time is 
primarily concerned with identifying what the problem is, the collection of information 
regarding it and the creation of shared understandings as what the key problems are 
across a number of stakeholders. The tools using during this phase are risk based 
tools that allow for the collection of knowledge from a number of sources and the 
analysis of this information. 
 
The solution phase 
The key task of the solution phase is to respond to the assessment and decide what 
actions are to be undertaken, how they should be undertaken and by whom. The key 
framing for this phase is innovation. The communication through this phase is based on 
the solutions themselves and creating shared narratives and understandings in relation 
to this so that people are able to act with a common vision. The primary task during this 
phase is to assist the development, diffusion and adoption of the solution. 
 
Key tasks 
Because the risks in climate change are dynamic and constantly changing the process 
needs to be continuous in its nature in that once one task is complete the next task 
starts. Also one the process starts the current task will be informed by the previous 
task. 
 
Task 1: Identification of the problem 
Key questions: 
 What is the problem? 
 Who is affected by this problem? 
 How are they affected by this problem? 
 What is the priority? 
This phase is where information and knowledge is collected from a number of different 
sources to identify the problem. The primary tools used are risk analysis tools and the 
primary communication is the translation of knowledge to assist with the identification 
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and understanding of the problem. This will require tools such as scenarios, different 
types of visual tools such as GIS mapping and 3 D representation of information. 
 
Task 2: Assessment 
Key questions: 
 What is the priority problem? 
 What is the most appropriate action to address this problem? 
 Who should they be responsible for this? 
 How will they be responsible for this? 
 
The assessment phase is central to the process and during the cycle both the problem 
and solution inform what is assessed and the outcomes of the assessment (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1: Problem solution framework presented Department of Justice 2012 
This task happens at two points of the cycle: Firstly when the findings of the problem 
phase are considered and then used to inform the decision as to what the best solution 
option and secondly after the implementation has been completed and the outcome of 
action is assessed. 
 
Once the problem is identified and assessed this is the transition point from the 
problem/ risk focus to a solution/innovation focus.  At the end of the implementation 
task where implementation is assessed the transition back is back to a problem/ risk  
focus. 
   
Task 3: The implementation of actions 
Key questions 
 What are we doing? 
 How is it working? 
 What does this mean for the actions we are undertaking? 
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This is the active stage of the process where innovation based frameworks that are 
designed for uncertain outcomes and the different stages of implementation of new 
ideas and technologies are used. It also requires extensive collaboration between 
stakeholders and also multiple sources of communication that allow for information 
exchange and knowledge development between all the different stakeholders. It also 
requires constant monitoring and evaluation during this process and adjustments may 
be necessary in relation to this. Language used during this time is active and based 
around what the solution is and how it is progressing. 
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